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Abstract 
Right from the time of decolonization, followed by end of cold war, Sub-Sahara Africa has 
enjoyed a relative peace. This is due to continued civil wars that still exist. The preliminary 
research on this topic found that the Sub-Sahara Africa appears to have an abundant supply of 
illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) such as AK-47,  which are supposed to be 
exclusively owned and used by the military, police officers or other security agencies  in the 
region. In Liberia, the emergence of domestic conflicts flared  up by warlords and Warlordism 
during the reign of ex president Charles Taylor that led to the rampant use of SALWs in 
conflict areas. 
 Nonetheless, the threat of illegal supply of SALWs has not been placed under International 
security priorities. In fact, illegal  production, transfer and possession of firearms are 
considered only as criminal activities. This thesis has an important question; to what extent the 
circulation and the illicit proliferation of SALWs have posed a threat to Liberian national 
security? The major assumption is that the illicit proliferation of SALWs in Liberia’s conflict 
areas such as Monrovia, Nimba county, and Mano River basin, threatened not only its national 
but rather regional and continental security because it became a base for nurturing radicalist 
minds like Al-queada. Thus, this research aims firstly to analyse SAWLs proliferations in 
Africa and Liberia and secondly to analyse the capability of the regional states (ECOMOG), 
African Union, international bodies like UN how it responded to those threats. This research 
used quantitative methods by using primary as well as secondary data as major sources of 
references. Primary data gathered were from government official documents as well and some 
scholars on the issue.  
The findings of the research show that the illicit proliferation of SALWs has threatened wide 
range of national security at three levels: individual, societal and state and as well as at 
Continental and International level. Furthermore, this thesis concludes that the Liberia’s 
national legislations on SALWs are insufficient to regulate and control SALWs proliferation. 
Hence, the research suggests that Liberia should accept the assistance offered by the: Regional 
Programmes on SALW, Proper disarmament and rehabilitation, Role of African Union and 
European Union, United Nations Program of Action (UNPoA) to update and develop its 
national legislation on the illicit proliferation of SALWs. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Back Ground of The Study. 
It’s very possible that  some students, lay people  have difficulty differentiating between 
International Studies (IS) and International Relations (IR). IS is a new discipline in the 
field of Political Science and it generally refers to the specific university degrees and 
courses which are concerned with the study of ‘the major political, economic, social, and 
cultural issues that dominate the international agenda’. The term itself can be more 
specifically defined as ‘the contemporary and historical understanding of global societies, 
cultures, languages and systems of government and of the complex relationships between 
them that shape the world we live in
1
 and can encompass all phenomena which are 
globally oriented.  
The terms and concepts of IS and IR are strongly related. However, IR focuses more 
directly on the relationship between countries, non-state entities, and issues relating to 
international identities. The threat of ‘proliferation of small arms and light weapons’ 
(SALW) in Liberia, which is being considered in this work,  quantifies it as one  example 
of an IR issue. 
Most theories of IR are based on the political experiences of Western world. Nevertheless, 
there are numerous examples many students and researchers who have applied different 
theories  in the  study of African politics. The  primary and theoretical view is based on 
realism and liberalism.  
1.2 . Realism 
 Basing on the fact of African findings in International relations, more  is left to be 
searched in order to understand and get clear picture about Sub-Sahara due to its 
complexity. When we speak about Political realism, it is a school of thought that explains 
                                                             
1
 Cfr. www.flinders.edu.au/courses/undergrad/bis, retrieved on, 08.11.2014. 
2 
 
international relations in terms of power. This power extends beyond territorial control 
hence causing insecurity, fear and even conflict in the case of different Political Ideology. 
In fact classic realists like Machiavelli argues that, the supreme value of politics is 
National Liberty, independence, and the principal of responsibility in which the 
government is always obliged to follow and defend its proper interest of its own State and 
therefore to guarantee its survival
2
. Due to different nature of Political ideology, Thomas 
Hobbes backs his argument by underlining the nature of political life as indispensable  and 
to imagine living in a situation of “nature”, before invasion of State Sovereignty , 
circumstance that defines “State of nature”. For him, the nature of the State for human 
beings, is a condition of life extreme, unfavorable, characterized by permanent “State of 
War” (every man against every man).3   As such, powerful States always push their 
ideologies to less powerful that at times end up in conflict through alliance, however, 
Idealism emphasizes international law, morality, and international organizations, rather 
than power alone, as key influences on international events.
4
 
The world from its time of revolution, has seen gradual changes in all spheres. It has been 
ear marked been by insecurity, fear and conflict between groups. According to the theory 
of realism, these features are as a result of the way both individuals and states relate to one 
another in international society. Classical realist like Hans J. Morgenthau attributed these 
problems to the nature of human beings. He bases this on the theory of Thomas Hobbes, 
who said human beings by nature are conflict oriented. Classical realist transfer this human 
quality directly to political system.
5
 
According to realists, there are fundamental aspects of the International system; anarchical, 
conflict and war are rooted in human nature and lastly power being substantive focus of 
realism.
6
 Power is in this sense is defined as the ability to get another actor to do what it 
                                                             
2
 Cfr. Jackson Sorensen, Relazioni Internazionali,  (second,  ed., Maria Weber), Oxford University Press, 
2007,  p.72. 
3
 Cfr. Ibidem., p.74 
4
 Cfr. Nardin,Terry and David R. Mapel, eds. Traditions of International Ethics. Cambridge, 1992; Cfr also: 
Long, David, and Peter Wilson, eds. Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed. 
Oxford, 1995,pp.1-22. 
5
 Cfr. Karin, Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p.21. 
6
 Cfr. Ibidem., p.22. 
3 
 
would not otherwise have done (or not to do what it would have done). A variation on this 
idea is that, actors are powerful to the extent that they affect others more than others affect 
them. These definitions treat power as influence. If actors get their way a lot, they must be 
powerful. However, this definition is limited in the sense that we seldom know what a 
second actor would have done in the absence of the first actor’s power. There is a danger 
of circular logic: power explains influence, and influence measures power. States interact 
within a set of long-established “rules of the game” governing what is considered a state 
and how states treat each other. Together these rules shape the international system.
7
 
Based on this understanding of the driving forces in international politics, we arrive at 
what R. B. J.Walker  refers to as the “inside/outside” perspective of realism.8 Within the 
borders of the state there is peace and order. Social change is primarily related to 
development and progress. It is therefore meaningful to talk about a difference between the 
past and the present. Outside the state that is, between the states there is anarchy, disorder, 
and war.
9
 
1.3. Liberalism  
Like realism, liberalism is not a unitary theory. Nevertheless, we can talk about some basic 
understandings that most liberalists share. The theoretical point of departure for liberalism 
is the individual, and liberalists have a positive view of human nature. Their focus of 
analysis is individuals and various collectivities of individuals, that is, first and foremost 
states but also corporations, organizations, and various kinds of associations. Liberals 
maintain that both cooperation and conflict shape international affairs.
10
 
Essentially, though, liberalists are optimists; they believe that when humans employ reason 
they can arrive at mutually beneficial cooperation. In this way, an end can be put to war. 
As generally used . . . “liberal” and “liberalism” . . . denote in politics, and to some extent 
                                                             
7
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in literature and philosophy, the party which wishes to alter existing institutions with the 
view of increasing popular power. In short, they are not greatly remote in meaning from 
the words “democracy” and“ democratic.11 Duncan Belli in his article to define “what is 
Liberalism”, he points out the Lockean narratives as  reconfigured ideological, other of 
‘totalitarian’ ideologies, left and right.12 
The optimism of this theoretical direction is closely connected with the rise of the modern 
state. Liberalists believe that modernization means progress not only within states, but also 
in international society.
13 Liberal arguments for more cooperative international relations 
can be divided into four different strands: sociological liberalism, interdependence 
liberalism, institutional liberalism, and republican liberalism.14 
1.4.  Realism, liberalism, and the African reality 
IR theories use the Westphalian state as their point of departure. The concept of the 
Westphalian state stems from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty 
Years’ War and introduced the European state system. The newly independent states were 
all given the same legal rights: territory under their sovereign control, the freedom to 
conduct relations and negotiate treaties with foreign powers, and the authority to establish 
whatever form of government they chose. The concept of “State sovereignty” that no one 
is above the state captures these legal rights. It is the Westphalian system that provides the 
terminology used to describe the primary units in international affairs.
15
 
The classical theories also refer extensively to Max Weber’s definition of the modern state, 
which emphasizes three main aspects of the state: its territoriality, its monopoly of the 
means of physical violence, and its legitimacy. Weber argues that if a state lacks monopoly 
of the legitimate use of force within a given territory, anarchy will ensue. We shall see in 
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the following chapters that African states do not depict these classical pictures of what 
a state should be. 
A few years later after the end of Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union, Sub-Sahara 
according some scholars, it became “sense of profound disorder on the continent”.16 This 
can be seen from a number of devastating conflicts notably, those in Liberia, Somalia, and 
Rwanda. 
During the previous decades, international society has sustained these monopoly of the 
regimes as Cold War proxies, protectorates of ex-colonial powers, or both. Clapham 
advances a revised periodization of the postcolonial era by describing the onset of a second 
Cold War in the mid- 1970s in which Africa became more important as an arena of 
International rivalry, as reflected in arms sales that increased significantly for example in 
Liberia.
17
  
The Cold War ended a classic period of Nuclear deterrence and was followed by a number 
of wars in Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa characterized by the 
employment of relatively low-tech weaponry, but with very heavy death tolls. Some of 
these conflicts  were also characterized by great savagery, leading to some commentators 
to suggest that these conflicts were also a novel form of war
18
 and that such war would be 
characteristic of the post Cold War, postmodern world: that the era of industrialized great 
power war had passed.
19
 The principal instrument deployed in this struggle, were 
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diplomacy, economic assistance, ideology, and, more importantly, arms transfer and 
various forms of direct and indirect intervention.
20
 
The end of the Cold War was thought to generate a worldwide optimism for international 
peace and security through negotiations dealing with some of the most stubborn and 
difficult wars of proxy. A shift from the Super Power proxy-wars in the Third World to 
socio-economic development (through liberalization of trade and the embrace of 
democratic values) seemed a viable project. However, events in the last few decades and 
recent years disastrously shattered those expectations, especially in the third world Africa 
in particular. In place of enhanced security, vituperative internal conflict, crimes and gross 
violation of human rights have emerged at an alarming rate.
21
The question is, would the 
fall of Berlin Wall and the rapid dismantling of the communist states in Eastern Europe 
remove the former obstacles to democratic  reform, national and regional reconciliation, 
and continental Africa? 
Karin answers this question, pointing out that there is both pessimism in the analysis and 
prognoses of the question. The optimist expected African states to move toward Western-
style-democratic systems of government. The  pessimists feared that the removal of one set 
of problems for Africa would only make room for another.
22
 We need to bear in mind that 
the geopolitical situation particularly,  affected economic and military aid to most of 
African countries. For economic aid, it meant a substantial decrease. To a large degree, 
African states were now left in a security-political vacuum.
23
 To this dictum, the geo-
colonial impact in Africa touched the pivotal point of the Africans, that is, the land  in 
which most European powers claimed as their possession, either as colonies or 
protectorate, or as in the case of King Leopold of Belgium, as private property in the form 
of the Congo Free State. The distribution arising out of the powers’ scramble for Africa 
was formally recognized by their representatives at the Congress of Berlin, 1884-85. In all 
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of this, Britain, France, Germany, and Portugal paid no regards to enormous differences 
among the different African societies, which ranged from small- scale, self governing, 
hunting-and-gathering bands to large, hierarchical political systems, as in empires of Mali, 
Ghana, and Songhay in West Africa. People with diverse cultures, religions, languages, 
and political systems who had previously lived alongside one another, sometimes 
peacefully and sometimes in violent conflict, but without formal boundaries, were now 
pulled together into entirely artificially created ‘nation’- states.24  
By the end of Cold War, there was a general perception that the security was closely 
related to states and the sovereignty of states. In fact, ever since Machiavelli, Hobbes, and 
Rousseau introduced their classical works, security had been referred to as “security of 
states”, with military apparatus playing the most important role in its maintenance. 
Security was traditionally considered to be synonymous with military security because 
most challenges to a state’s integrity seemed to come from external violence.25 
The beginning of 1990s would inaugurate a new world order if wars were not vindicated. 
The number and overall cruelty of conflicts, as measured by battle deaths, decreased 
overall, but it was instead earmarked by violent breakdown of civil society, the socialist 
states of the former Soviet bloc to Africa, together with outbreak of ethnic, religious, 
racial, linguistic and other  forms of communal strife. With the collapse of Soviet Bloc and 
the consequent blow to the status of state socialism, liberal democracy and the market 
economy became dominant paradigms for social change and foreign assistance. This was 
particularly challenging as it was combined with the melting away of social norms and 
government structures that would otherwise contain the violence. The surface 
manifestations seemed chaotic, with military factions mobilized along clan, tribal, or ethnic 
lines, fighting for no political agenda apart from capturing the state. With the end of the  
globalised struggle between communism and capitalism, analyst struggled to understand 
the nature of these and other conflicts in the developing world. The explanation focused 
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variously on ethnicity and tribalism, the structure of resources, , poor governance, 
democratization, and state failure.  But this was a clear sign of state fragility, state failure, 
or state collapse. These terms at times are always used interchangeably.
26
  
But according to Zartman, citing Monika Francois and Inder Sud, “failed state is one that 
has few or no functioning state institutions that can offer identity and assure security to the 
population. In the process, the government loses its legitimacy, both nationally and 
Internationally.”27 While according to U.S- government- commissioned State Failure Task 
Force, it links state failure to a widespread of internal conflict of various kinds. The report 
lists revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and 
politicizes as the most important kinds of conflict that further destabilizes an already weak 
regime.
28
 
On the other hand Robert Jackson distinguishes the two terms; the “collapse state”-the 
international system is not easily capable of bringing the state back, “failed state” defined 
by the shrinking into virtual irrelevance of the state’s institution apparatus and its 
incapacity to assure the general welfare or protect the security of the citizenry.
29
 According 
to  Zartman, collapsed state refers to a situation where structure, authority (legitimate 
power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, 
old or new.
30
 He further indicates that the state collapse in Africa occurred in two waves: 
one came towards the end of the second decade of independence from a factional civil war 
among the guerrilla victors over the previous regime, and the second round came another 
decade later and continues to extend into the 1990s and into new cases.
31
 He indicates that 
many countries in the developing world have de jure status, that is, they are formally 
recognized in their international systems as states, but lack de facto statehood, that is, the 
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capacity to perform basic functions associated with modern state, above all providing 
security and basic services for development, as a result, they become ‘quasi-states.’32 
Citing Zartman, “Posing the problem of  state collapse”, Nellier in 1993 characterized half 
the African states as being in serious or maximum danger of collapse, if not already gone. 
He argues that the condition is not different from the earlier cases: the authoritarian 
successors of nationalist generation were overthrown by a new  successor regime that can 
destroy but not to replace, and government functioning and legitimacy has receded.   In 
this process, coinciding with Huntington’s third wave of democratization as well as with 
ambitious philosophical mind like Robert Kaplan’s vision of ‘the coming anarchy’ and the 
decline of global civilization.
33
 “The coming anarchy”, he writes that “crime is what makes 
West Africa a natural point of departure for my report on what political character of our 
planet is likely to be in the twenty-first century.”34  Kaplan further adds that “West Africa 
is becoming the  symbol of a worldwide demographic, environmental and social stress, in 
which criminal anarchy is becoming a real strategic danger. Disease, overpopulation, 
unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of 
nation-state and international borders, and empowerment of private armies and security 
firms and international drug cartels are demonstrated through a West Africa prism.
35
  
To Zartman, the concept of state collapse is a situation where the state can no longer 
perform the functions required for them to pass as states. A state is the authoritative 
political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory.
36
 This definition focuses 
on three functions: the state as the sovereign authority, the state as the security guarantor 
for a populated territory, and lastly it becomes difficult to establish an absolute threshold of 
collapse.
37
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The collapse of the state means that the basic functions like laws are not made, order is not 
preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced.
38
 As the authoritative political institution, 
it has lost its legitimacy.
39
 As a system of socioeconomic organization, its functional 
balance of inputs and out puts no longer function with either traditional nor charismatic nor 
institutional sources of legitimacy.
40
 As we shall see in the following chapter a state 
collapse in Liberia, the government retracted and the countryside was left on its own, 
organizing its own life, for or against the rebellion or the remnant state. This will be clearly 
evidenced with so many ethnic- cleansing in the countryside by different tribes. 
The state collapsed is also marked by the loss of control over political and economic space 
just like it happened in Liberia. The informal economy took over, overshadowing the 
formal economy in its transactions and escaping the control of the state.
41
 Thus, 
paradoxically, as the Cold War was being won, a ‘decline of the West’ was being 
foreshadowed in new forms of violent horrors and terrorism, indicating that the basic 
Western ‘values’ could no longer be relied upon as a foundation for universalist 
consensus.
42
 Televisions images at the time in Liberia seemed to confirm the return of the 
repressed of atavistic forms of witchcraft, cannibalism and barbarism, enhanced by the use 
of globalised synthetic drugs, rock music and Rambo videos-apocalyptic visions of ‘a 
rundown, crowded planet of skinhead Cossacks and juju warriors, influenced by the worst 
refuse of western pop culture and ancient tribal hatreds, and battling over scraps of 
overused earth in guerilla conflicts that ripple across continents and interest in no 
discernible pattern.
43
   
In Africa, the very nature of violence was transformed from traditional combat between 
nation-states to inter-communal conflict within states involving wide variety of factors, 
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including governments, rebel movements, armed political militias, ethnic and religious 
groups, tribes and clans, expatriate and Diaspora groups, criminal gangs and mercenaries.
44
 
William Reno has urged , the ‘criminalization of the state’ in Africa need not to be a 
symptom of its collapse, but could indicate rather a consolidation and expansion of 
resources, a process not dissimilar to the ways in which wars, piracy and gangsterism 
contributed to state building in early modern Europe.
45
 Thus, ‘the crisis of very weak states 
may eventually favor the growth of internal order and promote their insertion in the global 
economy and political activities that are more acceptable in the international system of 
states’.46 
In recent years, attention has come to focus on the ways in which the increased availability 
of low-cost SALW contributes to the likelihood, intensity and duration of armed conflict. 
Although these conflicts often possess deep and complex roots, it is evident that the 
widespread availability of modern light weapons has emboldened belligerents to pursue 
their objectives on the battlefield, rather than at the bargaining table. 
An analysis of contemporary warfare also reveals that such conflict overwhelmingly takes 
place in the world's poorest countries. In the 1990s, thirty of the sixty least-developed 
countries in the world had experienced conflict directly, while another twelve had to 
support large refugee populations from neighboring countries in conflict.
47
 We shall 
discuss more on this in another chapter as regards the consequences of illicit Proliferation 
of SALW in Liberia. 
In addition to those issues mentioned, Jackman attributed three other reasons for conflicts 
in Sub-Sahara; social mobilization or modernizations, cultural pluralism and Political 
factors (for example political party systems and mass participation). According to him, 
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both social mobilization and the presence of a dominant ethnic group and destabilizing 
consequences for the newly established states in sub- Sahara in Africa. He also argued that 
a multiplicity of political parties can be destabilizing, whereas single party dominance has 
had a stabilizing effect on post-independence governments.
48
 In fact, Adedeji  points out 
that the real reason for the security crisis is Africa’s political crisis “civil wars and civil 
strife exist because of violent reactions to the pervasive lack of democracy, the denial of 
human rights, the complete disregard of the sovereignty of the people, the lack of 
empowerment of the people, lack of accountability and generally poor and bad 
governance.”49 
However, the common distinguishing characteristics  of intra-state conflict include 
multiple warring parties, blurred lines of conflict, greater involvement of civilians, and the 
fact that the conflict itself is not fought on traditional battlegrounds within society itself. 
There is also irregular and paramilitary forces. Too often, the vulnerable like children and 
teenagers  are recruited or forced into these organizations and then made to kill, loot and 
rampage.
50
 
The scale of these homegrown challenges like proliferation of armed groups, poor 
stockpile management,
51
 corruption,
52
 and the recirculation of existing stocks on the 
continent stem from domestic problems that African governments and policy makers face. 
African governments, rather than international actors, are often the primary source of arms 
and ammunition for these and other groups. While some groups receive support from 
foreign governments (many on the continent) or from private interests or companies from 
outside the continent, most seem to have obtained their weapons locally.
53
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The widespread of death and suffering resulting not from the major conventional weapons 
traditionally associated with war tanks, aircraft and warships, but rather from SALW. Of 
the forty nine  major conflicts that have broken out since 1990, light weapons were the 
only arms used in forty six, whereas only one conflict (the 1991 Gulf War) was dominated 
by heavy weapons.
54
  
Taya Weiss explain that SALW now goes beyond superpowers’ use of conventional 
weapons to include guns that are easily held and operated by even the smallest child 
soldier (the AK -47 automatic rifle weighs about 4.5kg and has only nine moving parts).
55
 
Some estimates place a number of SALW in circulation at more than six hundred millions, 
enough for one in every ten people on earth.
56
 According to Small Arms Survey (SAS)
57
 
2002, recent studies of battlefields statistics indicate that people wounded in combat by 
small caliber ammunition frequently rises above 70 percent.
58
 In the last decade, however, 
this number has tripled due to the increase in conflicts and wars such as in Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan among others. 
The possession of SALW explains why there were several insurgencies in Liberia  in the 
aftermath of cold war. After the death of Gen. Samuel Kanyon Doe, who had been elected 
president in 1985, he was deposed and killed as rival rebel groups struggled with 
government forces for control. The ECOWAS, which had sent peacekeeping force to 
Liberia in August 1990, backed the nomination of Amos Sawyer as Interim President, and 
in January 1991, an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was appointed. Civil 
war continued, however, in July 1993 a UN-sponsored peace agreement was signed by the 
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IGNU, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)under the leadership of Charles 
Taylor and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) headed 
by Alhaji Kromah.  It provided for a ceasefire, the encampment of troops and the 
formation of a transitional civilian administration.
59
 But many Liberians and International 
observers believed that ULIMO was being supported by ECOMOG and that it forces, 
rather than being demobilized, were, in fact, being integrated into ECOMOG. According to 
the NPLF, ECOMOG was no longer neutral force.
60
 
Throughout 1995 and 1996, intensive multi -sided fighting continued between and among 
the NPLF, ECOMOG, ULIMO, the LPC (Liberian Peace Council), a breakaway ULIMO 
faction, and the remaining elements of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Clashes 
between the ULIMO breakaway faction known as ULIMO-J, because of its leader 
Roosevelt Johnson and ECOMOG in the west of the country in December 1995 and 
January 1996 left 16 peacekeepers dead and saw the capture of 130 more, all of whom 
were Nigerians with rumors that it was due the effect of an agreement reached between 
Nigerian strong man Sani Abacha and Taylor made during a secret trip the latter took in 
Nigerian capital Abuja in mid-1995.
61
 
By this time, ECOMOG forces had been augmented to some 12,000, versus an estimated 
60,000 rebel fighters in the various factions. While the latter and especially the NPLF, 
controlled most of the interior of the country, ECOMOG was largely isolated around the 
capital and in the various ports.
62
 
By mid 2003, however, rebel forces of the Liberians Democracy  under the leadership of 
Sekou Damante Konneh (LURD)
63
 and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
(MODEL)
64
 had closed in on Monrovia (city named after President James Monroe US, 
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president, 1817-1824) and the President who had been indicted of war crime by UN 
prosecutors in Sierra Leone came under intense international pressure to agree to resign.
65
  
We shall look at detail in the second chapter. 
Other parties in Liberia includes; The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(INPFL) by Prince Johnson.
66
 All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP) under the leadership 
of Lusinee Kamara, Equal Right Party (ERP)- this was a signatory to the peace agreement 
signed in August 2003, Freed Democratic Party (FDPL) by Sarh Ciaph Gbollie, Labour 
Party (LP)- Rev. R. Reuben, Liberia National Union (LINU)-Jonathan K. Weedor, 
Liberian Part Action (LPA)- Gyude Bryant, Liberian Peole’s Party (LPP)- Togba-Nah 
Tipoteh, Liberian Unification Party (LUP)- Joseph Merchant, National Democratic Part of 
Liberia (NDPL)- Isaac Dakinah, National Reforamtion Party (NRP)- Martin Sherif,  New 
Democratic Alternative for Liberia, People’s Democratic Part of Liberia (PDPL), People’s 
Progressive Party (PPP), Reformation Alliance Party, (RAP), True Wing Party (TWP), 
United People’s Party (UPP), Unity Party (UP).67 
Rapid globalization
68
 may have united the world around certain shared values, but in weak 
states,
69
 it has also ruthlessly exposed the inadequacies of governance and catalyzed the 
violent empowerment of non-state actors  like warlords, terrorists, private military 
entrepreneurs. We live in an era when state and non-state alike are guaranteed speedy and 
often indiscriminate access to lethal technologies, including  night-vision equipment, 
satellite communication gadgets, and rocket- propelled grenades. Africa  becomes the 
destination of choice for much of this deadly merchandise, Liberia falls a victim of this.  
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The local warlords are the major principal actors in illegitimate resource appropriation is 
the major cause of ongoing asymmetric warfare
70
 in Africa and the proliferation of 
weapons and provocative elements in these wars.
71
 That is why the private army units of 
Liberian leader Charles Taylor, Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels 
were at heart of the diamonds-for-guns operations that illegally exploited Sierra Leone’s 
diamond, a portion of which were bartered for sophisticated  weaponry to fuel the decade-
long civil war.
72
  
Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and by extension Còte  d’Ivoire are located in the so called 
Mano River Basin that has an attractive market place for illicit weapons trade.
73
 The region 
has rich natural resources of diamonds, rubber, and timber, which are used for purchasing 
the weapons utilized in insurgencies and wars. Experts have estimated that during the civil 
war in Liberia, 350 millions of dollars worth diamonds were spent every year to fuel the 
war.
74
 These SALW surfaced on the global policy-making radar recently as 2001.
75
 
1.5. Statement of the Problem 
The problem of Proliferation of SALW in Liberia intensified  greatly between 1989-2003. 
This was during the reign of ex- president Charles Taylor. Through many relations all over 
the world including West Africa, the Middle East and the United States, Charles Taylor 
controlled Liberia for several years. Prior to his Presidential election, the NPFL controlled 
many industries within Liberia and the diamond mines in Sierra Leone. Once in power, 
Taylor maintained power over the natural resources, increasing his influence and wealth. 
This made Liberia to become more chaotic as well as criminalized State in Political 
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scenario hence becoming a shadow state according to William Reno. Nikki Funke and 
Hussein Solomon in authoring their article ‘on William Reno’s conception of the African 
State as a “Shadow State”.   
Quoting Reno, “Shadow State rulers manipulate external actors  access to both formal and 
clandestine markets, by relying on the global recognition of sovereignty, and are thereby 
able to undermine formal government institutions. This is often if not always  to their 
benefit especially as such institutions may acquire interests and powers at odds with the 
rulers’ efforts to retain power. Another way in which rulers undermine formal government 
institutions is by way of weakening bureaucratic structures and manipulating markets in 
order to “enrich themselves and control others”. Thus Shadow States or “informal 
commercially orientated networks” are created that operate alongside remaining 
government bureaucracies.”76 
To many Liberians, life became unbreakable that somehow ‘jungle law’ was applied 
“survival for the fittest”. This situation was punctuated by  purchasing and smuggling of  
SALW in order to meet demands. This became modus agendi in the  Republic of Liberia 
(meaning ‘Land of the Free’), which gained its independence from ‘The American 
Colonization Society’ (ACS) on 26 July 1847, became later a theatre of War during early 
‘90s. This did not affect only Liberians, but its neighbors as well77 more specifically Sierra 
Leone. 
The multiplication of armed militias, the scale of the atrocities by all sides, the exploitation 
of child soldiers, the ideological void surrounding the fighting, the instrumentalization of 
high -value resources to finance insurgency, and the high degree of external involvement in 
efforts to halt the combat all foreshadow patterns that shaped subsequent internal wars.
78
  
The striking parallels between the two polities, and the broad similar chronologies of 
conflict, reinforce the invitation to paired analysis. Both countries grew out of externally 
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sponsored resettlements of free slaves, Freetown (1787) and Monrovia (1822).
79
 The 
cultural groupings that emerged from this origin, creoles in Sierra Leone and Americo -
Liberians in Liberia, were distinct from the vastly more numerous hinterland populations 
in their Victorian synthesis of European and African social practices and their habits of 
entitlement.
80
  
Attempts to explain these wars commonly underlines the problem of state recession, 
combined with the emergency of Warlords and Warlordism.  The question is why do 
movements that began as social albeit violent-rebellion against an authoritarian and deeply 
corrupted state end up as a perverted mirror-image of the state they originally set out to 
destroy? 
According to Morten, rebel (case in Liberia) groups forsake political agendas to become 
profit-seeking, market-based entities may best be understood using a dual analysis: 
contextualization of insurgency in regard the pre-conflict levels of structural and actual 
level in the society. The other analysis being that ‘just because these guerillas act within 
local, social, economic and historical contexts does not mean that their trajectories are 
entirely unique’.81 
The problem of illicit production, Sales, distribution and trafficking of SALW became a 
total threat to human welfare and dignity in many parts of the country and across the 
border. Ranging from distortion in National economy due to violence, terrorism and 
assassination, to corruption of public officials, especially, the law enforcement agents who 
were faithful to Charles Taylor. 
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Despite the ECOWAS moratorium, armed crimes, violence and conflicts remain a reality 
across West African borders and coasts. Instead of providing a Framework for responses, 
the moratorium appears to have remained as expression of intent.
82
 
That is why this research paper is going to centre on  “The proliferation and SALW in 
Liberia after the Cold War”. It’s on this back ground that we shall reflect together on the 
following: 
 What are some of the factors that fuelled up the proliferation of SALW in 
Liberia after the Cold war ( from 1989-2003)? 
 What are the underlying factors that increased Insecurity in Liberia? 
 What role did International, Regional, National organization play in 
averting Proliferation of SALW?  
 Was it really impossible to control or put strict and respected measure to 
minimize proliferation of SALW, what were the loopholes in case it 
existed?, was there any strategic thinking above all? 
1.6. Objectives of the Study 
In general terms, the study seeks to explain in a comprehensive manner, the link between 
SALW proliferation and Politics , the social, economic,  and consequences for the security 
and stability of Liberia. 
 We shall therefore attempt to Identify and explain the roles of small arms and light 
weapons in the escalation in Liberia civil war. We shall explain as well the 
difference between Small Arms and Light weapons according to UN definition of 
1997. 
 Examine the role of states, sub-regional and International Organizations in efforts 
to control the proliferation of these “little arms” and “mobile weapons” 
 Examine the possible causes of the proliferation and why it is considered as a 
Human Security threat 
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 Examine the effectiveness of the ECOWAS Moratorium (in details)  and other 
organization in trying to address the  proliferation small arms and light weapons. 
 Contribute to existing policy frame works for the management of small arms and 
light weapons. 
 1.7. Research Methodology and Considerations 
The study shall rely quantitative research that will help us to  confirm our hypotheses on 
both primary and  secondary sources; State Documents, journals, books, newspaper, 
Internet, films  and other academic publications, not forgetting documents from UNDP, 
UNICEF, UNHCR and technical reports by International governmental and Non-
governmental Organizations. I have chosen Liberia among all other West African states. 
Shall we call it case study? Yes! This is because case study has a distinct advantage when, 
“a, “how” or why”. These are  Questions that are being asked about a contemporary set-off 
events over which the investigator  has little or no control.”83  
According to Yin’s technical definition,  “case study is an empirical inquiry, that 
investigates a contemporary  phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident.”84 This 
research is not seeking to find any general truths. There might arise the question about 
internal validity
85
 of the findings. 
1.8. Research Hypothesis 
A hypothesis is an idea or explanation for something that is based on known facts but 
which has not yet been proved. The more explicit and focused a research is, the easier it is 
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to develop a hypothesis from it. A hypothesis formulates a relation, which then will be 
tested empirically.
86
 It is therefore prudent to concentrate on the following: 
 the conflict(s) in Liberia was not caused only by Proliferation of SALW but also 
bad and poor governance along other factors. 
 The proliferation of SALW is partly due to poor management  of governments to 
regulate the inflow of illegal arms, which may either be due to corruption or 
negligence, as well as International and the ECOWAS treaty on free movement of 
people, goods and services 
 Personal interest of neighboring State leaders to amass wealth. 
 Poor regional Laws and violation of territorial sovereignty. 
 Common interest of States and non-state actors.              
 1.9. Scope of The Study 
Although Liberia as a country was well know for peace and democracy, almost the 
structure of America in its Political setting, considering that its National Constitution was 
drafted in Washington, but after the cold war precisely from 1989-2003,  Liberia became 
weak state hence  dilemma of insecurity  or what Jackson may term it as “quasi-states.”87 
This is evidenced by  Taylor’s domestic and foreign policy. It’s of no doubt that during this 
period, the stockpiles of SALW both at local and International got more market in Liberia.        
 2.1. Significance of The Study 
The work is also momentous as it seeks to shed light on threat of illicit Proliferation of 
SALW in Liberia being as a weak State with its related problems and globalization forces. 
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2.2. Limitations to The Study 
Not being a Liberian, does not mean not seeking to know about Liberia, but as student of 
International Relation in the department of International studies, and as an African, am 
obliged to make research about it. We may call it “epistemological quest”- Epistemology 
(from Greek-ἐπιστήμη, episteme/knowledge, understanding/λόγος, logos/study of ...).88  
The worrying situation of endless Wars and Conflicts in Africa, has motivated me a lot to 
seek, understand, and to know why the conflicts are continuous. Of course many 
Europeans would explain in two words “we are ignorant and stupid” that is why we have 
endless Wars and conflicts. I chose to make my research on Liberia, the famous country 
that I use to hear about from my childhood. It’s obvious that  this will limit my research. 
Due to the nature of the topic and the current outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, time limit, 
financial constraints explains why I will not be able to meet the major actors of 
proliferation of SALW in Liberia or those in Prison like ex president Charles Taylor, and 
Victor Bout. 
Yet other limited factors like reliability, sources and data collection can’t be ignored of the 
sensitivity of the Topic  due to methodology being applied. We are aware of understanding 
of such events (methodology) that depends critically on more self-conscious about what 
observers bring to analysis. What each analyst sees, thinks and judges to be important is 
not only function of the evidence about what happened. But also of the “conceptual lenses” 
through which he/she looks at the evidence.”89 
Yin mentions six main sources of evidence one can use in a case study. Which we shall 
consider some of them in this research paper. For example just to mention; documentation 
and archival records. This is because they are stable, unobtrusive, and exact and they have 
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broader coverage. Their weaknesses are that they may have irretrievability, authors may 
have been biased and access can be a problem.
90
  
To study African affairs is different from studying European affairs. Yin mentions, official 
documents are scarce and difficult to find. The content of the those that can be found is so 
limited to help researchers, in part because one cannot place trust in them. Pragmatism is 
commonly used in Politics and especially in African Politics. This has lead to several 
situations where state leaders and major key players have signed documents which is 
contradictory with the goals. I hope not to be misinterpreted about irrationality of African 
political players, rather, African politics in which it involves a different kind of rationality 
and approach  with different priorities than those which appear to be modern and classical.  
In western and state-centric IR theory, Policies, Protocols, Charters and Treaties are often 
sacrificed on behalf of the pragmatism or they are formulated order to reach a specific goal 
through what we may call alliance. This can be seen in light of what Joakim Bakke  in his 
thesis about “Regionalism Approach?”91 referred to as “summit-diplomacy” and also there 
many different identities of African leaders.
92
 Coupled to this, we also have to consider the 
ex-colonial master’s way of thinking and doing or the so called ‘pros and cons’ which 
influences most of African leaders in their roles in the service of the State. 
Yin also presents the three principals of data collection. The first one is use of multiple 
sources of evidence.
93
 This relies mainly on documentation. Of course this is time saving 
compared to field work research or other sources. The aim of using these two, is that the 
aim of using multiple sources is data triangulation, this is in order for the case study to be 
more convincing and accurate. The reason for not using other four which is direct 
observation, participant-observation, interviews and physical artefacts is already explained 
above.  
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But am convinced and sure that, the number of sources from various actors will hopefully 
ensure satisfactory triangulation and better reliability of this research. Quoting Sorensen, “I 
do not believe that I will increase the validity of my study by using multiple sources as part 
of the same study, but I do believe it will increase the reliability”94. 
However, I may not give an excuse of poor research work that may contradict the 
methodology, but,  it will be a challenge to get the whole truth and picture of the topic. The 
reason being most of Africans and European leaders through their organization 
documentation may not give the real and true information because of the interests. Often 
one actor can have contradictory goals and hidden agenda.  
Basically in my opinion I keep wandering where were the International, Regional 
organization to avert  what happened in Liberia?  why did they wait for all that to happen 
in Liberia? Can African leaders and their Western allies explain the atrocities in Liberia by 
only forming up ICC for Taylor?  Will they give correct information? It depends! 
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CHAPTER TWO 
1.0.  Literature Review Of Liberia 
1.1.  Map of West Africa
95
. 
 
1.2. Geography and Peoples
96
 
Liberia is located on the Atlantic coast in West Africa and encompasses a territory of 
43,000 square miles.
97
 The country shares borders with Sierra Leone to the northwest, 
Guinea to the north, and Côte d’Ivoire to the east. The country is rich in natural resources 
including iron ore, timber, diamonds, and gold, and provides a favorable environment for 
growing rubber trees.
98
 Liberia is divided into 15 counties whose territories correspond in 
some measure to territories claimed by particular Liberian ethnic groups.
99
 English is the 
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official language of Liberia, although more than twenty indigenous languages and a form 
of English known as Liberian English are also widely used.
100
 
Although Liberia is a small country, it has an ethnically diverse population. Ethnicity in 
Liberia, sometimes  referred to as tribal identity, is a complex and often artificial notion
101
 
just as it is in other parts of Africa and the world.
102
 At least 95 percent of the population is 
of indigenous African origin.
103
  A defining feature of Liberia’s recent social, cultural, and 
political history is that a small proportion, less than 5 percent, of its population consists of 
descendants of repatriated Africans, including freed slaves from the Americans and the 
Caribbean, free-born African-Americans, and Africans captured from slave ships on the 
high seas.
104
 
This latter group, also known as Americo-Liberians, settlers, or Congo
105
 forms one of the 
seventeen generally recognized socio-cultural groups in Liberia.
106
 The other sixteen 
groups include indigenous Africans based on cultural and linguistic similarities, 
specifically the Gbandi, Bassa, Gio, Dei, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Kru, Kuwaa (Belle), 
Loma, Ma(Mano), Mandingo, Mende, Vai, and Krahn
107
. According to Liberian historians, 
“intermarriage, modern education and westernized Christianity, Islam and other foreign 
influences have blurred some of the distinctions” between these socio-cultural groups.108 
These indigenous groups arrived in Liberia in waves beginning in 6000 B.C.E. and have 
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cross border ties with similar ethnic communities in other West African countries.
109
 The 
last group to arrive was the Americo-Liberian settlers in the nineteenth century.
110
 Liberia 
also has a significant Lebanese community. People of Lebanese descent, and all other 
people of non-African descent, are not permitted to hold Liberian citizenship even if born 
in Liberia.
111
 
After the struggle for liberty in the American Revolution, freed and enslaved African 
Americans faced continued hardship and inequality. A number of white Americans, for a 
variety of reasons, joined them in their efforts to resolve this complex problem. One 
possible solution (advocated at a time when the assimilation of free blacks into American 
society seemed out of the question) was the complete separation of white and black 
Americans. Some voices called for the return of African- Americans to the land of their 
forebears.
112
 The transition from a slave-based economy to a capitalist one, created a 
massive pool of unemployed Black people, and this frightened the American ruling 
class.
113
 The fear was precipitated by the perception that such a reservoir of unemployed 
Black people could occasion cause serious social-cultural, economic and political problems 
that could adversely affect the interests of the ruling class.
114
 
1.3. Black Colonization 
Hamstrung by the United States’ weak position in the global division of power, as well as 
the imperatives of the country’s policy of isolationism, the U.S. government, the 
bureaucratic wing of the ruling class, outsourced the repatriation project to the ACS.
115
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In1815, African-American Quaker and maritime entrepreneur Paul Cuffee (or Cuffe) 
financed and captained a successful voyage to Sierra Leone where he helped a small group 
of African-American immigrants establish themselves. Cuffee believed that African 
Americans could more easily "rise to be a people" in Africa than in America with its 
system of slavery and its legislated limits on black freedom. Cuffee also envisioned a black 
trade network organized by Westernized blacks who would return to Africa to develop its 
resources while educating its people in the skills they had gained during captivity. Cuffee 
died in 1817 without fully realizing his dream. In the same year of his death, The American 
Colonization Society was established.
116
 
1.3.1 The American colonization society 
The ACS  was established in 1817 in Liberia as a free place for freed slaves to call it their 
home. This idea was brought upon by upper class white citizens who weren't ready to view 
the freed blacks equal rights to whites. This movement was mostly supported by southern 
plantation owners who saw them as a threat in the United States. In 1819, the  Congress 
approved $100,000 to return the illegally brought Africans back to Africa. However, some 
of the blacks didn't consider themselves African because they were born in United States 
and African was only their heritage. In 1821, the U.S. Navy purchased this land called 
Liberia for the placement of the freed blacks from the United States. Up until 1840 when 
the American Colonization Society declined more than 11,000 blacks were placed in 
Liberia. However, the United States took responsibility for Liberia until 1912. ("American 
Colonization Society") 
The partial success of Paul Cuffee's African venture encouraged white proponents of 
colonization to form an organization to repatriate those free African Americans who would 
volunteer to settle in Africa. Prominent Americans such as Henry Clay, John Randolph of 
Roanoke, and Justice Bushrod Washington were members of ACS during its early years. 
Many freed African-Americans, however, including those who had supported Paul 
Cuffee's efforts, were wary of this new organization. They were concerned, that it was 
dominated by Southerners and slave holders and that it excluded blacks from membership. 
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Most free African-Americans wanted to stay in the land they had helped to build. They 
planned to continue the struggle for equality and justice in the new nation.
117
 
1.4. From Colony to Republic 
In 1820, The American Colonization Society sent its first group of immigrants to Sherbro 
Island in Sierra Leone. The island's swampy, unhealthy conditions resulted in a high death 
rate among the settlers as well as the society's representatives. The British governor 
allowed the immigrants to relocate to a safer area temporarily while the ACS worked to 
save its colonization project from complete disaster.
118
 
 In 1821, ACS dispatched a representative, Dr. Eli Ayres, to purchase land farther north up 
the coast from Sierra Leone. With the aid of a U.S. naval officer, Lieutenant Robert F. 
Stockton, Ayres cruised the coastal waters west of Grand Bassa seeking out appropriate 
lands for the colony. Stockton took charge of the negotiations with leaders of the Dey and 
Bassa peoples who lived in the area of Cape Mesurado. At first, the local leaders were 
reluctant to surrender their peoples' land to the strangers, but were forcefully persuaded  
some accounts say at gun-point to part with a "36 mile long and 3 mile wide" strip of 
coastal land for trade goods, supplies, weapons, and rum worth approximately $300.
119
 
Believing that the colonial agent had allocated town plots and rationed provisions unfairly, 
a few of the settlers armed themselves and forced the society's representative to flee the 
colony. The disagreements were resolved temporarily when an ACS representative came to 
investigate the colony's problems and persuaded Ashmun to return. Steps were initiated to 
spell out a system of local administration and to codify the laws. This resulted, a year later, 
in the Constitution, Government, and Digest of the Laws of Liberia. In this document, 
sovereign power continued to rest with the ACS's agent but the colony was to operate 
under Common Law. Slavery and participation in the slave trade were forbidden. The 
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settlement that had been called Christopolis was renamed Monrovia
120
, in the Grain Coast 
(now Liberia). With economic and military support from the U.S. government, the ACS 
embarked upon the quest for territory for the establishment of a colony.
121
 
Functionally and operationally, the ACS became a quasi-colonial power, because it 
undertook the search for territory in Africa where it could establish a colony under  its 
control. This was a calculated dumping ground for the negated African now freed. This 
was because the freed African, as we have discussed, were viewed as threats to White 
hegemony in the United States.
122
 
1.5. Early Liberia 
Once the free blacks, called Americo-Liberians, got to Liberia they modeled their 
Constitution in 1847. While living in Liberia, the Americo-Liberians oppressed the native 
Liberians as they had been oppressed in the U.S. This created tension between the two 
groups. For almost a century and a half the Americo- Liberians, who made up 5 percent  of 
the population, controlled the government and gave few rights to the native Liberians. This 
created the beginnings for a civil war.
123
 Initially, these indigenous ethnic groups were 
receptive to the repatriates, whom they saw as their lost kin, who had returned home, after 
years of enslavement in the United States.
124
 Unfortunately, conditioned by what Brown 
calls a “slave psychology,”125 the repatriates were not interested in joining with their 
brothers and sisters to build a democratic and prosperous state. Instead, consumed by a 
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false sense of superiority,
126
 the repatriates perceived themselves to be better than the 
indigenes.
127
 
Accordingly, the repatriates believed that theirs was a “Christianizing and civilizing 
mission” designed to transform the indigenes into American styled Christians and 
Westerners. To use the Huntingtonian  parlance, “the resultant clash of civilizations”128 led 
to conflicts and wars between the repatriates and the various ethnic groups. However, with 
American military support, the ACS was able to establish a colony in Liberia under its 
suzerainty.
129
 Subsequently, the light-skinned repatriates, to whom the ACS had ceded 
some degree of autonomy in 1839, declared Liberian an independent and sovereign state in 
1847.
130
 
Interestingly, once the Liberian colony was established, the United States assumed a 
nonchalant attitude. Two major reasons accounted for this. The establishment of the 
Liberian colony signified the conclusion of the repatriation project, and the overarching 
achievement of the central objective of the American ruling class to rid the United States 
of an excess pool of freed Black people. The other reason was that Liberia did not have an 
economic and/or strategic value to the United States at that time. Such an approach is a 
characteristic of American foreign policy, because economic and strategic resources are 
more important than humanitarian concerns. This will explain also why in the first civil 
war, US was aloof despite of humanitarian  atrocities that occurred in Liberia. 
It is not surprising that after the 1884 at Berlin Conference, Europeans nations, after 
dividing up the entire patchwork quilt map of Africa among themselves like a ‘piece of 
cake’, where thereafter were forced to exert control over their new possession’s vast 
perimeters. More often than not,  these  formed the boundaries of economically 
uninteresting and ethnically illogical subdivisions of ancient Africa, but nevertheless it 
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became inviolable territorial touchlines, the defense  of which was essential to anchor the 
commercially  lucrative at coastal outposts which were original reasons for the Europeans’ 
presence on the continent.
131
 
However, by 1862, there was a shift in the United States’ attitude toward Liberia: the 
United States recognized the independence of Liberia, and began to take renewed interests 
in the country. The policy shift was propelled by the exigencies of America’s economic 
interests. American policy-makers received new information that Liberia was rich in 
minerals, such as gold that was pivotal to America’s industrial development. About four 
decades later, Liberia’s economic value to the United States was confirmed with the 
discovery of gold. Accordingly, various American companies flocked to Liberia and got 
involved in the mining of gold and the resultant private accumulation of capital through 
profit-making. However, no effort was made to industrialize Liberia. This was because the 
United States wanted Liberia to be a supplier of raw materials. On the other hand, being 
industrialized would have made Liberia a competitor to the United States and other 
developed capitalist states.
132
 
In the nineteenth century, colonial case and the governments of the early Liberian 
Republic, where the resources required for the administration of a territory were 
unavailable and the challenge of maintaining control in the absence of infrastructure was 
great, the resort to violence as means of control may have been the only option available 
from the point of view of the ruling authority thus, requiring arms for settlement since 
there was no culture for  peace.
133
 This is because among other factors during World War 
II, the United States continued the process of transforming Liberia into a neo-colony.
134
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According Nkwame Nkrumah, neo-colonial states are nominally independent and 
sovereign. This is because they have all of the outward trappings of international 
sovereignty. However, in reality, their economic systems and thus their political policies 
are directed from the outside.
135
 This then has the net effect of the neo-colony doing the 
biddings of its imperial patron. For example, the U.S. constructed an airport and a deep 
water port on Liberian soil to help advance its war efforts. Thereafter(beginning in 1945 to 
1989), the U.S. took other steps, including the support for various authoritarian regimes, 
the continual use of Liberia to advance American strategic interests, especially during the 
Cold War and as an investment haven for American multinational corporations and other 
businesses.
136
 
1.6 Tensions Increase 
The late twentieth century says Luis Roniger “Comparative study of Clientelism  and the 
Changing Nature  of Civil Society in  Contemporary World”, has been marked by  twin 
processes of increased mobilization, democratization,  and Liberalization, on the one hand, 
and decentralization of power structures, pluralism, and renewed ethnic and national 
conflict on the other. These processes have been for the most part of internal 
contradictions, struggles, and unraveling of ruling coalition, followed by redrawing of 
international boundaries and agreements. 
In Liberia, Politics and state were understood to operate through rent seeking, personal rule 
and patrimonialism whereby tradition lost its force as source of legitimacy without having 
been replaced by legal, rational and modernity. As a consequence, forms of personal rule 
that did not correspond to any of the three weberian idea types of legitimacy (legal-
rational, traditional or charismatic) essentially owed their maintenance to material 
incentives and rewards, notably political clientelism (whereby an exchange relationship 
between unequal, which provides a political advantage to the more powerful agent and a 
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material advantage to the less powerful agent)
137
 and corruption.  This may be because 
“social classes were not yet sufficiently developed and organized to play any dependent 
and decisive role”.138 
We must also acknowledge that when a state fail to maintain human security and it 
encompasses in violence, the ensuing vacuum feed tensions that often lead to civil conflict 
and unrest. Without discarding the notion of national responsibility, it is important to note 
that the breakdown of state structures in maintaining internal peace is often taken out of its 
larger geo-political context. The rise of civil tension usually stems from economic, social, 
and political power brokering, and other factors to make disenfranchised groups as in the 
case of Liberia basing on ethnicity, easy prey for those seeking to build their own militias 
or crime syndicates.
139
 This  was due to the availability of guns in Liberia a long side other 
factors which became a symbol of Identity and social meaning or what Jacklyn says  is 
“not just a gun”, but a “mythic icon” and a “maker of group identity, serving as a kind of 
code to assert one’s political allegiance”.140 
Looking at Liberia, when William Tolbert Jr., was elected president in 1971, as the last 
of many leaders of Americo-Liberians, his   presidency was run short in 1980 when 
Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe staged a military coup against him. After  executing 
Tolbert, along with thirteen of his employees by firing-sguard, Doe began the first 
Republic lead by native Liberians. Doe's seizing of the government started out in an 
economic collapse, so the U.S. sent Doe $60 million in an effort to keep communism out 
of Africa (MSN Encarta Online Encyclopedia).  
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When Doe took power in 1980, Libya was the first to recognize the new regime and 
readily acted to foster diplomacy between the two states.
141
 In addition to establishing 
diplomatic ties with the Doe regime, Libyans had also established a business presence in 
Liberia during the 1980s,  owning the Pan-African Plaza office block and Monrovia’s 
bottling plant.
142
 But the relationship cooled as Doe accepted U.S. support,  including a 
purported ten million dollars in cash on condition that Doe would cancel his scheduled 
visit to Libya.
143
 Liberia’s diplomatic overtures toward Israel further abated relations 
between Liberia and Libya, leading to the expulsion of Libyan diplomats and Libya’s 
severance of ties to Liberia.
144
 
Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe was poorly educated member of Krahn clan ethnic 
group, one of the poorest and most isolated of Liberia’s sixteen indigenous people. Doe 
was ambitious man and quick to study. He soon gathered around him many of the 
reformist intellectuals at the University of Liberia who had led the protest against the last 
Americo regime on the 1970s. Indeed, the head of these reformers, Professor Sawyer 
once taught Doe in the night school where he had set up for working people and soldiers 
in Monrovia. Doe picked Sawyer to head a commission to design new constitution for 
the country.
145
 
At the same time, Doe introduced the People’s Redemption Council (PRC). The, largely 
composed of military personnel, chaired by Doe himself and ran the country alongside 
the council of Ministers, which included civilians. But the coalition fell within a couple 
of years. Many of the reformers hoped that the Doe’s  administration would allow them 
to carry out their radical plans for a redistribution of resources to the countryside and the 
establishment of genuine democratic rule. It became clear that they were being 
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marginalized by Doe’s fellow soldiers, some of the more idealistic reformers left  
government, while others began to partake of the corruption themselves.
146
 
Meanwhile, the Doe’s government regime struggled to win international recognition, he 
was forced to pledge that there would be no more summary executions of members of 
the previous government. But it was his effort to curry favors from the West that won his 
government the biggest benefits. Instead Tolbert had favored the position of the non-
aligned movement  in the cold war confrontation strict neutrality between the West and 
East. He allowed Soviets to open up an embassy for the first time in Monrovia and he 
ousted the Israelis. Doe  turned this policy around, welcoming back the Israelis and 
cozying up to the Americans.
147
 
During his administration, largely coinciding with the Regan years, Doe received nearly 
$500 million aid, more than Liberia had received from the United States making it next 
to Israel the largest recipient from US. In return, the US won the use of Liberian territory 
as a listening post for the South Atlantic, a way station for the shipment of arms to 
anticommunist rebels in Chad and Angola, and a site for the Voice of America’s African 
transmission tower.
148
 
By the mid 1980s, the excess of the Doe’s  administration were becoming embarrassing 
for Regan White House. The Liberian leader was executing opponents and unleashing 
his security forces on the populace to crush dissidents. Meanwhile US began pressing 
Doe to hold elections, under the constitution that had been ratified by early 1983. While 
it was not much different  from old constitution, it did get rid of property qualification 
for voting and banned the hated hut tax, the flat property paid by every head of the 
house-hold.
149
 In 1984, Doe dissolved the PRC, replaced it with Interim National 
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Assembly (INA), also under his chairmanship, and established the National Democratic 
Party of Liberia (NDPL) as his own electoral vehicle.
150
 
In 1985 Doe won a rigged presidential election and then turned to oppressing tribes in 
Nimba County. Although Doe was unpopular with the Mano and Gio tribes who lived in 
this area, he kept tight control of the army and secret police to stay in power. Later, Doe 
survived military coups with the support of the United State's Reagan Administration.
151
 
This support was given because Liberia was not a supporter of Iran and Libya, two 
countries which the Reagan Administration was fighting against. In the same year, 
however, as his relationship with the United States soured, Doe re-initiated dialogue with 
Libya and paid the country a visit in 1988.
152
 
As resistance to the Doe government grew, human rights violations became widespread. 
Torture, disappearances, extrajudicial executions, imprisonment of opposition leaders, and 
restriction of freedom of expression were all commonplace of violations of human rights 
under Doe's government. As Doe's power base diminished, he began to rely on the AFL to 
carry out atrocities. After 1985, a year in which Doe had been challenged by Jackson Doe 
(no relation to Samuel Doe) and General Thomas Quiwonkpa,
153
 the AFL began to target 
as well the Mano and Gio ethnic groups in Nimba county because both Jackson Doe
154
 and 
Quiwonkpa
155
 were natives of that region.  
Of course, there is no surprise that the victims experienced  this inequality and insecurity 
that is far removed from global perspective. Rampant criminal activity, competitive access 
to scarce resources, and the absence of authoritative public institutions leaves groups 
economically, socially, politically, and geographically vulnerable to fend for themselves. 
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The multidimensional crises of underdevelopment in cultural, economic, political, security 
and social phenomenon,  have their origins in the establishment of the Liberian colony in 
1820, and the resultant civil conflict reached their climax in 1989. This was vividly 
reflected in the increased level of the crisis of illegitimacy.
156
 Frustrated by the failure of 
various neo-colonial regimes, including the Doe government, to address their cultural, 
economic, political, security and social needs, the majority of Liberians became distant 
from the state.
157
 For these citizens, the neo-colonial Liberian state had become irrelevant 
to their lives.  
2.0  Liberia’s First Civil War 1989-1997 
The theoretical and complex nature of civil War and its concomitant conflicts right from 
1980s, most scholar have underlined issues such as root causes; protagonist involved and 
the peace making, peace keepers and post conflict building efforts. According to Kieh 
advances five arguments for outbreak of first civil war in Liberia: ethic, elite pathology, 
Institutional pathology, spiritual anarchy, and political culture.
158
  
2.1. Ethic theory 
According to Kieh, ethic theory has been the most dominant aspect to explain the first civil 
war in Liberia. This is based on several postulates. First, the major  group to actors in 
Liberian Politics were ethnic stocks and groups as stated above “Americo-Liberian” or “ 
settler’s stock” and the sixteen indigenous group. Each group having its own set of 
institution setting, practices, and values. Quoting Levitt (2005: 246) asserts, “settlers and 
indigenous societies were established on diametrically opposed principles. Secondly, each 
group had it own set of distinctive interest and agenda. Hence competition of ethnic 
interest that sparked broad gamut from political to social. Thirdly, the Liberian state was 
dominated by  Americo-Liberian stock from 1847-1980, wielding all political, economic 
and social powers and by the Krahn ethnic group that ruled from 1980-1999. Fourth, the 
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failure to have corresponding agenda which was exacerbated by “hegemonic practices” of 
the two clans Americo-Liberian and Krahn.
159
  
2.2. The Institutional Pathology Theory 
This theory is based on poor structure of institution from the State especially the public one 
that did fail to perform according to the expectation of the citizens. The legislature, 
Executive and Judiciary did not have proper coordination. Another factor is that the elites 
were conditioned by the dynamics of the institutional defects and came to accept them as 
normal, meaning there was nothing to do about it. These elites are as a result of 
dysfunctional institutional arrangement which provides breeding ground for the growth of 
and development of their pathological behaviors. This pathology led the government 
incapable of addressing the various challenges the country confronted. As a result, it 
generated mass resistance and hostilities towards not only the elites but each group 
targeting each other hence political unrest that ended up in civil War in Liberia.
160
 
2.3. The Spiritual Anarchy Theory 
In explaining the complexity of African belief and its civil wars, it’s known for barbarous 
culture of political violence guided by spirits guided by religious rituals that rationalize 
anarchy. Looking at Liberia, there is intrinsic connection between the invisible world 
spiritual world and physical one. Once there is disorder in one, it affects the other. They 
believe that spiritual forces conditions the political behavior, the cycle of disorder in the 
traditional Liberian cosmological world where the forces of rebellious behavior first 
developed by the NPFL and others militias also followed as well. According to Ellis, 
Spiritual imaginations entails a mental process of legitimizing the linkages among political, 
physical and spiritual powers. In other words, using the mind of individual as religious 
crucible, war-making is rationalized as a by-product of the inter-play between the forces of 
spiritual world and physical one.
161
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To back this theory, religious power is accessed through sacrifices of which at time human 
beings are sacrificed for ritual cleansing, followed by cannibalism. Acts of unmitigated 
violence are rationalized by combatants (as we shall see with Charles Taylor) as integral to 
the maintenance of connection with the spiritual forces that serve as sources of the war. In 
summary, since war was caused by rumblings in the invisible world, the making of human 
sacrifices during the act of warfare is a pivotal to the maintenance of the causal chain.
162
 
2.4. The Political Culture Theory 
Kieh here quotes (Yoder 2003) who says that Liberian Civil War was caused by country’s 
illiberal and undemocratic values. From here derives several arguments. They argue that 
both settlers Americo-Liberian and indigenous ethnic groups did not have democratic 
political culture. Before the expansion of Liberia as a state, they were two distinct political 
systems: the settler Political system and the indigenous one. Each had it proper political 
orientation. Both of them seem to have authoritarian political ambition.
163
 
Another factor is that after the expansion of the settler state and the subsequent 
establishment of a Liberian polity that embodies both settlers and the indigenes, a national 
political culture was crystallized. During interaction between the two groups, each 
acquired certain value that influenced relationship. The Liberians interacted  with people 
from various countries including USA that have democratic system hence introduction to 
Liberal democratic values; the emphasis on political rights and civil liberties, including  
tolerance and pluralism. However, because Liberians had been socialized in the values of 
their illiberal political culture they were thus unaffected by exposure of democratic to 
democratic values.
164
 
However, to Charles Taylor, this was not what he could swallow in his political ambition. 
He had prepared fertile ground to wage war. He is characterized by all the above factors 
we have seen above. It is not by surprise that in one of his statement: “When wartime come 
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and I say, get-from-daway you m’ist down there and say “fwenken”.“I won’t say 
fwenken”, I will say “foot help de body.”165 
The Liberian civil war began on Christmas Eve 1989, when a group of roughly one 
hundred and fifty ill-equipped rebel soldiers, supported by Libya and Burkina Faso 
crossed into Nimba County, Liberia from neighboring Cote d’Ivoire under the command 
of Charles Taylor, former director-general of Liberia’s General Services Agency (LGSA)  
and leader of the NPFL, who returned to Liberia after breaking out of a Massachusetts 
prison for embezzlement charges he committed in Liberia. Initially this group enjoyed 
massive and popular support, with many young men and women joining them, armed 
only with single barreled guns and at times sticks.
166
And within five months, the NPFL 
controlled 90 percent of the country.   ‘ I started with a shotgun and three rifles and a few 
dozen men behind me’ Taylor narrates two years later. 
“They thought we had a multitude…it was dark, and they just assumed. Their guilt and 
their corruption magnified their enemies in their sight…they ran without fight. Now we 
had arms to take the next garrison. General Varney and Prince Johnson, seasoned 
military men, joined our cause. Suddenly we’d become formidable”!167 
The small rebellion army of Taylor soon became pivotal to some of the most dramatic 
events ever experienced in West Africa. The main reason was that Taylor’s had deep 
knowledge about the African state system, which is a combination of strong regimes and 
weak states and the contradictions built into such a system. The government had no real 
control, either over the international borders or over the more remote provinces of the 
country as noted in the previous chapter. 
NPFL gained members through the reconciliation of several ethnic tribes; however, the 
insurgency focused on attacking those other  tribes that benefitted from association with 
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President Doe, causing intense ethnic violence and cleansing throughout those first 
months.
168
 Doe sought assistance from the international community, calling on the 
United Nations, however, he was unable to received assistance due to NPFL support 
from ECOWAS member states, specifically Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire.169 It 
ultimately provided Cease-fire Monitoring Group forces (ECOMOG) to end the conflict 
and human rights violations (more details to be discussed ahead). With the assassination 
of Doe, several Liberian political groups created the IGNU with the backing of Nigeria. 
Taylor, backed by Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya, had still control the majority 
of Liberian territory hence refusal to acknowledge IGNU.
170
 
When the war first started, it was difficult to know exactly what happened to the Special 
Security Service (SSS) during this time. Although the AFL was viewed as the official 
Liberian army, members of the SSS may have collaborated with the AFL to put down the 
rebellion. As the analyst pointed out, the SSS had a fluid and undefined role. As such, 
they could easily have been included with the AFL and deployed alongside the AFL in 
terms of presidential protection. As the NPFL insurgency progressed, Doe directed the 
AFL to respond with violence in both Greater Liberia and Monrovia. Government forces 
engaged in a violent campaign throughout the country, committing widespread killings 
in Monrovia,
171
 as well as indiscriminately shooting unarmed population in several 
villages, looting possessions, and burning homes.
172
 Liberians, particularly residents of 
Nimba County, were targeted for suspected opposition activity or ethnic affiliation. 
Statements reveal that government forces deliberately sought out and persecuted Mano- 
Gio, Americo-Liberians, and other suspected rebel supporters. 
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The Liberian army, AFL, continued fighting and was later aided by another faction, the 
LPC originating in the south- east of the country. Other  factions, often enjoyed localized 
regional support, came and went, such as the LDF and the Congo Defense Force (CDF). 
The main incentive to continue the war was, however, financial. Soldiers sought to 
obtain instant booty, whilst warlords aimed at gaining control over productive 
geographical areas, especially those with gold and diamond deposits, as well as timber 
and rubber, coffee and cocoa plantations. Rebel movements kept some amount of 
popular regions and ethnic groupings. These were further politicized by the war itself.
173
 
In reality, the brutality of combatants towards the very people they claimed to serve kept 
civilians submissive. Shady international businessmen, conglomerates of West Africa 
stated that  at times foreign departments of powerful Western states all supported the 
warlords.
174
 
In due course, following an internal struggle, the NPFL, created  another group, INPFL 
under Prince Y. Johnson leader of the Gio tribe. Taking different directions and at the 
time of fighting each other, both defeated the AFL and reached the Atlantic coast of 
Monrovia in July 1990. In August, a West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG), was 
created under leadership of Nigeria and sent to take control of the situation in 
Monrovia.
175
 Prince Yormie Johnson seemingly struck a deal with the peacekeepers and 
lured President Doe into a trap, capturing, torturing, beaten, mutilated then shot, on 
September 1990.  His torture and execution was videotaped by his captors.
176
 
2.4.1.  Rise of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL ) 
The hostilities between Charles Taylor’s NPFL and Doe’s AFL were soon exacerbated by 
the rise of another fighting faction. In July 1990, a split developed between Taylor and a 
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group of NPFL fighters led by Prince Johnson.
177
 Prince Johnson launched a splinter group 
known as the INPFL, comprised of approximately five hundred combatants.
178
 The INPFL 
gained control of areas in Monrovia, and established its base in the city’s outskirts at 
Caldwell. The rise of the INPFL increased the risks of violence to the civilians, as they did 
not only become subject to violations by fighters of INFPL, but also could be suspected of 
association with yet another faction. The INPFL often arrested and detained people at 
Caldwell, where they would be tortured, sometimes to the point of death.
179
 Statement 
givers described the atrocities that took place at the INPFL base, including “manhandling 
of people; severe torture; summary executions.”180 
2.4.2.  First Battle for Monrovia: July 1990 
The Civil War in Liberia in 1990s, was due to two cleavage lines in analysis of rebel 
factions. First, there was a line between local communities and the nation-state, as opposed 
to ethnic groups. The troublesome relationship between the state and local communities 
exceeded that of any ethnic logic. Politicized ethnicity would rather be recognized as a 
further consequence. Secondly, a cleavage line between the youth and gerontocratic 
leadership became more increasingly evident in the conflict. 
By summer 1990, Monrovia remained an area of contention among warring factions. Doe, 
while still in office, was losing his ability to administer the country and enforce the rule of 
law
181
. The INPFL commanded various areas of Monrovia, as well as Bushrod Island.
182
 
Taylor controlled large, key parts of Liberia, but Monrovia still remained outside of NPFL 
control. As different forces sought to acquire or retain control of the capital, intense 
fighting around Monrovia surged during battles  of 1990, 1992, and 1996. These three 
battles afforded factions not only the opportunity to seize Monrovia, but also the chance 
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for opportunists to plunder and take revenge.
183
 Numerous statement givers gave 
eyewitness accounts of atrocities committed by both rebels and government soldiers as 
they fought for control of the capital. The statements again reveal the multiple forms of 
violence and the targeting of certain groups and ethnicities: 
They (INPFL) started going on a house to house…Within that instant, my boss lady, 
M.M., whom I was assistant to, was arrested, tortured, beaten, raped and she was 
subsequently executed (beheaded). My husband, M.K., a Mandingo by nationality, 
was a businessman. He was arrested and executed. Realizing that my life was at stake, 
I decided to run away with my two kids, but I was caught by the rebel. They started to 
beat me with the gun butt. I was stabbed with the soldier knife in my stomach and lost 
consciousness. So they thought I was dead, so they left me.
184
 
AFL soldiers were equally ruthless in their attempts to defeat the rebels. The atrocities 
were often misdirected or senseless and they resulted in the loss of numerous innocent 
lives. For example, one statement giver described how the AFL shot indiscriminately, 
opening fire on everyone at the supermarket in July 1990.
185
 As the INPFL approached, the 
AFL retreated, slaughtering many people as it did so.
186
 The terroristic impact of the 
killings was magnified by mutilation and other inappropriate treatment of the bodies.
187
 
One statement giver described finding the bodies of his family after they were murdered by 
AFL soldiers on July 30, 1990. 
My father’s body was terribly mutilated. My mother’s stomach was ripped open. She 
was eight months pregnant. I was so frightened I couldn’t even touch them. My sister 
had been shot right in the middle of her head. I was in a terrible state. I couldn’t even 
look at them closer because I was just in shock. I mean even to see my father was 
hard. I could just recognize him by his watch which was still on his hand.
188
 
During their flight from the battle, Liberians were subject to additional abuses. One 
statement giver described his experience during the siege: 
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During the first week in July 1990, when Taylor attacked Monrovia, my mother, six 
brothers and I sought to flee to Kakata by way of the Fendell campus. As we were 
walking, we were detained by Taylor’s militia…The leaders directed militia members 
to beat my older brother. My brother was also subjected to tabay
189
  and was killed in 
front of my eyes. The following day my mother instructed me to proceed without her 
and to flee with my five younger brothers. As my brothers and I resumed walking, we 
were again detained by Taylor’s militia. The militia cut one of my young brothers then 
shot all of them dead -- only I was spared.
190
 
Later, the statement giver learned that his mother had also been killed.
191
 
This breakdown of the state led the whole region of West Africa to implode into the 
developing Liberian war economy. One fallout was the war started by Foday Sankoh, a 
well-known rebel in the civil war in Sierra Leone, and others close to him, against the 
military regime in the Sierra Leone capital, Freetown, taking advantage of the unrest in 
the region. But Sankoh was not the only one who sought to use the Liberian civil war for 
his own purposes. Liberian warlords as well as civil and military governments of other 
West African countries, such as Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Togo, 
to mention the most active ones, took active participation. This kind of regional dynamics 
that the civil wars, first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone, triggered and revealed a 
number of transnational relations between the various actors of the regimes of these 
countries. At the same time, the regional dynamics also led to the creation of new political 
situations. These regional alliances turned out to be extremely unstable. They were to a 
considerable degree ad hoc and were not based on any established institutional 
structure.
192
 
After the killing of President Doe, the INPFL continued playing an active role in 
Monrovian politics until Johnson was brought into exile in Nigeria in late 1992. 
Meanwhile, several other rebel factions appeared. The ULIMO created in 1991 in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone, with assistance from Sierra Leonean government. Soon 
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‘The United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy’ by Kromah faction 
(ULIMO) itself split into two: ULIMO-J led by Roosevelt Johnson an ethnic Krahn 
Fighters loyal to Johnson triggered the first major violation of the Abuja Accord in 
December 1995, resisting ECOMOG deployment around the diamond mines near 
Tubmanburg. He was dismissed from the ULIMO-J leadership in early 1996.
193
  
Like many others involved in the Liberian civil war, Johnson was known to use 
mercenary fighters to further his causes. One notable example was his funding of Joshua 
Milton Blahyi, commonly known as “General Butt Naked”. The General commanded a 
brigade of drunken or otherwise intoxicated young teenage boys who would fight naked 
or in women's clothing because of a belief that it would protect them from bullets. Such 
was the mix of politics, semi-religious belief, uneducated leaders, drugs and utter fall of 
civil society that typified the Liberian conflict.
194
 
Another faction under ULIMO, was ULIMO-K led by Alhaji G.V. Kromah which was 
mainly comprised of Islamic Mandingo tribe. Its power base was in northwestern Liberia, 
in and around Lofa County. Kromah was a special assistant to the Vice-President and later 
Assistant Information Minister during the regime of President William Tolbert before 
becoming Director General of the Liberian Broadcasting System in 1982 and Minister of 
Information in 1984 under President Samuel Doe and denied the government's crackdown 
leading to some deaths at the University of Liberia in 1984. He went into exile in June 
1990, months after the civil war began in Liberia.
195
 
2.4.3.  ECOWAS intervention force (August 1990)  
On 7, August 1990, the 16-member ECOWAS agreed to deploy a joint military 
intervention force, the ECOMOG, and place it under Nigerian leadership. Nigeria 
persuaded the other member states to establish a peacekeeping force officially to try to 
separate the combating parties. Its real objective was probably very different. The Nigerian 
                                                             
193
 Cfr. The Secretary General, Eleventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Observer Mission  in Liberia, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/473 ( June 10, 1995). 
194
Cfr.  www.org/wiki/Roosevelt Johnson (retrieved on 4.2. 2015). 
195
 Cfr. Ibidem., 
48 
 
president, Ibrahim Babangida, was concerned that an armed insurgency was about to 
overthrow a military regime in a neighboring country. His words to the other ECOWAS 
leaders illustrate this: “Today it is Liberia, tomorrow it could be any of you”.196 
This possibility was alarming to the Nigerian military government as well as to the other 
authoritarian regimes of West Africa. In particular, they feared that a Liberia governed by 
Taylor would become a breeding place for other West African rebellion groups. The 
intervention in Liberia was therefore necessary, not primarily to protect the Liberian 
government but to protect the regimes of the other member states. General Momoh of 
Sierra Leone, for instance, felt a danger of the rebellion spreading from his closest 
neighbor and therefore offered his country as a base for the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) operations in Liberia. Thus, Taylor, in view of the unity among dictators in 
the region, had an obvious motive to support fellow-rebel Sankoh and the RUF in the first 
phase of the Sierra Leonean civil war. This is an important element in the regionalization 
of the civil wars in the two countries.
197
 
Another similarly important element in the spread of the Liberian war was the challenges 
to the leaders’ regional interests as a result of the war. At that time there were very close 
political and economic relations between Babangida’s regime in Nigeria and Doe’s regime 
in Liberia. This alliance had a counterpart in an alliance centered on former president of 
Côte d’Ivoire, Houphouet-Boigny. For many years, Houphouet-Boigny had had close 
relations with two leaders of Liberia, first with William Tubman and later with Adolphus 
Tolbert.
198
 
One of his cousins (of Houphouet-Boigny)   was married to Tolbert’s son. Both Tolbert 
and his son were killed in Doe’s coup, but Houphouet- Boigny’s cousin survived. She fled 
to Burkina Faso, where she married Blaise Compaoré (who later became the president of 
Burkina Faso). “The Doe-Babangida axis during the late 1980s was therefore seen by 
Houphouet-Boigny not only as the perpetuation of the personal humiliation he had suffered 
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when the upstart Doe had been responsible for the murder of his son-in-law, but also as the 
reversal of previous diplomatic alliance linking Abidjan (the capital of Côte d’Ivoire) and 
Monrovia (the capital of Liberia)”.199 The focus of attention of the regional networks was 
the question of who would be in control of the lucrative formal and informal trade 
networks in the region and the question of who would be in control of Liberia’s natural 
resources.
200
 
Particularly important was the large amount of iron ore in Nimba county. Nimba is 
reckoned to be one of the richest sources of iron ore in the world, and French, British, as 
well as American companies were eager to get admittance to the area. Taylor argued that 
Nigeria’s involvement in the conflict was an Anglo-American plot to undermine French 
influence in the region. This kind of political rhetoric is interesting, because it illustrates 
how alliances shift. Liberia had never been a part of francophone Africa. Traditionally, the 
country had been the closest ally of the United States in the region. When Taylor started to 
plan his insurgency against Doe, he therefore first went to the United States to ask for 
support. However, his appeal was rejected by the American government, which continued 
to support Doe even though it was aware of the extensive corruption and the violation of 
human rights committed by Doe’s regime. The regionalized civil war in West Africa was 
now a reality, and the regionalization was to a large degree propelled by the transnational 
relations facilitated by a system consisting of strong regimes and weak states.
201
 
The mission later included troops from non-ECOWAS countries, including Uganda and 
Tanzania. ECOMOG’s objectives were to impose a cease-fire; help Liberians establish an 
interim government until elections could be held; stop the killing of innocent civilians; and 
ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. ECOMOG also sought to prevent the 
conflict from spreading into neighboring states, which share a complex history of state, 
economic, and ethno-linguistic social relations with Liberia. The ECOWAS attempted to 
persuade Doe to resign and go into exile, but despite his weak position besieged in his 
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mansion, he refused. ECOMOG, an ECOWAS intervention force, arrived at the Freeport 
of Monrovia on August 24, 1990, landing from Nigerian and Ghanaian vessels.
202
 
2.4.4. Attack on Monrovia (1992) 
Peace was still far off as both Taylor and Johnson claimed power. ECOMOG declared an 
IGNU with Amos Sawyer as their president, with the broad support of Johnson. The 
implementation of ECOWAS brokered peace accords
203
, disarmament, safeguarding aid 
supplies, sheltering troops
204
, helping supervise elections of 1997,
205
 and promoting 
security by helping to rebuild Liberia’s military, police and security forces.206 
The regional forces successfully repelled the NPFL invasion.
207
 Nevertheless, political 
undercurrents and inadequate planning, logistics, and lack of equipment hindered 
ECOMOG’s initial efficacy.208 Preexisting regional political tensions led to division 
among ECOWAS members.. With the exception of Guinea, the Francophone nations (led 
by Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso) supported Taylor and objected to the intervention; the 
Anglophone countries, including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, supported the 
intervention. Logistical factors, including inadequate force levels, the lack of a Monrovia-
based ECOWAS official to facilitate political negotiations, and inconsistent interpretations 
of the mandate, reduced ECOMOG’s effectiveness of widespread looting by ECOMOG 
soldiers, alleged sales of weaponry by Nigerians to armed groups, and concerns about 
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Nigeria’s support for the LPC.209 Its deficiencies were quickly evidenced by its failure to 
prevent the assassination of President Doe by INPFL forces less than two weeks after its 
arrival. 
Early on, Taylor viewed the ECOMOG intervention as a threat to his objectives and as an 
adversary.
210
 In August 1990, prior to ECOMOG’s deployment, Taylor criticized the 
peacekeeping force, which he considered an act of aggression. He proclaimed he would 
“fight to the last man,” stating, “I’ve given orders to open fire on any strangers setting foot 
on our territory.” NPFL-controlled radio frequently broadcast anti-ECOMOG messages. 
The NPFL intended to weaken the political resolve of ECOMOG’s member states so that 
Nigerian and Ghanaian citizens would force their governments to withdraw.
211
 
Although it was intended to be a neutral peacekeeping force, ECOMOG soon assumed a 
more offensive role. As early as October of 1990, violence erupted between ECOMOG and 
the NPFL as ECOMOG successfully pushed the NPFL out of Monrovia.
212
  
Another consequence of Taylor’s hostility toward ECOMOG was that foreign nationals 
became the target of human rights abuses.
213
 The NPFL targeted citizens of ECOWAS 
countries in retaliation for ECOMOG’s role in the conflict. Specifically, the NPFL adopted 
a policy of targeting Nigerian, Ghanaian, and other ECOWAS civilians in retribution for 
the deployment of ECOMOG.
214
 Referring to the ECOMOG force, Taylor reportedly 
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stated that, “for every Liberian that’s killed I’m going to make sure some other nationals 
get killed too.”215 In a widely reported massacre of foreigners, the NPFL killed two 
hundred ECOWAS nationals in 1990.
216
 
Taylor launched an assault on Monrovia on October 15, 1992, named 'Operation 
Octopus.
217
 The assault may have been led by Burkina Faso soldiers.
218
 The infamous 
operation Octopus which lasted nearly 120 days reportedly sparked-off after series of harsh 
and unfavorable political and economic exchanges from interim President Amos C. Sawyer 
on one hand, ex-president Charles Taylor, and the former leader of the INPFL  Prince 
Yormie Johnson.
219
 Attacking ECOMOG positions around Monrovia, and even striking at 
the AFL, which was encamped at its Schiefflin barracks on the outskirts of the city.  
For almost a month, ECOMOG struggled to repel what has been called "the siege of 
Monrovia." Fighting raged in and around the city, with the suburban areas of Gardnerville, 
Barnesville, New Georgia and Caldwell particularly had hard hit. Approximately 200,000 
people displaced from these areas flooded into the central city to escape the fighting. Other 
civilians were pushed behind Taylor’s lines into the country's interior, joining thousands of 
displaced persons there. Those who refused to cooperate were often executed by the 
NPFL.
220
 
3.1.  UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) 
In 1993,  ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin. Following this, on 
September 22, the United Nations established UNOMIL while the war continued. 
UNOMIL in early 1994 deployed three hundred and sixty eight military observers and 
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associated civilian personnel to monitor implementation of the abortive Cotonou Peace 
Agreement, prior to elections originally planned for February/March 1994.
221
 
Renewed armed hostilities broke out in May 1994 and war continued, becoming intense in 
July and August. ECOMOG, and later UNOMIL, members were captured and held hostage 
by some factions. By mid-1994, the humanitarian situation had become disastrous, with 1.8 
million Liberians in need of humanitarian assistance. Conditions continued to deteriorate, 
but humanitarian agencies were unable to reach many in need due to hostilities and general 
insecurity.
222
 
3.1.1.  Akosombo Agreement: 1994 
Factional leaders agreed in September 1994 to the Akosombo Agreement, a supplement to 
the Cotonou agreement, named after the Ghanaian town where it was signed. On 
September 12, 1994, three warring factions, the NPFL, ULIMO-K, and AFL, signed the 
Akosombo Agreement. The accord granted Taylor considerable dispensations, including a 
seat on the five-person Council of State,
223
 much to the displeasure of the Nigerian 
government
224
. Subsequently, ECOMOG attacked Gbarnga in September 1994. Civilians 
in Gbarnga found themselves in the midst heavy fighting and bombings. The attack, 
although unsuccessful, nevertheless demonstrated that Nigeria would not passively accept 
Taylor’s ascent to power.225 
Various factors, including politico-historical roots, ethnic divisions, and ECOMOG’s 
maneuvering among the armed groups, continued to splinter the factions. Alliances 
between ECOMOG and other factions proved unstable, leading to severances and attacks 
between factions and the peacekeeping force.
226
 For example, ECOMOG and the Nimba 
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Redemption Council (NRC) had discussed plans to launch a second front against the NPFL 
in early 1993.
227
 Upon deployment, the NRC’s spokesman issued a statement announcing 
the formation of the NRC and calling for support for ECOMOG’s deployment.228 To his 
surprise, however, ECOMOG forces were not deployed alongside the NRC combatants as 
planned. 
The security situation in Liberia remained poor. In October 1994, in the face of ECOMOG 
funding shortfalls and a lack of will by the Liberian combatants to honor agreements to end 
the war, the UN Security Council reduced to about ninety  the number of UNOMIL 
observers. It extended UNOMIL’s mandate and subsequently extended it several times 
until September 1997.
229
 
In 1994, division within the NPFL arose, leading Tom Woewiyu, Sam Dokie, and Lavelli 
Supuwood to form the NPFL Central Revolutionary Council.
230
 By 1995, there were seven 
different fighting factions, including the NPFL, NPFL-CRC, LDF, ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, 
AFL, and LPC. The exclusion of the newer, non- signatory factions from the Akosombo 
negotiations remained contentious.
231
 Thus, the factions convened to sign two more 
agreements on December 21, 1994.
232
 The Accra Agreement enabled, inter alia, accession 
to the Akosombo Agreement, a ceasefire to begin midnight of December 28, 1994, and the 
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establishment of a new Council of State composed of five representatives selected by the 
various fighting factions.
233
 
During this time, hostilities remained widespread throughout 80 percent of the country, but 
at a lower level of intensity.
234
 A U.N. report noted the segmenting of fighting into 
different territories according to the warring factions. For example, the NPFL and LPC 
coalition forces primarily battled in the eastern, northern, and to some extent, southern, 
parts;
235
 ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K fought in the western areas;
236
  ULIMO-K and the 
NPFL fought in Lofa County;
237
 and ULIMO-J and the NPFL fought in Bong and Margibi 
Counties
238
. Most fighting consisted of skirmishes, looting, and attacks on infrastructure.
239
  
In December 1994, the factions and other parties signed the Accra Agreement, a 
supplement to the Akosombo Agreement. Disagreements ensued and fighting continued. 
3.1.2. Abuja I: August 1995 and the April 6, 1996 War 
On 19 August 1995, the main factions signed an agreement largely brokered by Ghanaian 
President Jerry Rawlings, Abuja 1. At a conference sponsored by ECOWAS, the United 
Nations and the United States, the European Union, and the Organization of African Unity 
now the African Union.
240
  The agreement provided for a new Council of State, 
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disarmament, and elections.
241
 On September 1, 1995, a collective transitional government 
known as the Liberian National Transitional Government II (LNTG II), headed by Taylor, 
Alhaji Kromah, George Boley, and three civilian representatives, came into power.
242
 By 
bringing factional opponents into the political realm, the Abuja agreement ushered in 
political strategy as another means to gain control of the country.
243
 
Notably, ULIMO-J was excluded from direct participation in the Abuja peace 
negotiations.
244
 Although the agreement included a provision granting ULIMO-J’s 
Roosevelt Johnson a head position at the Ministry of Rural Development,
245
 the exclusion 
of his faction from negotiations and the implicit failure to recognize ULIMO-J as a major 
force within the conflict likely served to alienate Johnson and ULIMO-J from the final 
terms of the Abuja accord. The outcome proved detrimental to both Roosevelt Johnson and 
Kromah, as ULIMO-J’s alienation and the new political framework  converged against 
both leaders’ limited political backgrounds and mass appeal.246 As a result, it essentially 
preserved the potential for future conflict. 
Under the terms of Abuja I, a ceasefire commenced on August 26, 1995.
247
 Once again, the 
brokered peace remained tenuous. In December 1995, ULIMO-J forces violated the 
ceasefire agreement, attacking ECOMOG forces in Gbarma and Tubmanburg
248
 and 
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repeatedly using civilians as human shields.
249
 During the fighting, ULIMO-J forces killed 
sixteen Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers, wounded seventy eight others, and seized the 
peacekeepers’ arms.250 
At this time, Taylor was setting the stage for a third battle in Monrovia by contriving a rift 
between ULIMO-J and ECOMOG.
251
 Using a murder reportedly committed by Roosevelt 
Johnson’s forces, Taylor urged the government to respond252. The Council of State 
attempted to arrest Roosevelt Johnson, compelling him to seek refuge in AFL military 
barracks
253
. Roosevelt Johnson insisted that the police represented henchmen of Charles 
Taylor’s NPFL and would not afford him just treatment.254 The confrontation launched, the 
third battle for Monrovia on April 6, 1996.
255
  ULIMO-J, LPC, and AFL forces fought 
against NPFL and ULIMO-K.
256
 Within the first few days, an estimated 2,000 people were 
killed,
257
 with total fatalities rising to 3,000 people.
258
 One statement giver recalled that the 
death toll was so high that human bones began to pile up in the streets. Another statement 
giver witnessed combatants throwing bodies into the river.
259
 
4.1.  Abuja II : August 1996 and Fighting in Monrovia 
Heavy fighting broke out again in April 1996. This led to the evacuation of most 
international Non- governmental Organizations and the destruction of much of Monrovia. 
Liberia: Action/Background Docs., 04/11/'96 -Since the weekend's breakdown of the 
Liberian peace agreement, events have moved rapidly. Despite reports of a renewed 
ceasefire early in the week, as of this posting heavy fighting was still continuing and 
the West African peacekeeping force had not yet taken action to stop the fighting. The 
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action and background information in this posting and the next, from the Friends of 
Liberia and the Africa Faith and Justice Network, provide information that is still 
relevant for anyone concerned about Liberia. While the media, particularly in the 
United States, are putting their primary focus on the evacuation of foreigners, there is 
urgent need to refocus on what can be done to restore the fragile peace.
260
 
On August 17, 1996, another ECOWAS-brokered peace agreement was signed in Abuja, 
Nigeria with a revised timetable that called for elections to be held in 1997.
261
 The 
agreement extended the timetable for disarmament and elections beyond the original 
timetable of Abuja I and added the threat of sanctions, including a bar against running for 
elected office and prosecution for war crimes, against anyone violating the agreement
262
. 
Under the terms of Abuja II, ECOMOG began disarming the fighting factions in 
November 1996 with assistance from the United Nations.
263
 A new ceasefire was declared 
on August 20, 1996, and elections were set for May 30, 1997, although ECOMOG later 
postponed the elections until July 19, 1997, to allow time for preparation.
264
 On 3 
September 1996, Sankawulo was followed by Ruth Perry  as chairwoman of the ruling 
council, who served until 2 August 1997 handing over the office to Taylor as elected 
president.
265
 
Having fought his way to military dominance in Liberia, the flamboyant rebel leader was 
finally elected president in 1997 with more than 75 percent of votes in an election that 
most poll monitors deemed to be largely a fair contest. His nearest rival, Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf, who is now president, took only 10 percent of the votes. 
“Taylor’s thirst for state power was unquenchable and far greater than the international 
community’s to forestall the conflict. For Taylor, peace without power was simply not an 
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option” . In 1997, after the fourteenth peace agreement, elections were held where Charles 
Taylor was declared President in a landslide victory; however the next years were not 
peaceful as Taylor’s government and armed forces committed human rights violations.266 
4.1.1. But how and why did Charles Taylor win election of 1997? 
Why a man commonly derided as a brutal warlord should win so clearly puzzled many 
foreign journalists. As head of the strongest military faction, it was  reasoned by Liberians 
that he could bring stability to a war torn country. Certainly experience had brought too 
much of Liberia, and people in the country side to appreciate what Taylor had done. For 
example, in Agricultural sector  where he had shown generosity in raising wages and 
improving conditions. Furthermore, among ordinary Liberians, they  preferred  a candidate 
( Taylor) that had gain a reputation as family man, and a soft touch with children, earning 
his nickname ‘Papay’. This was a refreshing positive in an increasingly dysfunctional post-
civil war society where many men who lost interest in providing for their  families and 
took off with young women, abandoning their wives and families. The electorate believed 
that, despite his faults, Taylor was a man who would not abandon his ‘Liberian family’ 
when times got tough.
267
 
By contrast, the  electorate was also not impressed by the new breed of politicians that by 
then aspired to represent them. The melting pot of wartime had exposed people to new 
faces and new personalities, whether from their experiences in refugee camps or in the 
cauldron of Monrovia.
268
 
Another factor at the front of the voters’ mind was the near certainty that Taylor’s failure at 
the polls would result in a resumption of hostilities by the NPFL, and so there was more to 
the decision than just choosing the strongest leader. It was a calculated risk which entailed 
a high element of insurance against further insecurity.
269
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Intimidation by another name perhaps, but tarnishing Taylor success at the polls in 1997 
with his assessment, his detractors  could ignore the fact, that, in addition to the NPFL, 
many other factions and forces had also been responsible for the trauma of the Liberian 
civilian  population since 1990. In particular, the looting and destruction unleashed upon 
them by ECOMOG force throughout the early years of their deployment must also have 
been the major consideration for ordinary Liberians trying to give their country a fresh start 
under a strong and experienced national leader. After all that had happened in the previous 
seven years, at the hands of outsiders as well as home-grown warlords, Liberians had 
decided to give Charles Taylor one more chance. The performance that had earned the 
rapacious earlier peacekeepers of the ECOMOG force their Liberian nickname ‘ Every Car 
Or Moving Object Gone’.270 
Granted that the  population was in a situation of extreme pain and desperation, many saw 
Taylor as both Satan and savior. They only knew that if his takeover of Monrovia in July-
August 1990 succeeded, it would at least have brought an end to the starvation and the 
inhumanity of life in a city under siege by rebel armies, ravaged by rampaging remnants of 
its own government’s army.271 
With memories of the Easter 1996 bloodbath still fresh in the minds of Monrovians, and 
for the Krahn, Mandingo and other groups in the country side still particularly vulnerable 
to a return to violence, it was less a case of the man  they wanted than the man they knew 
through bitter experience. The logic of support for Taylor can be better explained by his 
NPP’s presence deployment   across the country, he perceived power as a leader much 
feared as well as loved and the sheer exhaustion of the electorate with the prospect of 
continued inter-factional chaos.
272
 
On September 18, 1998, security forces including the SSS in Monrovia conducted a 
military assault, with code named Camp Johnson Road. This district was a stronghold of 
Roosevelt Johnson, a former faction leader of ULIMO-J, and his supporters, who were 
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members of the Krahn ethnic group. There had been some unrest in the area due to 
attacks by supporters of Roosevelt Johnson, who were apparently acting with impunity. 
The government indicated that they were entering the area to restore law and order. 
Hundreds of SSS officers and members of the police Special Task Force, joined by 
scores of irregular former combatants of Taylor's NPFL, employed automatic weapons, 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and mortars. According to the US Department of 
State, "credible reports indicate that as many as 300 persons, most of them  Krahns, 
comprised of women and children, were killed in a 17-hour battle and in subsequent 
house-to-house searches and summary executions by government forces”.273 
4.1.2.  Post election  administration of Charles Taylor 
After election, Charles Taylor’s administration began showing the contrary;  series of 
murders and disappearances attributed to his personal security forces in his presidential 
term rapidly disillusioned supporters in Monrovia and abroad. He formed tightened 
security through groups like ATU, SSU, and SSS.  
4.1.2.1. The Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) 
One militia, ATU, was controlled by his son Chucky Taylor Junior, who had moved from 
the US to join him. ATU soon gained a reputation for lawlessness and brutality, and in 
later years, was in theft, as well as far worse offences on a number of occasion. One of the 
methods applied in brutality was to tie prey to a mattress as they were being beaten, to 
lessen evidence of external bruising so that all injuries  would be internal and less easy to 
identify when victim would arrive in hospital. Chucky applied also the so called 
‘Tabay’.274 
As a commander of the ATU, Chucky ordered and committed numerous acts of torture and 
murder not only against civilians but on occasions against his own staff. One such 
unfortunate, Lieutenant Isaac Gono, was employed by Chucky Taylor as a driver. He had 
gone for over a year without payment, reported Chucky due to his delayed payment. But it 
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was discovered that Chucky kept the salary allocated to his driver and for his father’s staff. 
Gono wrote a letter begging for some compensation from his superiors, which angered 
Taylor Jr. On 18 September, 2002,  Gono was driving in town and hit a dog, splashing the 
animal’s blood over the front of Taylor’s car. When he saw the mess, ordered his men to 
punish Gono severely which led to his death few days after in the hospital.
275
 
On 9 January, 2009, Chucky Taylor  was convicted by a Florida court under a law that 
allows US citizens to be tried for acts of torture committed overseas. He is serving a 97-
year sentence for torture and conspiracy to commit torture, under a 1994 federal law 
allowing US citizens to be tried and convicted for acts of torture committed overseas.
276
   
4.1.2.2. The Special Security Unit (SSU) 
Additionally, the Taylor administration created a new security unit, known as the 
Executive Mansion Special Security Unit or simply as the Special Security Unit (SSU). 
This unit was initially intended for the protection of the President and his family. 
However, these men were seen not around the mansion or the residence of the President, 
but all over the city, at check points, major intersections, and in the communities 
carrying long-range weapons. Most of the men in these units were former fighters of the 
NPFL, who were trained for war and not for civilian protection. The SSU may be a small 
part of the larger, 1500-member SSS; however, this was unclear. 
4.1.2.3. Special Security Service (SSS) 
The  Special Security Service (SSS), led by Benjamin Yeaten, was the president’s 
personal security force charged with guarding  access to the executive Mansion, the 
airport and the other key installations, and protecting senior diplomats and Very 
Important Persons (VIPs). It was a security force within the government of Liberia 
dedicated to the protection of the president. Prior to 1980, the unit was specifically 
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designated for presidential protection. It was created by President Tubman and modeled 
on the United States Secret Service (USSS).
277
 
During the interim government, the SSS was dormant. However, when Charles Taylor 
was elected to the presidency and took power, the SSS was reactivated. By the end of the 
war in 1997, the Abuja Accord called for elections and disarmament. By the terms of the 
accord, the army was to be reconstituted to include members from all of the warring 
factions. However, after Charles Taylor's victory in the presidential elections on 19 July 
1997, he did not acknowledge that part of the peace accords. Rather, the police, SSS, and 
military were filled with former soldiers of the NPFL. Every able-bodied NPFL person 
was integrated into the new army, such that 60-75 percent of the personnel of the new 
national security forces were Taylor’s supporters. The Monrovia-based National Human 
Rights Monitor (NAHRM) reported in 1998 that "the SSS, since the inauguration of the 
new government, has been infested with former fighters of the rival NPFL of the 
incumbent President, Charles Taylor".
278
 
By 2002, in rural areas, particularly in remote parts of Lofa and Gbarpolu Counties, armed 
security forces illegally entered homes, most often to steal food, money, or other property. 
Members of the security forces in rural areas generally were paid and provisioned 
inadequately and often extorted money and goods from citizens. Local communities were 
compelled to provide food, shelter, and labor for members of the security forces stationed 
in their villages. Human Rights Watch reported that President Taylor's security services, 
the SSS and the Special Operation Division (SOD), both mobilized to combat LURD 
rebels, consisted of former NPFL rebels who were paid a one-time fee of $150 (8,200 ld) 
and were expected to loot and pillage thereafter to support themselves.279 
Coupled to  security , Business was one thing Liberia’s new head of state certainly knew 
something about; just as he had worked out his commercial  connections in the region, in 
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Europe, the Middle East and in the United States during wartime. He was now able to 
generate more profitable opportunities for Liberia and for himself once in office.  He 
combined aptitude for running government business and personal business simultaneously, 
despite the new constraint of having a government administration and the country at peace 
to impose checks and balances on his activities. Government business would help finance 
personal deals. This included cuts he was able to take on government monopolies in 
timber, gold and diamond in mining, as well as commissions taken on the exclusive control 
of commodity import such as rice. One diplomat tracking the presidential stake in Liberia’s 
economy estimated it as ‘possibly equal’ in size to the actual national budget.280  
Avoidance of accountability also seemed to be the mantra of the incumbent Taylor’s 
administration: it quickly became clear that his government did not intend perhaps 
surprisingly- to hold any one responsible for the officially estimated 150,000 deaths and 
even less surprisingly the wholesale looting of the country’s resources of iron ore, gold, 
diamond, rubber and timber over the preceding seven years.
281
 
4.1.3. Native culture of Taylor 
In the context of Charles Taylor’s assimilation to native culture and his ascent to the 
Dakhpannah of the Poro, suggestions emerged that, while he was based in Gbarnga, 
rituals were being carried out as his headquarters which went well beyond usual tradition 
secret society practice and included cannibalism. In such accusation, he was named as an 
actor in ‘ritualistic consumption of human body parts’. The accusation appeared in an 
article published in The Times on 2 November 1999, citing Ellis book, Mask of Anarchy 
as its authority. 
 In The Hague courtroom, a prosecution witness, Joseph "Zigzag" Marzah, maintained that 
he and Taylor had eaten human hearts together. The “juju”282 practice is supposed to 
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enable the victor to absorb his victim's powers. The former president's lawyers dismissed 
the claims as untrue and denied that Marzah had never been close to Taylor. “I felt like 
throwing up when I heard that nonsense" Taylor told the court, "and I think even the 
prosecution were shocked at listening to that foolishness”.283 
A showman by nature, Taylor often appeared dressed head to toe in white robes to 
proclaim his innocence and stress his supernatural or pseudo-angelic status. An eager 
adapter of religious symbols, he even announced once that he had converted to Judaism, he 
said, ‘because of my background’ and ‘because my ancestry links me to Judaism’, while 
declining to elaborate on what links might be.
284
 
5.1. Second civil war in Liberia-1999 
The formation in 1999 of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) 
under command of Sekou Conneh  marked the beginning of the end. The commander was 
married to Ayesha Conneh, the spiritual advisor of Guinean president Lansana Conteh. 
LURD was founded in 1999, composed mostly of Liberians of Mandingo and Krahn 
ethnicity. LURD members moved freely on Guinean territory and used Guinean border 
towns as a point of transit points. In addition , LURD also recruited soldiers in Guinean 
refugee camps (HRW 2003).  Its first significant incursion into Liberia was in April 2000, 
when fighters crossed into Lofa county, attacking civilians in areas the Guinean border. US 
for its part began a program of support for military training for the Guinean military, which 
in turn backed up LURD in its cross-border raids into northern Liberia. Having dithered for 
a decade through following a policy of avoiding military involvement in Liberia, 
unofficially but unmistakably the US at last had an armed proxy in the region for its battle 
against the rule of Charles Taylor.
285
 
LURD’s leadership, under Sekou Conneh, had always sworn that its only objective was to 
remove Taylor from power and that they would hand back control of captured towns, 
plantations, mines, Ports and other assets of the country as soon as he left office. Over the 
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course of the following three years, LURD fought a campaign against Taylor government 
first in Lofa County and then in the west and centre of Liberia, ultimately capturing a large 
swath of territory and moving on to encircle the capital. Its campaign further impaired the 
government’s effort to revive the economy, and, with an international arms embargo 
imposed on Liberia but not Sierra Leone or Guinea, both of which armed and supported 
LURD, it was an uphill struggle to keep the rebels at bay.
286
 
The resurgent regional civil war that began in Liberia  in 1999, engulfing Sierra Leone and 
a also parts of Guinea, soon dragged yet another victim into its clutches. Confronting an 
increasingly well-backed threat from LURD in the north west, the Taylor government’s 
stance towards its eastern neighbor was then polarized by a political and constitutional 
crisis which broke out in September 2002 in Cote d’Ivoire.287  Could we say that the 
LURD  was chasing Taylor into ‘his  mothers' womb as well?  Yes of course! This is 
‘because the hole you dig, may someday be your own." Goes African proverb. 
With the region now awash with Sierra Leonean and Liberian mercenaries, after over a 
decade of armed conflict in both countries, many who had apparent interest in 
demobilization and civilian life were drawn to wherever there were opportunities to fight 
and, of course to loot. The Ivorian president, Laurent Gbagbo, was fighting civil war in his 
own country against northern rebels, and sent a delegation to President Taylor in Monrovia 
seeking helicopter support for his forces. But the old regional alliances between formal 
regional franco-phone alliances had broken down since the days of Fèlix  Houphonuèt- 
Boigny and his successor Henri Conan Bédié. Burkina Faso’s Blaise- Compaoré was now 
sympathetic towards the northern rebels in Cote d’Ivoire’s civil strife, and maintaining US 
acceptance through a good relations with Compaoré was now a priority for Taylor, so he 
turned down Gbagbo’s request and sided with his opponents.288 
Gbagbo took revenge on Taylor in 2003, and in the process helped to seal the Liberian 
president’s fate, by backing and arming another Liberian Anti-Taylor faction allied to 
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LURD in the south-East of the country. The group, led by Thomas Nimley, known as the 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), succeeded in capturing the key logging 
port of Harper, and later Buchannan, as well as much territory that lay in between. By mid 
-2003, the combined forces of LURD and MODEL controlled over 70 percent of the 
Liberian territory, and it was Charles Taylor who found himself hemmed into enclave in 
Monrovia, defending the capital against well-armed and well-backed. As fighting against 
LURD,  There were UN security council resolutions condemning his regime for arms sales 
and in 2002 the UN-sponsored special court for Sierra Leone  was established.
289
 
The absence of capacity within Charles Taylor’s government, which assumed power in 
1997, coupled with adherence to the principle of attaining peace at all costs, compromised 
efforts to bring to justice former combatants who were accused of atrocities. It is not 
surprising therefore that this contributed in part to the emergence of new groups who 
perpetrated further rounds of atrocities in the recent conflict. In the human rights abuses 
that followed, the protagonists carried out arbitrary killings, torture, cruel and inhuman 
treatment of prisoners, summary executions, rape, hostage taking, forced displacement of 
civilians, and forced labor, including recruitment of child soldiers.
290
 
The collapse of states like Liberia based upon patronage systems of rule also exposes the 
hollowness of claims that former  rulers acted for people on whose behalf they claimed 
sovereignty. Sovereignty was a pretext for extracting resources from outsiders in exchange 
for diplomatic support. Incumbent regimes and insurgents started  openly to contest state 
sovereignty, but not in terms of liberation for a particular people. War in both of these 
cases is an outgrowth of the struggle between once dominant regimes and increasingly 
enterprising strongmen to control markets, both internally and externally, and convert that 
control into political authority and turmoil.
291
 
First, contenders who seek to control elements of the once centralized patronage networks 
treat outsiders as though they were private traders. They use connections with outsiders to 
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accumulate more resources just like Charles Taylor did in Liberia. Here insurgencies can 
be regarded much like rival entrepreneurs.
292
 
Second, this political economy breaks down patronage systems and highlights the 
importance of the distribution of natural resources in driving warfare. Concentrated, 
portable natural resources attract outside partners, whose marketing connections, access to 
foreign exchange, and possession of private armies can be used to follow up on military 
advantages and deny resources to rivals. The political context of this partnership 
undermines the arguments of some observers that effective private militaries can be relied 
upon to restore failing states, not just incumbent rulers, in lieu of capacity or political will 
on the part of the United Nations or its member states.
293
 
Third, the Liberian  experiences demonstrates the lack of reciprocal relations between 
rulers and the bulk of local populations. Cold War era patronage networks provided some 
support for significant segments of the population. Some hitch their fortunes to strongman 
entrepreneurs. Others try to opt out of political deals altogether. This situation points to the 
importance of decentralizing control over natural resources, so that potential rulers are 
forced to bargain with local populations, protecting community interests as a way to 
advance their own.
294
 
Research on contemporary civil war points to the salience of economic factors in 
exacerbating and perpetuating conflict. While their role in the onset of conflict is typically 
indirect, they can influence the character, duration, and adaptation of war in consequential 
ways
295
, together with low intensity conflict in which small arms are critical, and widely 
used, become a threatening to non-negotiable core value (national security) especially in 
developing countries of West African Sub-Region; in particular Liberia. 
                                                             
292
Cfr. Ibidem., 
293
Cfr. Rubin, 1997, Harper's Magazine, February, pp.44-55. 
294
Cfr.William Reno, Warlord Economies in Liberia and. Sierra Leone, August 1997. 
295
 Cfr.For further reading on the political economy of armed conflict, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 
Greed and Grievance, Policy Research Working Group Paper no. 2355, Washington DC; The World Bank; 
Cfr. also Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,  2000); Cfr. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political 
Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. 
69 
 
The process of state collapse in Liberia also had a major impact on the ability of the state 
to guarantee the rule of law. As sufficiently argued by Abiodun Bashua in Chapter Six, the 
rule of law, coupled with good governance, respect for human dignity, and sustainable 
economic development, is a sine qua non for sustainable peace and stability. This facet was 
missing in the Liberian environment, which encouraged further fratricidal tendencies.
296
 
As a consequence, there has been so many statistical data about the people who are being 
affected right from economy to insurgency. This is due to SALW in Liberia that has been 
used to terrorize  both the Liberians and neighboring countries creating a great negative 
impact on social-economic development. Thus, a large number of documents by non-
governmental organizations, international organization and even articles in the peer-
reviewed medical literature have cited figures which are increasingly been used as 
‘evidence’ by those concerned with weapons availability and misuse, but which are 
difficult, if not impossible to substantiate. 
Christopher Louse, in his work ‘Relationship between the proliferation of Small arms and 
Light weapons, stated that the effect of globalization and societal disintegration have been 
greatly under-researched. The absence of serious enquiries into this phenomenon is all the 
more significant because such weapons continue to be most commonly used in many of the 
violent civil and ethnic and religious conflicts of the post cold war era.
297
 
But Krause argues that the covert trade in weapons involves three systems; the black 
markets, secret government to government deals, and sponsorship of sub-state groups. This 
last category usually relies upon sympathetic support from a foreign government, although 
private assistance from arms dealers or altruistic interest groups is not uncommon. 
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Estimate of the size of this trade range from $2billion in a lean year to $10 billion in a 
profitable one.
298
 
Krause further asserted that the availability and use of more sophisticated weapons has 
contributed to the erosion of state authority. This has become particularly evident in the 
escalation of crime. It is widely held that guns are not the root cause of crime, but rather, 
that, crime is rooted in the inept structural forms which create or sustain human insecurity 
in its broad sense. It is clear that the proliferation of SALW is in part, a response to 
demand for personal security when normative social relations collapse or are seen to be on 
the brink of collapse. It is also evident that the widespread availability of arms accelerates 
and appreciates dysfunctional trends.
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Conclusion 
In summary, American neo-colonialism played a pivotal role in helping to generate the 
multidimensional crises of underdevelopment that culminated in civil conflict, and 
eventually the first Liberian civil war in 1989. Using an assortment of neo-colonial 
instruments, the United States exploited Liberia economically, politically and strategically. 
The United States’ stranglehold was made possible through the establishment of a patron-
client relationship between the American government and various Liberian neo-colonial 
regimes. Using the power of the state, the various neocolonial regimes created the 
conditions for Liberia to serve the interests of the United States.  
These  Civil wars in Liberia did not come as a result  only from the impact of domestic 
social forces and the failure of governing elite. They  also emerged from forces, events, 
and activities originating outside the country, from the surrounding region or the world at 
large. It on this analysis that we shall see in the following chapter how one of the factors 
like SALW proliferation changed the face of Liberia in all spheres. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE THREAT OF THE ILLICIT PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT 
WEAPONS (SALWS) IN AFRICA:CASE STUDY LIBERIA 
Each individual has a set of beliefs, opinions, values and interests which shapes their 
attitude towards politics and the political process. These political ‘preferences’ often derive 
from deep historical or cultural identities such as nationality, religion, or language. 
Political preferences also stem from economic interests, such as whether a policy will 
increase a person’s income. Inevitably, different individuals and social groups have 
different preference and this produces conflicts.
300
 This is the case as we have seen in 
previous chapter about Liberia and its counter parts in West Africa. At the same time, the 
various conflicts in West Africa are woven together through strategic elite alliances, 
through regional (formal and informal) economy and trade networks, through the 
steady stream of refugees, and through the large amount of mercenaries301 moving 
between and among neighboring countries. There were also numerous reports of cross-
border movement of natural resources, weapons, with the political elites playing a 
central role in many of the activities that led to increase of proliferation of SALW in 
Liberia between 1989 t0 2003. 
1.0 Definition of Terms and Concepts 
1.1  Proliferation 
This is the spread of SALW, either into a country or across international bounders. It may 
be vertical proliferation (meaning, an increase in the amount or devastating capacity of any 
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currently existing SALW within a state) or, Horizontal, (meaning, the spread of SALW to 
a state that have not previously possessed them).
302
 
1.2. Small Arms And Light Weapons 
The term “Small Arms and Light Weapons” will mean any portable lethal weapon that 
launches a shot, bullet, or projectile by the actions of an explosive. It can be referred also, 
to mean weapons that can be carried by a single person, either for militancy, military or 
civil use. The term covers a wide range of weapons from pistols, machine guns and other 
fire arms, to grenades, portable anti-tank systems and mortars
303
 not forgetting as well 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) although it at the beginning it was not indicated in the 
above definition.  
1.2.1. Small Arms  
They are broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include inter alia 
revolver and self loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and 
light machine guns.
304
 
1.2.2 Light Weapons 
They are weapons designed for use by two or more persons serving as crew, although, 
some may be carried and used by a single person. They include inter alia, heavy machine 
guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted launchers, portable antiaircraft guns, portable 
launcher of anti-tank missiles, rocket launchers and mortars of a caliber of less than 100 
millimeters. Although SALW are thus, distinct categories of weapons, the United Nation 
Development Program (UNDP) uses the term ‘small arms’ to cover both small arms and 
light weapons.
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 Although UN panel provided the definition of SALW, Governments have yet to agree on a 
universal definition of small arms and light weapons.
306
 Differences of opinion have 
centered on civilian versus military classifications, and on whether certain weapons such as 
shotguns or hunting rifles should be included. Moreover, the distinction between what 
constitutes a ‘small arm’ and what qualifies as a ‘light weapon’ can vary from document to 
document. 
Until the establishment, in 1996, of a Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, the 
UN had not significantly addressed SALW. The UN Experts Panel 1997 report, roughly 
categorized certain varieties of SALW as well as their ammunitions and explosives. In 
addition, the Panel listed: ammunition and explosives, which includes cartridges (rounds) 
for small arms; shells and missiles for light weapons; mobile containers with missiles or 
shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems; anti-personnel and anti-tank 
hand grenades; landmines; and explosives.
307
 
The Panel provided additional clarity for some terms, obfuscated others, and chose not to 
address anti-personnel landmines. Notably, it used the concept of portability to delimit and 
distinguish SALW  from each other and from larger conventional weapons. According to 
the Panel, the defining characteristic of small arms was that they could be carried ‘by one 
person’. By contrast, light weapons necessitated transportation ‘by two or more people, a 
pack animal or a light vehicle’.308 The Panel indicated that anti-personnel landmines came 
under its mandate, but decided not to include them in its deliberations as the international 
community was dealing with the issue in other forums.
309
 
The portability distinction was not, however, uniformly applicable to the weapons in the 
two categories. Some light weapons in the Panel’s list, such as rocket-propelled grenade 
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launchers, can be carried and operated
310
 by a single person, while some small arms, such 
as light (as opposed to heavy) machine guns, may need to be transported and operated by a 
small team of people (particularly when large volumes of ammunition are involved). The 
Survey largely accepts the categorization for light weapons that the 1997 UN Panel of 
Governmental Experts used.  
Bearing in mind these distinct definitions, in Africa it is estimated that half of the world 
trade in small arms is represented by illicit trafficking. An estimated 8 million weapons 
were circulating in West Africa alone, and 50 percent of them are probably illicit.311 
Although the UN has guaranteed a sum of $300 to each combatant handing in weapons 
in Liberia, the problem of small arms going out of control in the country was not 
solved. One of the reasons for this is that,  small arms are one of the main features of 
illicit transnational activity in West Africa. The availability of SALW is often linked to 
the changing nature or transformation of conflict since the end of the Cold War from 
predominantly interstate to predominantly intrastate. Arms transfers during the Cold 
War were primarily motivated by ideological and geopolitical considerations and 
primarily consisted of heavy, high maintenance equipment. In the post Cold War era, 
arms trafficking in light weapons in the gray and black markets, Illicit and Black-Market 
Channels, Cross-border arms trafficking (we shall discuss more on these factors later) 
increased. These light weapons are of low-maintenance, durables, including AK-47s,312 
rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, and land mines. The primary motivation for 
the suppliers in these transfers is economic gain.
313
 
                                                             
310
 The word ‘operated’ here does not include ancillary (although often necessary) personnel, including 
spotting or security details that usually accompany the deployment of light weapons, such as MANPADS and 
mortars. 
311
 Information based on interviews in the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, April 2000. 
312
 The AK-47 is a selective-fire, gas-operated 7.62×39mm assault rifle, first developed in the Soviet Union 
Design work on the AK-47 began in the last year of World War II (1945). After the war in 1946. In 1948, the 
fixed-stock version was introduced into active service with selected units of  the Soviet Army. An early 
development of the design was the AKS (S—Skladnoy or "folding"), which was equipped with an under-
folding metal shoulder stock. In 1949, it was officially accepted by the Soviet Armed Forces and used by the 
majority of the member states of the Warsaw Pact (www. ospreypublishing.com, retrieved on  25
.
09.2014). 
313
Ibidem.,   
75 
 
According to Dr Amos Sawyer, former Liberia interim president (1990- 1994); “The 
proliferation of SALW in Africa have been stamped as channels that increases repression 
and the capacity by which those who wield them become increasingly more repressive 
against innocent civilian populations”. He made this statement while serving as a key note 
speaker at the African Day program of the of the UN conference on illicit trade in SALW 
at New York (which held from 9th-20th July, 2001).
314
 SALW have killed far more than 
biological, chemical or any other weapons of mass destruction. According to the UN 
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/50/70, 15th January, 1996, SALW are the most 
devastating conventional weapons.
315
 
Some other  scholars argue that  SALW  do not cause conflict, is accepted, but, it is 
believed that its effect on conflicts cannot be ignored. According to Ero and Ndinga-
Muvumba, “While SALW do not of course, cause conflicts, they soon become part of the 
conflict equation by fuelling and exacerbating underlying tension, generating more 
insecurity and adding to the number of casualties”.316 
Citing Abdel-Fatau Musah, Egungbemi says that, in Africa, the sources of SALW 
proliferation are many and varied. While the thrust of international efforts to curbing 
proliferation tend to concentrate on the manufacturer and supply of new weapons, a major 
pipeline of SALW remains the stockpiles that were pumped into Africa in the ‘70s and 
‘80s by the ex-Soviet Union, the USA and their allies to fan or sponsor proxy interstate 
wars. These leftover weapons, Musah claimed, have found their way through clandestine 
networks involving rogue arms broker, primary military companies, shady airlines 
companies and local trans-border smuggler to exacerbate ongoing tension and facilitate the 
growth of new ones in the country.
317
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1.3. The Proliferation And The Use Of SALW  In Liberia  
As opposed to heavy conventional weapons like battle tanks armored vehicle, artillery, 
warship, combat aircraft and other heavy arms and weapons, many features make SALW 
attractive to paramilitary, irregular forces and even untrained civilians to use. Apart from 
the fact that many governments increased their demands for SALW to counter political 
insurgencies and suppress domestic opposition movements. some of  factors that favored 
the Proliferation of SALW among others are; simplicity and durability, Low Costs and 
Wide Availability, Portability and Easiness to Conceal, lethality, porous border, 
Ineffectiveness to guarantee internal security, Corruption and Low Income, insurgency and 
terrorism, surplus of arms, peace keeping mission. 
1.3.1. Simplicity and Durability 
Due to their relative simple nature, SALW are quite easy to use even by people who have 
had very little or no military training. This explains their use by untrained combatants and 
even child soldiers as it was the case in many armed conflicts like in Liberia. In addition, 
they require little maintenance and logistical support and can remain operational for very 
long periods of time for example AK-47, in cases where they begin to break down due to 
age and wear, they can be replaced by new ones or spare parts taken from other 
weapons
318
. 
1.3.2. Low Costs and Wide Availability 
Due to the fact that the production of SALW does not necessarily involve sophisticated or 
hi-tech capacity and also because they are produced for military, police and civilian usage, 
this makes them cheap to procure especially as much of them are being recycled from 
conflict to conflict. A brand new AK-47, much coveted for its firepower and simplicity, 
can be purchased from a Russian factory at 240 US Dollars depending on the derivative 
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(type) and the amount bought. In certain parts of Africa, where supplies are plentiful, it can 
be bought for 30 USD. The availability and cheapness of SALW in Sub-Sahara Africa is 
further enhanced by the fact that 12 African countries have joined the ranks of producers, 
though, on a much lower scale. They include; Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Namibia, Kenya, 
South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Sudan, Tanzania, Guinea and Ethiopia
319
. 
1.3.3. Portability and Easiness to Conceal 
As their definitions demonstrate, SALW can be moved from one place to another by a 
single person or by a light vehicle. They can thus be smuggled quite easily from one place 
to another. In the ECOWAS Sub- region, SALW shipments are sometimes disguised as 
non-lethal cargo or as humanitarian supplies and are often discovered only after the 
traffickers fail to bribe police and customs officers or when a plane crashes and reveals the 
hidden nature of its cargo.
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1.3.4. Lethality 
Though many SALW are quite simplistic in nature, their lethality has increased making it 
possible for a single combatant to constitute a big threat to an entire society. Today’s 
assault rifles and other automatic weapons can fire up to several hundred rounds a minute. 
An AK-47 assault rifle can release 600 rounds per minute as long as the trigger remains 
pressed down and when being operated in automatic mode. Its maximum range lies 
between 800 to 1000 meters, but its accuracy is guaranteed when used by a trained 
marksman with the range of 400 to 600 meters.
321
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1.3.5. Porous Borders 
Due to the sheer size of Africa, there is the chronic problem of porous border
322
 security. 
Arms traffickers exploit this situation to smuggle SALW into the country. It is also 
interesting to observe that all three largest sub-Saharan countries, namely Sudan (the 
continent’s overall largest), the  DRC (3rd overall largest) and Chad (5th overall largest) 
have been experiencing instability and armed conflict for long. It may well be that their 
size and their porous borders make it easy for weapons to be smuggled inflaming and 
protracting violence.
323
 
1.3.6. Ineffectiveness to guarantee internal security 
In Liberia, citizens felt a strong need to acquire arms in order to protect themselves and 
their property from armed violence. This mostly occurred in places where there was lack of 
confidence in security forces, understaffing or sometimes simply the inability of security 
agencies to carry out their duty effectively. This can clearly be demonstrated in Nimba 
county. Where there was a lot of political chaos characterized by dilemma of security to 
protect the citizens. 
1.3.7. Corruption and Low Income 
The vicious cycle of low salaries and corruption creates breeding grounds for the 
proliferation of SALW among the civilian population. Customs officers were bribed by 
weapons dealers, while soldiers, police officers and security forces are known to have sold 
government weapons to criminals.
324
 In some situations they are being hired to criminals 
than selling. A live example was along Mano River in Liberia. 
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1.3.8. Insurgency and Terrorism 
Political instability, violence and lack of a culture for peace in  African states like Liberia, 
have remained a factor for the destabilizing use of SALW or explosives. Other factors that 
encourage the use of small arms are; drug trafficking, smuggling, criminality, political 
thuggery, and terrorisms. All these acts, involves the use of weapons either for offensive or 
defensive purposes.  
1.3.9. Surplus of arms 
The more these arms are in governments hands, the more  they slip into private hands. This 
is in conformity with the realist assumption that the more a country girds up for security by 
way of armament, the more danger and security threat the country is exposed to. This is the 
case  in Liberia. 
1.4. Peace keeping missions.
325
 
Several UN peace keeping or post conflict peace-building operations have resulted in 
incomplete disarmament of former combatants owing to peace agreements or mandates 
which did not cover SALW disarmament, or the shortfalls in implementation of the 
mandates because of inadequate operational guidance or resources. This large number of 
surplus of weapons became available in the conflict areas for criminal activities, 
recirculation and illicit trafficking.
326
 
Some of these weapons for example AK-47, has become more of cultural icon. It is not 
more than an effective tool of war; in many countries it featured on the coasts of  arms: 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique and previously on that of Burkina Faso (until it adopted a 
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more peace- oriented symbol), and appears on the Mozambican flag and currency until 
2005.
327
 
However, non- state groups in different environs also use AK-47s and other guns in their 
logos. According to Rachel Stohl Matt Schroeder Dan Smith, “The Small Arms Trade” 
they cite examples like how Hamas and the An-Najah Student Cell of the Islamic Palestine 
Block use the M16 and three well-known terrorist groups use the AK-47 in their insignias 
to signify a commitment to armed struggle. They further elaborate that, the Palestinian 
Liberation Front, which operates in Israel, Lebanon and Egypt, has AK-47s in its emblems 
and the salafist Group for Call and Combat, which operates in Algeria, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania and Niger, has a sword and an AK-47 in its symbol. Hezbollah’s symbol 
includes a fist clutching an AK-47, with AK-47 forming the ‘I’ of Allah’.328 
In anthropological  platform, AK-47 takes a new trend. Like in South Africa, an anti-
apartheid music group named itself AK-47. The name ‘Kalash’, is common in some 
countries in Africa due to history in the use of AK-47. In another development, when 
Kalashnikov was introduced to guerilla fighters in Mozambique, they told him (founder) 
that they had named babies after his weapons.
329
  
In another development, images of the AK-47 appear in some conflicts. Video of Osama 
Bin Laden showed him firing the above or sitting with one close to hand. This can be 
viewed in video released by  from ‘Boko Haram’ as well. when the US forces  captured  
Saddam Hussein’s , there was a video show of two AKs in his bunger.  
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1.5. SALW Trafficking Methods And Routes  
The following list of legal, illegal and covert methods by which SALW are sold, 
transferred and exchanged underscores the complexity of the problem: 
 Grants or gifts by governments to allied governments abroad; 
  Sales by governments to client governments abroad; 
 Commercial sales by private firms to governments and private dealers in other 
countries; 
 Technology transfers associated with domestic arms production in the developing 
nations; 
 Covert transfers by governments to friendly insurgent and separatist groups in 
other countries; 
 Gifts by governments to armed militias and paramilitary organizations linked to 
the ruling party or the dominant ethnic group; 
 Black-market sales to the governments of "pariah" countries and to insurgent and 
separatist forces; 
  Theft of government and privately owned arms by insurgent, criminal and 
separatist forces; and 
  Exchanges between insurgent and criminal organizations, whether for profit or in 
pursuit of common political objectives. 
Practically every illegal small arm began as a legal small arm, whether in the hands of the 
state, non-state actors, or civilians. Worldwide there are as many SALW in the hands of 
civilians as in the hands of states. It is estimated that more than 500,000 of these are stolen 
each year
330
 and enter illegal markets. Indeed, in many regions of the world diversion from 
civilian supplies is the principal source of illegal SALW. There is a range of ways in which 
in civilian possession are diverted to illicit markets including through: illegal manufacture 
and modification; illegal sales and transfers (primary, secondary via brokers); illegal resale 
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and “straw purchases”; theft; diversion from surplus  (illegal or unwanted weapons); and 
Falsification of documents and illegal importation (for example. concealment).
331
 
In addition, experience shows clearly that if surplus SALW are not removed from 
uncontrolled circulation following conflict, levels of violence remain high, as interpersonal 
violence substitutes for violence between warring factions. The dimensions of illicit 
trafficking vary from region to region and only a fraction of incidents are detected. 
Relatively few countries systematically collect or analyze data on SALW which are 
recovered by law enforcement officials. 
Illicit trafficking in weapons is understood to cover that international trade in conventional 
weapons, which is contrary to the laws of the states and/ or international laws. Illicit 
trafficking in such weapons plays a major role in the violence currently affecting some 
countries and regions, by supplying the instruments use to destabilize the societies and 
governments, encourage crimes and foster trans-border terrorism, drug trafficking, 
mercenaries’ activities and the violation of human right. Much of the supply and 
acquisition of SALW is legitimate trade which occurs among governments or among legal 
entities authorized by the governments. 
During the Cold War, and in present times, states have secretly carried out transfer of 
SALW; such transfers are not necessarily illicit. Any transfer, not approved by competent 
authorities in recipient states could, however, be classified by that state as interference in 
its internal affairs and therefore, illegal. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, former executive 
secretary of ECOWAS, puts the estimated amount of SALW in West Africa at 8 million. 
The weapons are recycled between Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and among 
belligerents and in other conflict Zones such as Casamance province and the rest of 
Southern Senegal, Northern Ghana, Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau.
332
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The intensification of hostilities along the Guinean-Liberian-Sierra Leone border 
heightened demand for arms in that already saturated area. Liberian dissidents operating 
across the Guinean border,  allegedly received arms and ammunition delivered to the port 
of Conakry. Several reports have suggested that Liberian timber exports increasingly were 
used to finance and smuggle weapons, further facilitating Taylor's ability to evade UN 
sanctions directed against Liberia's exchange of conflict diamonds for arms.
333
 
Some of these arms are manufactured locally, while others are imported into the sub-
region. In 2002 and 2003, for example, Cote d’Ivoire  allegedly received several deliveries 
of military equipment, while Liberia received forty nine deliveries in 2002, and twenty five 
deliveries in 2003. Also, some countries in the sub-region, especially Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, 
and Sierra Leone have flourishing industries of local arm.
334
  
Domestic purchasing laws facilitated the entrance of small arms in Liberia via  the illicit 
market. In Liberia, where there were  no limits to how many guns a person  might have 
legally own or bought at one time, the phenomenon of “straw purchasing”  became 
common. Individuals bought several weapons at a time and then illegally resold them, 
often brought  the weapons across international borders to sell  guns where laws were less 
restrictive. 
In Liberia, the illegal trading networks of illicit arms and extensive arms trafficking 
consisted of four major main transnational actors: the political authority (Liberian 
government), the natural resources (more so Timber and Diamond among others) and the 
arms suppliers. The heydays of this trade were under the regime of Charles Taylor. Liberia 
being among the weakest and most fragmented State in Africa characterized as a failed 
state and said to have become a de facto UNOIML trusteeship.
335
 As previously 
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mentioned, such a situation  facilitated the existence of transnational networks. Risse- 
Kapen divided transnational actors into two groups according to motives. One 
economically and another ideologically/politically motivated. In the economic motivation 
it includes groups like Transnational Corporations (TNCs), Multi-national Corporation ( 
MNCs) that often form part of illegal transnational networks to the proliferation of SALW. 
The other group has a range of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs).
336
 
The case of Charles Taylor is a clear example of economically motivated transnational 
actor although he has portrayed himself as mainly ideologically motivated. The political 
authority of Liberia is severely divided between different political actors and warlords. 
1.5.1. Political authority 
In terms political authority we shall focus mainly on Charles Taylor as protagonist of the 
time. We shall examine among other factors his coordination with external allies. 
Throughout the Liberian conflict, Taylor controlled about 90 percent of Liberia, including 
the natural resource wealth by focusing on commercial enterprises to assist with financing. 
Taylor embraced  relationships, which provided his armies with the necessary weapons to 
control  Liberia. “The Liberian civil war which was launched from neighboring Cote 
d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso where the conduits for most of the weapons used by at least one 
of the rebel factions”.337 Additionally, “Charles Taylor helped found and train the RUF and 
let Sierra Leonean rebels use Liberia for its resupply routes”.338 
These relationships provided important links that allowed Taylor’s criminal enterprise to 
flourish. The network was also crucial in providing entree to criminal elements from 
Liberia into other state structures. One of his closest confidants, Ibrahim Bah, played a big 
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role in escorting diamond buyers and weapons merchants to Burkina Faso, Niger, Cote 
d’Ivoire and elsewhere to do business.339 
Through Taylor’s patronage, the RUF successfully kept Sierra Leone in conflict for ten 
years of destruction and brutality. “The RUF became infamous for maiming and killing by 
chopping off the arms, breasts, hands, legs, tongues, and heads of their victims, and it was 
responsible for the deaths of untold thousands of innocent people”.340 
1.5.2. Transnational actors and arms suppliers 
Besides neighboring countries, Taylor garnered relationships with different 
businesspersons throughout the world. Some of these businesspersons included Russian 
weapons dealer, Viktor Bout, also known as the “Merchant of Death”. Bout had two 
important assets that set him apart from other traffickers: a private fleet of about fifty aging 
Russian-made aircraft, acquired as the Soviet bloc crumbled, and the ability to procure not 
only weapons, but advanced weapons systems (anti-aircraft, anti-tank systems, attack 
helicopters), on short notice.
341
 
Taylor and Bout started working through Sanjivan Ruprah, a Kenyan in Taylor’s inner 
circle, when Taylor decided he needed attack helicopters to challenge the newly formed 
rebel group, LURD.
342
 Besides working for years in West Africa, Bout also had 
connections to the Taliban in supplying weapons and also running and maintaining Ariana 
Airlines, the Taliban’s official airline.343 
Under Taylor’s patronage, international arms dealers operated alongside al Qaeda 
operatives, Israeli mercenaries, Hezbollah diamond merchants, Russian and Balkan 
organized crime figures and South African mercenaries. Because he controlled the borders, 
Taylor and his security apparatus were able to guarantee that even wanted criminals could 
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enter and exit with impunity.
344
 An  aspect which first fell under the spotlight following the 
1989 al-Qaeda bombings in Nairobi (Kenyan capital) and Dar -es- Salam (Tanzanian 
capital). 
Other connections Taylor developed included Leonid Minin, a Ukrainian-Israeli citizen 
who specialized in surplus weapons stock from Kiev; Aziz Nassour and Samih Osailly, 
Lebanese diamond merchants with connections with former Israeli military officers and 
Russian merchants; Balkans’ weapons trader, Slobodan Teic; and Iranian weapons dealer 
Ali Kleilat
345
 but more important to note is Leonid Minin. 
Leonid  Minin liked he was a pilots from Eastern Europe made sorties for the rebel alliance 
from bases inside Liberia
346
 his  anonymous  stay in ‘Hotel Europa’,  in Northern Italy just 
outside Milan , where $75 for  a double room and the privacy of all kind, of which he was 
accommodating himself in until the wee hours of August 5, 2000, when police, acting on a 
tip, barged into Room 341 and found Minin surrounded by four naked prostitutes,
347
 58 
grams of cocaine and half a million dollars worth of diamonds.
348
 
According to FRONTLINE/World report showed that the Milan customs police had had 
Minin under surveillance since 1992 while investigating an international criminal 
organization involved in international laundering  in drug and money through the foreign 
bank accounts of Italian businessmen. The report also says that in 1997 Italian intelligence 
services conducted a "complex investigation on a criminal group of Ukrainian origins 
associated with the so-called 'Russian Mafia' involved in international arms and drug 
trafficking, money laundering, extortion and other offenses. This group was headed by the 
Ukrainian businessman Leonid Minin”.349 
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The most shocking finding was picked up by the Western media, that $32 billion in arms, 
equipment and military property were stolen from Ukrainian stocks within six years. In 
fact, this figure referred to the total value of all Ukrainian military property real estate, 
factories, planes, ships, tanks as well as stockpiles of small arms, ammunition, uniforms 
and other goods which declined from $89 billion in 1992 to $57 billion by 1998, due also 
to loss of market value and lack of maintenance.
350
 
A further search turned up a green briefcase stuffed with some 1,500 documents in 
English, Russian, Dutch, and French. Months later, after translating and reviewing the 
documents, Italian law enforcement authorities discovered that they had stumbled upon an 
international arms dealer. Minin, they say, had been running guns from Eastern Europe to 
the regime of Charles Taylor in Liberia and to the RUF, a vicious guerrilla group in 
neighboring Sierra Leone both of which are banned from receiving weapons under a 
United Nations arms embargo. The paper trail seized by the police offers a rare glimpse 
into the new and usually opaque world of post-Cold-War international arms brokers. It 
shows how a new generation of black market suppliers have helped turn the former Soviet 
bloc into a weapons warehouse for outlaw regimes, insurgencies, and terrorist groups.
351
 
The Key to the Italian government's case were the end-user certificates (EUC) found in his 
hotel room. Minin was charged with international gun smuggling and using a fake EUC to 
sell arms to Liberia and Sierra Leone. He was implicated for his role in two shipments: 113 
tons of arms delivered to Ivory Coast on July 12, 2000; and 68 tons to Burkina Faso on 
March 13, 1999. The smuggling charge is for violating a U.N. arms embargo adopted by 
the Italian parliament, thus becoming Italian law. It is the first such case which does not 
involve a national law separate from the embargo. Little is known about the fate of the 
sales Minin had proposals to broker at the time he was caught. Valery Cherny, Minin's 
partner from Avia trend who brokered the purchase of arms for the Ivory Coast deal, told 
U.N. investigators $750,000 worth of weapons were still waiting for delivery when Minin 
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"disappeared" in June 2001. The documents seized at Minin's arrest indicated a variety of 
other deals at various stages of completion.
352
 
The Italians were not the only ones who were worried about the likes of Minin. U.S. 
officials and security experts were also worried as well saying that the small-arms trade 
fuels the growing instability that breeds and harbors terrorism. "The chaos that exists in 
parts of Africa has created a black hole where terrorists can come and go and conceal their 
activities," says an administration official who requested anonymity. His views are echoed 
by Republican. Ed Royce (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee. At a 
hearing on Nov. 16, he charged that international terrorist cells are operating in several 
African countries. "U.S. policies toward all regions of the world have been forced to adjust 
to the post-September 11 world," he said. "The general weakness of African governments 
makes parts of the continent hospitable grounds for terrorist operations." 
One of the hospitable parts of the continent that Royce had in mind is Liberia, where arms 
dealers, drug traffickers, Eastern European mobsters, and mercenaries have all found safe 
haven under Taylor. So, too, had Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network, according to ‘The 
Washington Post’ which reported that al Qaeda set up shop in Liberia in 1998 and had 
earned millions of dollars by buying cheap diamonds from Taylor's government and selling 
them in Europe. In March 2002, the U.S. government backed a United Nations resolution 
that banned travel by senior Liberian officials and Monrovia's chief financial and military 
supporters, including Minin. Then, the Bush administration  supported efforts to tighten 
sanctions in an effort to cut the flow of weapons to Liberia and the RUF, which was 
supported by Taylor's regime. 
Lee Wolosky, a former National Security Council official, calls black-market dealers a 
new and significant security threat. "There can be no world order with these international 
criminal syndicates running amok," says Wolosky, who until  July headed a little-known 
interagency working group charged with monitoring and controlling the small arms trade. 
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"They have significantly increased regional destabilization in Africa and threaten the 
transition to law-based democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe." 
While Colonel Gadaffi Libyan offered training camps creating the most important link in 
the military preparations, access to connections in Abidjan, Danane and San Pedro, were 
for Taylor the key to his financial readiness. His ability to tap into powerful networks 
established in Cote D’Ivoire over decades by Liberia’s Americo-Liberian and business 
families was an important asset. Taylor’s ability to earn the confidence of the exiled True 
Party business aristocracy helped him to reach clients  for Liberian commodities, the 
critical source of the foreign exchange he would need to finance his military campaign.
353
 
But what earned Charles Taylor foreign exchange? This question drives us to a natural 
resource as one source of financial income for Taylor. Thus we shall analyze the 
following:  Bong Iron ore mine, Timber Companies, Nimba Mining Company, Diamond 
Mines, Liberian Maritime registry system. 
1.5.2.1. Financial income earning of Taylor 
1.5.2.1.1. Bong Iron ore  
The canalization of first major business deal under Taylor is abundant  Bong Iron ore 
mine which had been once a German owned enterprise. Taylor arranged for the 
dismantling and resale abroad equipment from the disused mine, earning valuable foreign 
exchange in the process, with which he then effectively founded his future foreign 
exchange operations, via a financial entity known as ‘Bong Bank’.354 In NPFL controlled 
Buchanan, Taylor reportedly subcontracted out the handling of port operations to a 
Western owned operator, the Associated Development Corporation.
355
 Again the foreign 
management role provided an added measure of legitimacy as well as offering new 
business referrals, which included Lebanese and American concerns with an interest in 
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using the port.
356
 This Business continued until ECOMOG finally captured and ransacked 
Buchanan in 1993, putting an end to iron ore shipments.
357
 
It is estimated Taylor made between   $105-450 million from 1992-2003.
358
  Focusing first 
on the sale of mining machinery from an abandoned German-operated ore company, 
Taylor then collaborated with Firestone Tire and Rubber to cooperate in rubber production 
and marketing, organizing rubber workers in exchange for communication facilities.
359
 
Firestone provided both rubber revenue for the NPFL and when forward military base 
within striking distance of Monrovia from which the NPFL could attack the capital. The 
IGNU was particularly indignant over the role of Firestone in what it saw as its facilitation 
of the October 1992 ‘operation Octopus’ attack on Monrovia. Iron ore was historically the 
mainstay of the Liberian economy, accounting for 40 percent of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 1975.
360
 
1.5.2.1.2.  Timber Companies. 
Timber, and in particular the African hardwood so prized in the European furniture 
industry, found ready buyers operating through Cote d’Ivoire, and vast amounts of wood 
were hauled through Danane across the Ivorian border to the north or directly to San Pedro 
for shipment to Europe. Charles Taylor’s brother Bob played the key role handling forestry 
operations and managing timber exports from the Liberian side, while much of the wood 
thus exported was handled in Cote d’Ivoire by French and Lebanese businesses. Exiled 
Americo-Liberian businessman and former ministers from the Doe government were 
among those to set up business in San Pedro, British, Chinese and Russian interests also 
had commodity dealings with Taylor through Cote d’Ivoire.361 
Taylor turned his attention to the timber trade, swapping arms for timber. Establishing a 
“Forestry Development Authority”, collected cash for timber licenses and rough log export 
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taxes . Through the timber trade, he made an estimated $23 million from 1997-2003.
362
 
The timber industry continued to be a vital source of funding for Liberia’s illegal arms 
shipments, with logging companies themselves serving as arms importers and weapons 
transporters. The private logging company militias fought alongside the AFL and the 
notorious ATU in their battles with the rebel group LURDs. The presence of several of 
these logging companies, and their close ties to international diamond and arms traffickers, 
became a serious threat to the peace and security of the region.
363
 
Information obtained by Global Witness includes details of at least two shipments of arms 
imports in January 2002, and the involvement of Oriental Timber Corporation (OTC) 
personnel in delivering arms to government forces and their militias fighting in Gbarpolu 
county in lower Lofa. Furthermore, in logging company, militiamen perpetuated a reign of 
terror on ordinary people. Under the command of Guus  Kouwenhoven , Personnel of the 
OTC militia harassed and intimidated civilians as well as illegally arresting and detaining 
those they considered a threat to their interests. The Liberian government  converted most 
of the OTC and other logging companies’ militias into its own militia force under the 
command of General Cocoo Dennis, an executive of the Salami Molawi Incorporated 
logging company (by then known as the Mohammed Group of Companies ) and General 
Roland Duo, OTC chief of security.
364
 
Another Timber company,  Dalhoff, Larsen and Horneman  (DLH), from 2001-2003, it 
was a leading international timber wholesaler, bought timber from Liberian companies that 
were operating illegally and providing support to Charles Taylor’s regime during the civil 
war. DLH ignored repeated warnings from campaign groups over its handling of illegally 
obtained timber, and only acted when UN sanctions on Liberian timber came into force in 
2003. In November 2009, Global Witness and partner NGOs lodged a criminal complaint 
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against the company before the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Nantes, in France, under 
the charge of ‘recel’ , essentially accusing them of handling illegally obtained goods.365 
Thus far the United Nations had not taken  actions on Liberia in order to address the 
problem of Liberia’s timber industry; the situation meant that any delays in action will 
further hamper prospects for peace in one of the most violent regions in the world. 
“Regional peace cannot be achieved without halting illicit arms trade which is largely 
dependent on the timber trade,  a trade that is also actively involved in grave human rights 
abuses and which deprives the Liberian people of massive state revenues,” said Alice 
Blondel of Global Witness. “It is time for the International Community to stop stalling and 
take action. Failure to do so will undermine any peace that currently exists in the region” 
1.5.2.1.3. Nimba Mining Company 
Another major financial operation for Taylor was through a joint venture on the Liberia-
Guinea border, the Nimba Mining Company (NIMCO), former jewel in the crown of 
Liberia’s mineral economy based at Yekepa, a consortium of North American, European 
and Japanese mining firms. Through partnerships with the Liberian American Swedish 
Minerals Company, the Liberian Mining Cooperation, and the African Mining Company of 
Liberia, railroad passage in the port city of Buchanan stayed open for shipments of iron 
ore, allegedly netting Taylor $10 million a month for the railroad services.
366
 Through 
these connections with transnational foreign companies, Taylor was able to exercise 
political authority, generating a “warlord economy” worth approximately $200-250 million 
a year. With this wealth, his “war effort did not suffer greatly from his inability to 
command sovereignty over the Liberian state because he was able to wield a commercial 
empire and insulate himself from his enemies”.367 
                                                             
365
 On 18th November 2009, Global Witness and Sherpa, along with Greenpeace France, Amis de la Terre, 
and a prominent Liberian activist,  lodged a complaint before the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Nantes 
against Dalhoff, Larsen and Horneman (DLH), one of the world's leading international timber and wood 
products wholesalers. The organizations alleged that during the civil war in Liberia between 2001-2003, 
DLH bought timber from Liberian companies that provided support to Charles Taylor's brutal regime. 
366
Cfr. Reno, op cit., p.114 
367
Cfr. Ibidem.,p.191. 
93 
 
One advantage of the international interest was construction of large projects such as the 
NIMCO operation was that it added to the de facto international recognition of Charles 
Taylor’s administration via commercial involvements of reputable international 
corporations. Indeed the former management of LAMCO
368
 readily provided consulting 
services to the new local iron ore operator, the Liberian Mining Corporation, seemingly 
without reticence over the identity of their new business partner.
369
 
The French state-owned corporation Sollac participated in the NIMCO project which in 
March of 1991 bought 70,000 tons of iron ore, paying $ 80,000 per month to Taylor for its 
shipments. Accused by Paris media of using its state firm as a back-door method of 
funding the NPFL, France nevertheless continued to be proactive in both financial and 
diplomatic support of Taylor during his early years as the alternative government in 
Liberia. France also provided diplomatic help to the NPFL for its business activities, such 
as when in 1992, the UN tried to mount opposition to the Liberian mining operation on 
environmental grounds. This in turn helped him to underwrite RUF’s invasion into Sierra 
Leone and gain additional wealth through the Sierra Leone diamond mines.
370
 
1.5.2.1.4.  Diamond Mines 
The commercial influence of Greater Liberia  extended it territory and what had been 
historically established cross-border trade in diamonds with Sierra Leone, mostly 
conducted by small scale nomadic traders, now took on a new more strategic dimension. 
With diamonds flowing from Sierra Leone, as well as from Guinea and even as far as 
Angola, where Jona Savimbi’s The National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) rebels also sought a commercial route for the germs they extracted, 
Liberia became  the official export source for many more times the quantity of diamonds 
than it actually produced. Helped by it US dollar-based economy, not to mention a regular 
flight schedule operated by SABENA, the Belgium national carrier, by 1994 Liberia was 
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the third largest supplier of diamonds to Antwerp, and in the following years supplies from 
the country grew by 227 per cent in carat terms.
371
 
Because of their diamond wealth, throughout most of the war carried out by the RUF was 
better armed than its adversaries. Diamonds bought Kalashnikovs by the hundreds, 
Browning 12.7-millimeter heavy machine guns by the dozens, and ammunition in million-
block orders”.372 RUF rebels relied on Taylor to trade their diamonds for weapons and 
Taylor in turn sold the diamonds to merchants exporting diamonds to Belgium.
373
 From 
1997-2003, it is estimated Taylor accumulated approximated $40 million per year from 
diamonds.
374
 
1.5.2.1.5. Liberian Maritime registry system. 
Additional wealth accumulated by Taylor came from the Liberian maritime registry 
system. The Lucrative Maritime Agency, which had been run by a United States company, 
International Registries Inc. (IRI), with over 3,000 ships internationally using its flag of 
convenience registration, previously accounted for around $24 million annually as much as 
half of all Liberian government’s official revenues. After Taylor was elected, the agency 
was transformed into ‘The Liberia International Ship and Corporate Registry (LISCR), and 
run by US associates of the Liberian president, chief among whom was Washington 
political fixer and legal counsel, Lester Hyman, who later became the Registry’s chairman. 
Crucially the change of meant that the revenue of the LISCR now began to go to non-
government as well as government account, allowing Taylor option of directing the 
revenue of the LISCR’s revenue to purposes of his own choosing.375 
The registry covered a third of the world’s shipping tonnage, more than 1,700 vessels. 
“The flag of convenience allowed American shippers to hire crews outside American wage 
and labor laws; the ships was reflagged and made available to the U.S military in times of 
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war”.376  In 1999, Taylor fired the Virginia company that ran the registry for 50 years and 
set up a new one generating a steady flow of income averaging about $18 million a year. 
These resources garnered significant revenue for Liberia both during the civil war and 
under the Taylor administration. One scholar approximates the total value of “warlord 
trade” in Liberia from 1990 to 1994 at $100-150 million in diamonds; $121.6 million in 
timber; $81 million in rubber; and $95 million in iron ore. Following the 1997 elections, 
the trade was still highly lucrative, although official figures are likely lower than actual as 
a result of corruption, tax-evasive practices, and the trade’s underground nature. A 2001 
U.N. report described the income generated by diamonds, rubber, and timber that in 1999, 
Liberia officially exported 8,500 carats of diamonds,
377
 an amount estimated to constitute 
only 10-15 percent of the actual exports.
378
 Timber production was valued at $46.2 million 
USD between January and June 2001, but estimates mark the actual value of exports to be 
50 percent to 200 percent higher.
379
 The value of rubber totaled $33.3 million in 1999 and 
$53.2 million in 2000.
380
 While foreign companies generally exerted greater control over 
the rubber industry, the U.N. report acknowledged it was unclear how the Liberian 
government spent the profits once received.
381
 
Ultimately, the trade in conflict resources led to U.N. sanctions against diamond and 
timber exports. On March 7, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution 
imposing sanctions on “the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia, 
whether or not such diamonds originated in Liberia.”382 While it significantly reduced the 
flow of conflict diamonds out of Liberia, it failed to address a major gap in the industry by 
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not providing for an international monitoring system.
383
 The Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme, a multilateral initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds, did 
not enter into effect until 2003.
384
 U.N.-imposed sanctions against the export of Liberian 
timber came into effect on July 7, 2003.
385
  In October 2001, the United Nations 
contemplated sanctions on Liberia’s rubber industry, but U.S. lobbying on behalf of 
Firestone and the potential economic impact deterred the Security Council from taking 
further action.
386
 
1.5.3. Policy Implications for Taylor’s Criminal Network 
Taylor’s association with illicit weapons traders and diamond smugglers as well as the 
shadow economy within Liberia, demonstrated many policy implications, specifically with 
international trade and commerce. Unlike parallel trade in legal goods, war economies 
usually link into transcontinental smuggling and other gray commercial networks to satisfy 
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their special requirements. Today’s so-called warlords or failed states may act locally; but 
they have to think globally.  
In this respect, a high level of complicity among international companies, offshore banking 
facilities, and Northern governments assisted the development of war economies.
387
Taylor 
focused on global connections, using companies throughout the world to invest in Liberia’s 
natural resources and provided a market for illicit goods including drugs and weapons; 
however, Taylor also made sure he maintained financial control and profits of the 
government backed subsidies. “The absence of agencies that can enforce an autonomous 
notion of legality also generated opportunities for politicians to use more innovative means 
to control natural resources and translate them into political tools”.388 
New crime groups, especially in conflict regions, such as Charles Taylor’s network in 
Liberia, have forged alliances with terrorist organizations due to inefficient, nonexistent or 
corrupt law enforcement agencies and governments. 
Additionally, as Taylor controlled the borders, smuggling routes were able to remain intact 
and undetected. From the international commerce side, Liberia not only provided resources 
to be smuggled, but also provided Liberian corporate identities without the need to list 
officers, owners or shareholders.
389
 Liberia also provided a “safe harbor for anyone 
wishing to keep aircraft sheltered from scrutiny. Once an airplane is registered in Liberia, it 
can be based in another country and used anywhere in the world, often leaving little 
evident of its travels”.390 This proved extremely useful for Viktor Bout who owned many 
airlines and aircraft and was able to easily register them and thwart regulators.
391
 
In Sierra Leone, then head of state, Valentine Strasser, sought foreigners representing state 
and non-state organizations to manage the shadow state’s global relations. International 
organizations sought to help Strasser to keep the RUF from obtaining power through 
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provisions of debt relief .
392
 Sierra Leone represented a wide range of formal and informal 
roles for external actors among them Strasser’s and Taylor’s foreign bankers  that exploit 
changes in post-cold war global commerce.
393
 
Most sanction against Liberia, specifically during Taylor’s regime did not occur until the 
end of the conflict. “The United Nations slapped bans on Liberian diamond exports in 
2001 and on timber two years later, saying the resources were being used to fuel war in the 
region”.394 The sanctions on weapons were initially issued in 1992 and additional sanctions 
freezing assets and travel restrictions on those that posed threat to the peace process were 
introduced in 2003.
395
 
Additional policy implications followed by lack of communication among U.S government 
agencies, the lack of research into terrorist financial group networks from regular 
commercial goods to illicit trade of weapons and drugs and the lack of resources to 
interconnect the financial networks. Douglas Farah, a journalist from the Washington Post, 
points out the lack of intergovernmental agency communication and coordination in his 
book  “Blood From Stones” (2004).  
While in West Africa in 2001, Farah discovered the links between conflict diamonds, 
Charles Taylor, Viktor Bout, the Taliban, al Qaeda and many others. While most of the 
U.S government focused on counterterrorism efforts before and after 9/11, al Qaeda was 
laying the groundwork of establishing foundations in the U.S to finance their efforts. “Al 
Qaeda’s resourcefulness allowed its financial structure to survive a near complete military 
defeat in Afghanistan. The size of al Qaeda’s bankroll after 9/11 remains a mystery. 
Estimates range from $30 million to $300 million”.396 
However, the “terrorist-transnational crime relationship extends beyond the generation of 
profits or provisions of logistics, but goes to the heart of the relationship between crime 
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groups and the state”.397 In Liberia, Taylor’s regime was the crime group, exploiting legal 
norms and procedures and enhancing the only functioning economy, the shadow 
economy.
398
 
In the aftermath of 9/11 and in recent years, more efforts have been made to “follow the 
money”, however there is a long way to go. “Still, knowledgeable sources say, more than 
two years after 9/11 the United States remains far behind in the race to cut off the flow of 
money, the lifeblood of terrorism, although cooperation among some government agencies 
has improved”.399 
1.5.3.1. Policy Implications for Conflict Diamonds 
In 2001, the UN issued sanctions against diamond exporting in Liberia, as the international 
community recognized diamonds were fueling the conflict, providing goods for the trade 
for weapons. At this time, about thirty-five countries began meeting to discuss the 
economic impact of buying and selling conflict diamonds. Previously, “the practice of 
selling rough stones outside the boundaries of established taxes and exporting structures 
for the sake of funding insurgencies against legitimate African governments was well 
established and accepted by the diamond-producing and importing countries of the world, 
but it was never, discussed in public”.400 
However due to the brutality seen in the West African countries, diamonds were being 
viewed in a different light, becoming “synonymous with death and mayhem”.401 
As the conflicts and diamond trafficking in Liberia and Sierra Leone forged on, in 
December 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing diamonds as 
a direct contribution to prolonged conflict and increased prosperity within the conflict zone 
and throughout the world. Resolution 55/56 that the international community developed 
detailed proposals for a simple and workable international certification scheme for rough 
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diamonds based primarily on national certification schemes and on internationally agreed 
minimum standards. 
 Additionally, negative marketing within the diamond industry sprang to public attention as 
Amnesty International –France developed advertisements focused on Valentine’s Day and 
making sure people do not buy “blood diamonds”.402 The result from the negative 
marketing and the meeting of the thirty-five countries was the establishment of the 
Kimberley Process.  
The Kimberley Process became the procedure for certifying diamonds as “clean” or not 
from conflict zones and also sought a plan to cut off the flow of diamonds from rebel 
group.
403
 In 2003, the group adopted the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), 
which developed the requirements for certification including country of origin, alpha code 
number, date of insurance, date of expiration, validation of certificate from exporting 
authority, among others.
404
 In 2006, the Kimberley Process conducted a review of the 
KPCS resulting in significant contributions to the end of diamond trafficking in certain 
post-conflict areas. Overall, the Kimberley Process has 49 members representing 75 
countries, accounting for 99.8 percent of the world’s rough diamond production.405 
Recent reviews of the KP demonstrated that while some countries have improved the 
certification process and government controls, most nations have a long way to go.  
An analysis of the UN Commodity Trade Statistics (Com-trade) database reveals that 
an illegal trade in rough diamonds worth $10.2 million may be taking place between 
Kimberley Process participant and non-participant countries, allowing illicit diamonds 
to evade regulatory controls aimed at keeping out conflict diamonds.
406
 
Several organizations called for stronger processes and controls for the Kimberley Process, 
including stronger government controls, regular cross checking of statistical data within 
different systems, better coordination between law enforcement and customs and border 
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control, and better requirements for diamond companies to track their data and have 
regular audits.
407
 
With the call for more oversight, the Kimberley Process has implemented a few measures 
such as the expulsion of Congo-Brazzaville from the KP after the country could not 
account for millions of exported diamonds. However, the expulsion of a country from the 
process does not address the problem of illicit diamond trade, but may potentially increase 
diamond trafficking.  
As of 2008, Cote d’Ivoire is the only country since the KP conception that it has addressed. 
“The KP has tried to address the issue through field visits and through additional 
recommendations to participants, but none of these measures have put an end to the illicit 
flow. There has been strong reluctance by governments and industry to meaningfully 
increase oversight and monitoring of the trade in Ivorian conflict diamonds”.408 KP 
members are not reporting infringements and are not auditing records as they should.
409
 
Again, members of the KP need to focus efforts on enforcement and pushing for better 
government controls and legislation. Without the buy-in of the member state governments, 
the illicit diamond trade will continue to prosper. 
1.6. Arms Transfer in Liberia 
For reasons related to the dynamics of illegal arms flows, it is almost impossible to 
ascertain the exact extent of SALW proliferation in Liberia through Mano River
410
 conflict 
cluster. Nonetheless, it is clear that the region became a key market for SALW with UN 
estimates putting the number in circulation to seven million. An economic logic clearly 
exists behind proliferation of ‘recycled’ weapons, as the acute insecurity in the zone has 
also made it the centre for the greatest demand for weapons. It is awash with small arms 
that have exacerbated the culture of violence, heightened banditry and hostage taking, and 
acted as a cover for horrendous mutilations, particularly among children and youth. 
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Women refugees and internally displaced persons have become victims of food-for-sex 
rackets. Among the rebels and local militia for example militia in the Sierra Leone conflict 
whom Taylor sponsored and supplied weapons like Kalashnikov rifle became a symbol of 
mob justice. For example ‘AK-47’ was interpreted as ‘out of every 7 captives, murder 4’, 
and AK-58 as ‘out of every 8 women, rape 5’. SALW diffusion within the region, as well 
as the exploitation and marketing of such resources as diamond, gold, timber and rubber, 
have followed a common pattern.
411
 
Much as Libya served as a common source of training  and weapons for the combatants,
412
 
private brokers and rogue airlines fixed deals and ferried weapons and ammunitions from 
Eastern Europe and South Africa. The AK-47 assault rifles, grenades and mortars were 
airlifted from Libya to Burkina Faso, from where they were taken on a Fokker-28 owned 
by Burkina Faso to Man airport in western Cotè d’Ivoire for onward transfer by cargo 
trucks inside Liberia.
413
 This supplemented its stocks with illicit war material acquired 
through illegal trade in minerals. According to one observer, Ivorian officials ”arranged 
business meetings for Taylor and his commanders while gendarmes escorted them around 
and custom and immigration officials did not seem to pay attention to the goods that 
crossed the border”.414 
The Partnership  Africa Canada Report on ‘Conflict Diamonds’ accused the South Africa, 
Michau Huisamen, and his mining company AmCan Minerals of being ‘willing to go 
almost any length, including the provision of arms and mercenary armies, to get 
diamonds’.415 
In Liberia several means were  used to ferry and transfer arms in the country. The arms 
ferries included Ibis Air, Sorus Airlines, and two British companies, Sky and Occidental. 
According to London’s Sunday Time of 28 January, 1999, the last two reportedly shipped 
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nearly 400 tons of arms and ammunition from Slovak Republic to supply to RUF through 
Liberia as the main agent. 
Another important figure to note in arms transfer and smuggling in Liberia is Fred Rindel, 
a former Apartheid officer who led a group of South African freelancers in training, 
equipping and directing Charles Taylor’s forces in their destabilizing campaigns in Guinea 
and Sierra Leone. He and Nico Shafer (who worked for the former Colombian cocaine 
baron Pablo Escobar) were reported to have set up an international consortium with 
Charles and the RUF that involved the procurement of diamonds, narcotics, arms and 
mercenaries.
416
 
According Human Right Watch, Guinea also vividly involved itself in arms trafficking in 
Liberia. It is argued that the Guinean Ministry of Defense had used a private Guinean 
mining and trading company, Katex Mine, as a broker for military procurement. These 
weapons are said to have ended up in the hands of LURD. Several flights, chartered by the 
Guinean Ministry of Defense, went from Teheran to Conakry in Guinea by a Ukrainian air 
company in 2002 and 2003. For instance, seven cargo flights from Iran arrived between the 
5
th
 and 17
th
 of March 2003.
417
 The waybills of these flights stated that they included  a total 
of 57,200 kg (1,040 pieces) of “technical equipment” and 13,000 kg (2,500 pieces) of 
“detergent” arriving in a twelve-day time period”. These flights preceded few weeks  a 
major LURD offensive.
418
 It was loaded as well with 3,500 pieces of clothes and hats 
(7,500 kg), 1,500 pieces of “lighter” (1,500 kg), and 270 pieces of technical equipment 
(19,300 kg) to be delivered to Ministry of Defense, Guinea.
419
 
The Flight of June 30, 2003, Ukraine-based LVIV Airlines, operating flight UKW 7612, 
delivered a consignment to Conakry. The aircraft departed empty from Ukraine on June 29 
for Iran’s Tehran-Mehrabad airport. Leaving Iran laden with cargo, at 23:00 on June 29, it 
went next to Benghazi, Libya, where it arrived at 3:30 on June 30. From there, the aircraft 
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made a brief stop in Tripoli, probably for refueling purposes (a “text stop”) before 
departing again, at 5:40, for Conakry-Gbessia, where it arrived at 12:20 on June 30. After 
unloading the cargo, the return flight operated as UR-7616 and flew back to Gostomel, 
Ukraine, at 22:25 on July 2.
420
 The actual cargo was described to Human Rights Watch by 
eyewitnesses as 7.62mm small arms ammunition and 60mm mortar rounds of Iranian 
manufacture.
421
 They said it was unloaded onto military trucks and taken to a Guinean 
Ministry of Defense weapons and ammunition depot at Doyama.
422
 
The Flight of August 5, 2003, a second cargo flight from Tehran by LVIV Airlines arrived 
in Conakry in early August, again using flight number UKW 7612. This time the air 
waybill and cargo manifest, which Human Rights Watch has on file, indicated that the 
cargo consisted of thirty motorcycles (3,200kg), 500 pieces of detergent powder small size 
(1,000kg), 440 pieces of detergent powder 50kg (22,000kg) to be delivered to Ministry of 
Defense, Guinea.
423
 
The U.N. panel of experts observed the unloading of cargo from this flight. It reported to 
the U.N. Sanctions Committee that it “saw green boxes with hand ropes being loaded by 
soldiers into military trucks. The Panel believes that military equipment was contained in 
the ‘detergent boxes’ mentioned in the manifest” (single ellipses added).424 The panel 
added that it confirmed, through diplomatic sources, “that transportation of weapons by 
truck have been made from Katex Mines Guinea to Koyama and Macenta” (near the 
Guinean border with Liberia), linking this information to its previous suspicions that arms 
delivered to Conakry on behalf of Katex were forwarded by truck (the panel did not 
specify by whom) to positions near the Liberia border for LURD.
425
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1.6.1.  Transfer from Guinea and Use in Liberia  
LURD commanders and other eyewitnesses have told Human Rights Watch that the 
munitions delivered on the June 30 flight, 7.62mm small arms ammunition and 60mm 
mortar rounds, were quickly transported into Liberia for re-supply of LURD. The onward 
shipment, LURD sources said, was carried out with the assistance of the Ministry of 
Defense of Guinea
426
 which as noted above took possession of the ammunition at the 
airport for transport to its depot at Doyama. 
Another interesting aspect of this is that Guinea was and had been for quiet sometime, a 
recipient of U.S military aid. Although knowing what was going on, the U.S did not stop 
the military aid to Guinea. According to US officials, they instead adopted the tactics of so 
called quiet diplomacy. Some have argued that, not only did the US ignore the actions of 
Guinea under disguise of quiet diplomacy, but they also silently supported it as a way of 
getting Charles Taylor out of Monrovia.
427
  
Quiet diplomacy, including the demarches and meetings, failed to have an impact. At a 
minimum, the failure to publicly condemn Guinea’s misbehavior represents a missed 
opportunity for the U.S. to influence the behavior of the Guinean government. It also may 
have compounded the problem by giving the impression that the U.S. government was 
willing to overlook Guinea’s support for LURD, even though it clearly violated U.N. 
sanctions and came at a high cost in civilian lives. More broadly, U.S. military assistance 
and public support for Guinea under the circumstances could be read as endorsement of 
Guinea’s actions in support of LURD. For example, Charles Taylor accused the U.S. of 
supporting LURD: “This is an American war. LURD is a surrogate force... (The United 
States) caused this war. (…) They can call off their dogs now.”428 
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Human Rights Watch interviewed U.S. officials who stated that the munitions Guinea 
obtained from Iran were delivered to LURD and used in the fighting.
429
 Several sources 
indicated that the weapons were sent by sea on board a freighter and then unloaded by 
small boats that delivered the cargo to Robertsfield, from where it was driven to Bushrod 
Island in Monrovia.
430
 Numerous Iranian mortars were found in Monrovia.
431
 Human 
Rights Watch has inspected several sites in the Mamba Point area where there were 
remains of 81 and 60mm mortars used by LURD in its three offensives.
432
 Those that were 
identifiable carried markings indicating production in 2001 and 2002 and were mostly of 
Iranian provenance.
433
 Some sources reported that Iranian munitions also may have been 
used by Liberian government forces. According to diplomatic sources a flight on May 26,  
from Minsk, Belarus, to Robertsfield was routed via Tehran, where it picked up 
consignment that reportedly included Rocket Propelled Grenades-7s (RPGs).
434
 
Again, this is an example of the contradictions in state actions, and not only on the side of 
Guinea, but also the U.S. According to Grant and Soderbaum  argued that there were 
multiple actors in both the African state and society, which are linked together in hybrid 
networks and coalitions, together creating a whole range of complex regionalism 
processes. And the fact that they do so was a response to their political, economic and 
social needs.
435
 The U.S. government, whose Embassy in Monrovia had been under fire in 
the Monrovia fighting and received at least one mortar strike, was also keenly interested to 
learn where the mortar rounds came from. The U.S. Embassy inspected the sites of mortar 
impacts in Monrovia for that purpose.
436
 They identified one U.S manufactured 81mm 
mortar round among those expended in the fighting, which they attributed to the re-sale 
                                                             
429
 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews with U.S. officials, October 2003. 
430
Cfr. Human Rights Watch interviews with military analysts in Liberia in 2003. 
431
 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses interviewed by phone and email, August and 
September 2003. 
432
Cfr. Remnants of mortar rounds in central Monrovia were seen by a Human Rights Watch researcher, 
August 2003.Their caliber was indicated by markings on the tail fins. 
433
 Cfr.Human Rights Watch inspection and U.S. and U.N. military sources. 
434
 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews with U.K. diplomatic sources. 
435
 Cfr.Grant, J. Andrew and Soderbaum, Fredrik, 2003,p.1. 
436
 Cfr.Human Rights Watch interviews; Tim Weiner, “U.S. Embassy in Liberia Searches for Missing 
American,” New York Times , September 2, 2003. 
107 
 
market in U.S. weapons.
437
 They also traced some of the mortar rounds to Guinea, 
including one that hit the U.S. Embassy building in Monrovia and resulted in a U.S. 
demarche to the government of Guinea.
438
 A U.S. State Department spokesperson publicly 
called on Guinea to halt any movement of arms or troops across its borders.
439
 
1.6.1.1. The French Connection 
Throughout the Cold War, French authorities made extensive use of business networks in 
the former French colonies to transfer arms secretly. As the only world power with a 
permanent military presence in several ‘independent’ African countries, successive 
governments in France kept a close eye on the arms supply and military support of its 
preferred heads of state. When discretion was needed in supplying political clients, the 
private networks of Jacques Foccart and the influential lobbies and private intelligence 
structures of oil companies or French commodity traders could be activated. They tried to 
make sure developments in the newly independent states would stay in line with the 
interests of the former colonial power Until his death in 1997, Foccart, the mysterious 
architect and broker of French Africa policy since de Gaulle, maintained an obscure web of 
former intelligence and military experts for this purpose. These were people, often 
recruited from the French Foreign Legion or veterans of the de-colonization war.
440
 
In 2002, traffickers acquired 5,000 AK-47s from Yugoslavian army stocks and moved 
them from Serbia to Liberia under the guise of a legal transaction with Nigeria. One of the 
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planes used in this shipment came from Ukraine and made a refueling stop in Libya while 
on its route.
441
 
1.6.2.  Trafficking Methods 
 In 2002, the Small Arms Survey gave a statistical approximated that some  638.9 million 
SALW were in circulation including roughly 241.6 million military firearms, 22 million 
shoulder-fired rocket launchers and about 781,000 mortars. And approximately 378 million 
of that total was believed to be in civilian hands.
442
 Although sometime SALW are traded 
through different channels, it was, is and will be a boom -rang  business  estimated to be 
around $ 5 billion a year- $4 billion in legal sales and $ 1billion in illicit sales. It is 
therefore not surprising that in such beneficial business, national governments can be 
transparent to publish statistics on the sale or transfer of light weapons or release 
information about the sales activities of private companies.  
According to SAS,  defines legal transfer as one that conforms to International Law and the 
national law of the importing and exporting states while an illicit transfer violates those 
laws. Although there so many doubts and ambiguities and its loopholes, it becomes more 
demanding to categorize a sale as legal or illicit. An example can be illustrated by some 
sales under national export law but violate international humanitarian or human rights 
law
443
. The trade of SALW takes the following trend: Covert and 'Gray-Market' Channels, 
illicit and black-market channels of one sort or another. 
1.6.2.1. Covert and 'Gray-Market' Channels 
In addition to legal sales and military assistance programs, SALW are disseminated 
through covert and "gray-market" channels (that is, channels that operate with government 
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support even though in violation of official government policy), most often by government 
intelligence agencies or private companies linked to such agencies.
444
 Another form of 
gray-market transfers entails the delivery of weapons from government stockpiles to 
political entities and ethnic militias associated with the ruling clan or party most often they 
‘exploit the weakness of national and international laws or policy being put in place. 
1.6.2.2. Illicit and Black-Market Channels 
The third major category of light weapons transfers includes illegal sales through black-
market channels, the supply of arms in defiance of international embargoes and other legal 
sanctions, and the theft of arms from government stocks or private citizens. In past years, 
there has been a striking growth in the operations of black-market dealers to satisfy the 
needs of non-state actors in ethnic and internal conflicts. Because such actors are normally 
barred from purchases on the legal munitions market, they must acquire their weaponry 
from illicit sources. The growing number of UN arms embargoes has also produced an 
increased demand for black-market arms. Although it is impossible to estimate the value or 
scale of all such transactions.445 
The general result of the combination of new arms dealers and the spread of underground 
economic activity is that covert arms deals are likely to take place within a matrix of black-
market transactions. Weapons were sold for cash; countertraded for grain. The deals was 
also transacted by go-betweens who are equally at home in smuggling natural resources as 
mentioned above. The payments were done through a series of coded bank accounts in the 
name of a global network of ghost companies and are protected by the banking and 
corporate secrecy laws of one or several of the many financial havens around the world.
446 
The complexity of these networks makes it impossible not only to address the illicit trade 
in arms but also the varied networks operate in many different countries with an 
international cast of characters. Always staying one step ahead of the law, these networks 
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are conduits for a wide variety of goods and services. But who are these dealers and how 
do they operate? Through Arms Dealers. This include financiers, freight forwardness and 
corrupt government official who are well coordinated internationally and nationally. These 
brokers do carry out their missions in different  forms and locations. Most of them taking 
advantage of the poor legislation in some countries. This has favored the manipulations of 
the law. 
1.6.2.3. Arms Brokers 
During the Cold War, governments utilized private arms brokers to facilitate covert arms 
deals. These arms traffickers, however, did not disappear when the Cold War ended, and 
the pipelines they developed remained operational to this day. The central orchestrator is 
the arms broker, or the middleman involved in “negotiating, arranging or otherwise 
facilitating the transfers of weapons.”447  Brokers can avoid capture and prosecution by 
performing their functions from within the confines of a house or hotel room in any 
country that does not legislate against brokering.
448
 So how can we define arms brokers? 
Loretta Bondi and Elise Keppler defined arms brokers as ‘private individual(s) or 
Company (ies) that act as an intermediary between supplier and a recipient of weapons to 
facilitate an arms transaction in return for a fee.
449
 
The arms trade in Liberia has been shaped by a number of factors, including historical 
events, a multitude of sources and networks, and a dearth of prosecutions. First, the demise 
of the Soviet Union provided a lucrative opportunity and an established infrastructure for 
arms brokers.
450
 Small arms and military transport aircraft became widely available as they 
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were relatively unattended or not needed, thus ending up in the hands of profiteers willing 
to sell to the highest bidder.
451
 
Arms brokers thus acquired “fully operational systems of clandestine transport, replete 
with money channels, people who understood how to use them, and, most important, 
established shipping pipelines”.452  The logistical pipelines once used by the Soviet bloc 
countries were transformed into tools for individual weapons brokers.
453
 These channels 
served specific purposes in the illegal arms trade, from supplying once legitimate weapons 
stockpiles to the grey and black markets, to providing government contacts willing to sell 
falsified end-user certificates
454
 that provided the cover of legitimacy to an illicit arms 
shipment
455
. These falsified documents facilitated the brokers’ acquisition of arms from 
sanctioned dealers, as well as their sale to a diverse customer base that spanned from 
governments to rebels.
456
 
Second, the vast number of sources in the arms trade hinders effective control of the 
weapons trade in Africa generally and Liberia specifically. Many of the weapons are left 
over from the Cold War era, during this period large amounts of arms were sent to rebel 
movements; other states, seeking to further their position, the rebel groups and 
governments, continued to instigate such traffic.
457
 Most weapons have been likely traded 
from one hand to another many times over several decades, either through seizure or theft 
from owners, captured or killed soldiers, or the sale by individual soldiers to competing 
groups.
458
 Liberia specifically has experienced a flow of weapons from governments and 
armed rebel groups in surrounding countries that had a stake in arming one faction or 
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another for political purposes. For example, there  was an evidence of the transfer of 
Chinese arms to Liberia, including “Chinese-made AK-47s, machine guns and rocket-
propelled grenade launchers”.459 
1.6.2.3.1. China arms transfer 
China has long been one of the world’s most significant exporters of SALW.460 It remains 
a key supplier for states seeking inexpensive SALW and is currently benefitting from a 
period in which many importing states are trying to diversify their sources of supply. It is 
also among the least transparent SALW exporters, as it provides official information on 
neither the volume nor the value of authorized SALW exports or deliveries. At the same 
time, China formally recognizes the destabilizing effects that SALW transfers can have on 
peace and security, economic development and social stability and has committed itself to 
preventing the illicit trade in SALW. However, some of China’s decisions on SALW 
exports and the level of care it shows in preventing illicit transfers have raised concerns 
regarding their potentially negative impact on peace, security and governance.
461
 From the 
mid-1990s the global community began to pay greater attention to SALW, and to regard 
them as the most destabilizing conventional weapons. A key step in this process was the 
1997 report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on SALW.
462
 
This led to the 2001 UN SALW Conference and the drafting of the UN Program of Action 
to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects (PoA). The 
POA was adopted at the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects in July 2001.
463
 It outlines a set of measures for states to 
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implement at the international, regional and national levels in order to counter the illicit 
trade in SALW.
464
 
During this decade attention began to focus on the appearance of Chinese SALW in 
conflict zones in sub-Saharan Africa. The Chinese Type-56 assault rifle coupled with the 
above (AK-47) were  found in a number of conflicts in East, West and Central Africa, 
although in many cases these items had been diverted from their initial end-use by African 
states or recycled between conflict areas.
465
  However, China was also a direct source of 
SALW supplies for conflicting parties.
466
 Attention has focused on the correlations 
between natural resources for China’s growing economy and its recipients of arms, with 
suggestions that China is targeting resource-rich states in the hope of securing access to 
energy and raw materials
467
 of which Liberia falls a victim as we have discussed above. 
Another significant but less discussed source of weapons in Liberia, is unauthorized 
gunsmiths who had the capacity to manufacture an estimated 200,000 small arms 
annually.
468
 The 1996-97 disarmament reveals the high numbers of weapons present during 
the first conflict. The disarmament, which lasted from November 22, 1996, until February 
9, 1997
469
, resulted in the registration of approximately 10,000 weapons and some 1.24 
million rounds of ammunition. Subsequent disarmament activities resulted in the surrender 
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of additional weapons. Of an estimated 33,000 combatants, the program demobilized 
21,315, including 4,360 children and 250 women.
470
 
Third, international efforts to stem the illicit arms trade to Liberia proved largely 
ineffective. U.N. Security Council Resolution 788 (1992) established an embargo on all 
weapons and military equipment shipments to Liberia. The sanctions were relatively 
successful in blocking participation by the legitimate arms-selling market, such as the large 
U.S. and European weapons manufacturers. Overall, however, the embargo proved to be 
less effective as the demand for weapons in Liberia and surrounding nations increased 
while traditional supply channels were cut off. This economic reality caused the grey and 
black markets to be flooded with weapons from various sources.
471
 From 1989 to 2003, a 
number of countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Russia, Libya, and Nigeria, were involved along the 
chain of illicit arms trade to Liberia.
472
 Furthermore, not even one person has been 
successfully prosecuted as a culprit for violating the terms of the embargo.
473
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Overall, few statements reference the role of economic actors in the conflict, and the 
majority of those that do so are primarily in the context of seeking refuge. One statement 
giver reflected on foreign companies’ general disregarded  Liberia’s development. He 
stated that foreign investors in Liberia “keep all the desirable jobs for their own nationals, 
and give only menial work to the Liberians.”474 If given the opportunity, however, 
Liberians would quickly learn the technical aspects of the investment activities.
475
 He 
concluded by faulting the Liberian government for being so anxious to bring in foreign 
investment that it failed to impose conditions to bring about technology transfer to Liberian 
nationals.  Other statements referring to economic actors focused on their connection to 
development rather than their role in the conflict. For example, one statement giver 
testified: Liberia was the largest producer of natural rubber in the world; yet the profit from 
the country’s resources were being stolen instead of reinvested in development, 
infrastructure and education…With a small population of 5.1 or 5.2 million, Liberia’s vast 
natural resources should be more than enough to support a small population and provide 
well for them. The way multinational companies treated Liberia made it into a sort of 
“American colony.”476 
In addition, over the last fifteen years after the Cold War, the world’s black markets like 
the world’s legal markets have become increasingly globalized. And as the various 
methods of transporting goods have become more integrated, traffickers became quite 
adept at utilizing these networks for illicit means. Specialists in the arms trade have found 
that “cross-border mergers between airlines, marketing alliances, leasing, chartering, 
franchising and offshore registration of fleets, crews, and companies, all make it even more 
difficult to monitor and regulate the airspace and freighting industry.”477 
In an effort to move their products without detection, brokers have come to rely primarily 
on counterfeit documents or legitimate documents acquired through bribery and on 
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corruptible officials. They transport weapons using their false documents like bills of 
lading, fake end-use certificates, and incomplete manifests  roundabout routes and 
“friendly” transshipment countries. They often disguise their weapons shipments as 
humanitarian aid or other supplies.
478
 
Some Experts believe, moreover, that gone are the days when only veteran soldiers, former 
arms company executives, ex-intelligence operatives, or even war correspondents were 
arms brokers, after Cold War there is  generation of arms dealers who spend their entire 
lives learning the intricacies of black-market methods and putting the newest technologies 
to use.
479
 
Fortunately, it seems that arms brokers are finally getting the attention that they deserve 
from the international community. Approximately twenty three countries have passed anti-
brokering legislation, and steps are being taken to address brokering at the international 
level through U.N. panels and processes. But such steps are late in coming. Arms brokers 
have been able to operate because many governments have thus far been unwilling to 
oversee the activities of arms brokers or arrest brokers and break up the existing trafficking 
networks. In addition to weak domestic controls of arms brokers by individual 
governments, arms brokers have benefited from poor border controls and lack of 
international cooperation.
480
 The whereabouts of several notorious arms brokers were well-
known, but the lack of cooperation between countries had allowed these illegal actors to 
move freely around the countries in which they lived. Victor Bout, for example, lived in 
Moscow and was able to operate his clandestine businesses with impunity. 
1.7. The Effects Of Arms Proliferation In Liberia 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law violations report about SALW proliferation effects. 
Before we tackle this issue, one question that we can pose is, where and what was the role 
of U.S in Liberia political turmoil  more so from 1989-2003 yet Liberian constitution was 
based on US model? 
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The incursion of the NPFL in December 1989, the wheels of US diplomacy once again 
started whirring. The State Department finally had ‘a problem it could get it teeth into’, as 
Herman Cohen put it. Taylor kept in contact with USA about his progress and initially at 
least, his forces seemed to be treating US citizens and US property correctly. The key 
concern for the USA was to put the $400 million-plus worth of US strategic and 
communications assets at risk by pushing Doe too hard and too soon, while at the same 
time ensuring  that his successor initially presumed to be Charles Taylor would be stable 
and reliable enough to maintain them after taking over. Also, there were about 5,000 US 
citizens in Liberia at the start of 1990, and, while initially only recommending  and 
facilitating departures, the US embassy had not deemed it necessary or appropriate to order 
an evacuation.
481
 As the civil war raged on and the security of Monrovia and its large 
vulnerable civilian population was clearly threatened, the US embassy was still sufficiently 
interested in seeking a solution of some kind that it welcomed the Nigerian ECOWAS 
plan, which in effect took up the negotiations with Doe where the USA had left off a 
month before.
482
 
Diplomatically, Washington was now a passive observer in Liberian diplomacy. It was in 
summer of 1990 and the USA was expending its diplomatic capital in securing UN security 
Council votes for invasion of Kuwait, following the Iraqi invasion of its smaller neighbor. 
Cote d’Ivoire, the principal opponent of the ECOMOG intervention plan among West 
African states, was one of the members of Security Council at the time and the USA 
wanted to be sure of its support. For the White House, there were “ bigger fish to fry” than 
Liberia and so the USA reverted to a neutral status in the Liberian discussions, whilst 
publicly supporting any moves towards a peaceful solution. Furthermore, there was the 
added bonus of being able to encourage ‘African-led solutions to African problems’, a 
concept which was already gaining popularity in Western circles at the time and which 
would become almost the mantra of the non-interventionists in future African catastrophes, 
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following the US debacle in Somalia in 1992 and the UN’s ignominious retreat in the face 
of genocide in Rwanda in 1994.
483
 
In the case of Monrovia, the USA had its  force on the ground, or just off the coast, and in 
position to send in its marines to end the bloodshed and starvation that racked the city. It 
forgot completely the Responsibility to Protect. What increased beyond doubt was that, 
with the Cold War  mass suffering resulting from the civil conflict in Liberia were of 
minimal importance in America foreign policy. There was little incentive to intervene, 
except on humanitarian grounds and even then the USA preferred to play its part only as a 
supporter of others, not as a principal actor. But the USA had financed and condoned the 
rule of a brutal torturing, murderous dictator in Liberia for a decade and turned a blind eye 
to his gross human rights violations throughout the 1980s, so Liberians and international 
observers alike were justified in questioning the logic of US policy and its seeming 
inconsistency.
484
  
The August 1990 war against Iraq ensured that US attention would irrevocably be turned 
away from West African allies towards striving for success in its new military adventure in 
the Middle East. Not unlike Saddam Hussein, who enjoyed US support during his long war 
in the 1980s against Iran,
485
 even up to within a year or two of the his invasion of Kuwait, 
official America turned from being an ally of Taylor to an enduring adversary in a 
relatively short period of time.  
Understanding the effects of small arms in and on societies goes to the heart of the 
motivation for SALW: what harm is caused by the proliferation and misuse of these 
weapons, who are the most affected, and what are the circumstances under which they 
caused harm? Research goes beyond deaths and injuries to individuals to include the full 
range of impacts on societies. 
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Human Rights Watch investigations (2002) on the Liberian government  revealed that 
human rights violations were being perpetrated with impunity. As a result of Liberia’s 
proliferation of SALW that fuelled up the conflict,  resulting into Human rights and 
humanitarian law violations among others include: Forced displacement, food as weapon 
for war, wide spread looting and pillaging, restriction of movement, collective punishment, 
Taking of hostages and Outrages upon personal dignity, Forced labor, Summary 
executions, Threats Attacks against civilians, Attacks against humanitarian aid workers and 
medical personnel, and Child soldiers. 
1.7.1.  Forced Displacement 
Those living within Greater Liberia, particularly Nimba County, experienced particularly 
intense fighting and hardship as the NPFL pushed forward its offensive. The insurgency 
resulted in massive displacement, and it is estimated that approximately half of Liberia’s 
population was displaced in  1990s,
486
 an amorphous array of warlords and renegade 
combatants (estimated at about 33,000) succeeded in holding the Liberian population 
hostage, whilst perpetrating horrendous atrocities. As a consequence, an estimated 200,000 
people were killed, while another 700,000 were forced to flee the country and seek refuge 
in neighboring states, leaving approximately 1.5 million internally displaced. In socio-
political terms, the protracted conflict polarized Liberian society, reducing most to 
ferreting for survival or fleeing the country. This deepened the already strained ethnic fault 
lines of the society, leading to alliances such as that between the Mandingo and Krahn, 
against the Congo, Gio and Mano ethnic groups. Further societal fracturing characterized 
relations between political parties, which proliferated to over 13, all significantly based on 
ethnic lines.
487
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In some cases, rebels used forced displacement as a technique to clear the area for their 
occupation. Statements reveal how combatants displaced entire villages by forcing 
residents to march long distances from home.
488
 
“1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to 
the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so 
demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be 
taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of 
shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. 
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with 
the conflict.” Art. 17, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Protocol 
II. 
1.7.2. Food as a Weapon of War 
The NPFL offensive resulted in food shortage, particularly in the early years of the war.
489
 
One statement giver described how Taylor forced people to join the conflict by threatening 
to cut off food supplies if they did not participate
490
. He stated that Taylor told a group of 
displaced people that, if they joined him, they would “get food; if not, no food.”491. 
Another statement giver stated that child soldiers refused to let them harvest food because 
of their belief that the villagers, especially older women, would turn into feline spirits at 
night and harm the rebels.492 
“Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless for that purpose, objects indispensable to the 
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survival of the civilian population such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production 
of food-stuffs, crops, livestock,
 
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works.” Art. 14, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. 
1.7.3. Widespread Looting 
Rebel factions did not have central supplies and so pillaged basic necessities for 
sustenance.
493
 A statement giver reported that fighters regularly participated in organized 
raids against civilians called “food attacks” or “clothes attacks” whenever they found their 
supplies were getting low.
494
 
Pillage and threats to commit pillage are prohibited “at any time and in any place 
whatsoever” during non international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2)(g)-(h), Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ,and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. 
1.7.4. Restrictions on Movement 
The NPFL subjected residents of Greater Liberia to a myriad of restrictions on their 
movement and privacy during the first few years of the war.
495
 Travel restrictions and 
checkpoints were prevalent in NPFL territory. NPFL fighters enjoyed wide freedom of 
movement and could visit Monrovia,
496
 civilians, by contrast, needed to obtain a pass from 
G-2 (Taylor’s intelligence and administrative center) to travel within NPFL territory.497  
The “taking of hostages” and threats thereof are prohibited “at any time and in any place 
whatsoever” during non-international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2) (c), Protocol Additional to 
                                                             
493
 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 22. 
494
 Cfr. TRC Diaspora Statement Rec. 26. 
495
 Cfr. Countryside, for example, a person carrying letters through a checkpoint would be required to 
surrender them to soldiers. (Cfr. Human  Rights Watch, The Cycle of Abuse: Human Rights Violations since 
the November Cease- Fire, Oct. 21, 1991 (hereinafter The Cycle  of Abuse), 
www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1991/liberia/ (Retrieved on 22.Mar. 2015). 
496
Cfr. Ibidem., 
497
 Cfr. Edward Cody, Revenge Drives Liberian Rebels; Young Insurgents Rule by Gun in Chaotic 
Countryside, Wash. Post, July  14, 1990, at  A1. 
122 
 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts. 
1.7.5. Collective punishments  
Collective punishments and threats thereof are prohibited “at any time and in any place 
whatsoever” during non-international armed conflicts. Art. 4(2) 
(b), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. Protected persons include 
those who are not taking a direct part in or those who are no longer taking part in 
hostilities. Id. at Art. 4(1) 
1.7.6.  Taking of hostages and Outrages upon personal dignity 
 “Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, 
enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault” and any threats thereof are 
prohibited “at any time and in any place whatsoever” during non-international armed 
conflicts. Art. 4(2)(e), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non- International Armed Conflicts. 
1.7.7.  Forced labor 
 “No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.” Art. 8(3)(a), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
1.7.8. Summary executions
498
 
“No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of 
an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential 
guarantees of independence and impartiality.” Art. 6(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
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Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts. 
1.7.9. Threats Attacks against civilians 
Protected persons include those not taking a direct part in or those who are no longer 
taking part in hostilities. Art. 4(1), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts. 
1.7.9.1. Attacks against humanitarian aid workers and medical personnel  
“Medical and religious personnel shall be respected and protected and shall be granted all 
available help for the performance of their duties…In the performance of their duties 
medical personnel may not be required to give priority to any person except on medical 
grounds.”  
Art. 9, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977). 
1.7.9.2. Child soldier 
One of the heart wrenching consequences of the conflicts in Liberia included the use of 
child soldiers in  conflicts. As per the United Nations, the definition of a child soldier 
includes: Any child - boy or girl - under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular 
or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: 
cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than family 
members. It includes girls and boys recruited for sexual purposes and/or forced marriage. 
The definition, therefore, does not only refer to a child who is carrying, or has carried 
weapons.
499
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In addition, Wessells “emphasizes war as a source of opportunities for children, who 
willingly join armed groups to obtain things like protection, a sense of family, education 
and training, power, money, or a sense of purpose, among others denied to them in civilian 
life”500. Children are vulnerable and easily malleable and in times of conflict, additional 
factors can contribute to their recruitment as soldiers including poverty, education and 
employment, family and friends, politics and ideology, and culture and tradition.
501
 
Adolescence is a time of vulnerability with the uncertainties and turbulence of physical, 
mental and emotional development. It is also a time of opportunities with greater freedom, 
developing understanding of one’s own identity and place in the community and society, 
and a new capacity to make choices and to take on responsibilities.
502
 
In 2005, the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers reported 8,000 children were fighting as 
soldiers with 20,000 more estimated to be involved in Disarmament Developmental 
Rehabilitation (DDR) programs throughout West Africa.
503
 In Liberia, NPFL and the 
ULIMO consistently used children under the age of eighteen, including thousands of 
children, including thousands of children under fifteen.
504
  
The estimate of child soldiers used in Liberia is between five and fifteen thousand with 
children making up anywhere between 25-75 percent of the fighting forces. In Liberia, 
“enterprising strongmen found that cultivating a personnel following among people 
exploited in the past, especially youth, offers them better prospects for personal gain than 
does loyalty to old patrons”.505 “Modern-day conflicts are particularly lethal for children 
because little or no practical distinction is made between combatants and civilians”. Taylor 
used child soldiers to form a special unit called the “Small Boys Unit”. 
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1.7.9.3.  Policy Implications for Child Soldiers 
In 1989, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989 CRC) resulting in legal and policy initiatives that cover child trafficking, labor, 
prostitution, abduction, imprisonment, health, education, discipline, family relations and 
freedom of expression.
506
 
Art 3. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law,  administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for 
his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal 
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall 
take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures. 
3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the 
care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent 
authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their 
staff, as well as competent supervision. 
 Besides the 1989 CRC, additional policies should consider International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Laws (IHRL), specifically the fundamental 
rules that protect civilians in situations of armed conflict (Art 23-24). While IHL and IHRL 
focus on all civilians, the 1989 CRC details guidelines for special treatment for children 
civilians, giving them additional protection and assistance against indecent assault, health, 
and family rights (Art, 35-37). 
Additional provisions within the 1989 CRC focus on child combatants and ensuring they 
are not subject to the “death penalty for offences related to the conflict which were 
committed when they were under 18” (Art 47). 
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In 2000, the UN adopted the Optional Protocol on the Rights of Children, specifically 
Child Soldiers and children in armed conflict, designed to protect children from the 
recruitment into armed forces and labor trafficking (UNHCHR, Article 2). Besides 
highlighting children’s rights during and after conflict, the 1989 CRC also developed rules 
for the prevention of the use of child soldiers in conflict, specifically focused on 
recruitment. “Although strictly speaking, neither conscription nor deployment of children 
aged 15 to 17 is illegal (except in those countries that have ratified treaties such as the 
2000 Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers), such activities could be in breach of the 
prohibition on employing children in work harmful to their health or dangerous to life” 
(Art 49). 
On the first day the Optional Protocol was adopted by the General Assembly, 61 countries 
signed the protocol. “Currently, 126 countries have ratified the Optional Protocol on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict; and 130 States have ratified the Optional 
Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography” (HREA 2009, 
par. 12). With signing the Optional Protocol, nations agree to look at national legislation is 
guaranteed the rights as outlined in the protocol such as the right to life, education and 
special treatment (Ibid., par. 2-4). 
 Conclusion 
It was not only the  regime of Charles Taylor that exploited Liberia and its neighboring 
West African countries, people and their resources, for power and wealth. These countries 
did not suffer  only tremendous loss of life, as many hundreds of thousands were killed 
throughout the region, but the countries also suffered from providing many basic human 
rights needs including shelter, security, healthcare, and education. Taylor retained his 
power and wealth through cultivated relationships with other heads of state and 
commercial organizations assisting in the exploitation of  resources as we have discussed 
above in this chapter. The Inter relations  provided not only resources to sell goods, but 
also provided weapons to different rebel groups. 
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Most of the revenues from  trade was used to buy and smuggle weapons that contributed to 
the devastating prolonged conflicts and hostilities to such an extent of destabilizing other 
governments across and within the region.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
0.0 EFFORTS AND IMPACT  TO CONTROL THE INFLUX OF SALW  ( ARMS     
CONTROL) IN WEST AFRICA. 
Originally, ‘arms control’ was meant to denote rules for limiting arms competition (mainly 
nuclear) rather than reversing it to SALW. The term had a distinct connotation from arms 
reduction or disarmament. Subsequently, however, a wide range of measures have come to 
be included under the rubric of arms control, in particular those intended to:  
a) freeze, limit , reduce or abolish certain categories of weapons;  
b) prevent certain military activities;  
c) regulate the deployment of armed forces;  
d) proscribe transfers of some military important items;  
e) reduce the risk of accidental war;  
f) constrain or prohibit the use of certain weapons or methods of war;  
g) build up confidence among states through greater openness in military matters. 
Today the term ‘arms control’ is often used interchangeably with ‘arms regulation,’ ‘arms 
limitation’ and  even ‘disarmament’.507 
1.1 Agreements 
Arms control can take various forms: it can be a cease fire or armistice arrangements 
following armed conflicts. It can also be imposed upon defeated countries by peace 
treaties. However, an ‘arms control agreement’ is an agreement among sovereign states 
freely arrived at a time of peace through a process of formal inter-governmental 
negotiations; it must provide for both mutual rights and mutual obligations. This agreement 
may also be bilateral or multilateral. In the latter category, several existing agreements are 
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of a regional nature, valid for a specific geographical zone or continent. Agreements vary 
in form- from Treaties, Conventions, Protocols or Documents, to Guide lines, Memoranda, 
Declarations or Common Understandings, to Statutes, Charters and Binding decisions of 
International Bodies or Final acts of International Conferences, to joint or simultaneous 
statements by governments, exchanges of letters or notes among the concerned.
508
 
1.2.  Function of arms control 
Arms control may: reduce the risk of war started by ‘accident’; slow down global and 
regional arms races; increase predictability in the relations among opposing parties, race or 
states and reduce fears of the intentions of a political adversary; minimize the disparities 
between heavily and lightly armed states and thus remove important source of instability; 
encourage worrying parties to resort to peaceful means in solving their disputes; save 
resources needed for economic and social development; mitigate the destruction and 
suffering in armed conflicts which may break out despite negotiated arms limitations; 
diminish the dangers to the environment; and promote trust and better understanding 
between or among the conflicting parties.
509
 
In the conflict areas of Liberia, the above were not considered as important factors. This is 
because the armed state non-actors such as RUF and the many factions that fought in 
Liberia were often presented as lacking resemblance to any recognizable patterns of armed 
resistance or political conflict. This view, popularized in many media outlets such as CNN, 
also had its equivalent in the academic debate and particularly in the so- called “greed and 
grievance”510 literature that dominated the mainstream of this field at the beginning of 
twenty-first  millennium. For scholars who took  this position say that the two countries 
along Mano River Basin (Liberia and Sierra Leone), were resource war, fought not over 
political issues, but to gain access to profits.
511
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One of the factors that contributed substantially to the lethality and prolonged conflict in 
the sub-region (Mano River Basin)  was uncontrolled proliferation and trafficking of 
SALW and the consequent "weaponization" of entire societies across the sub-region. From 
these two phenomena  emerged another bleak reality in West Africa, in which children 
were combatants and the proliferation of rogue young combatants operating as regional 
mercenaries, for whom war had become both a "profession" and the most practical way of 
life as we saw in previous chapter. 
Numerous international and regional programs aspired to reduce the flow of weapons into 
sub Saharan Africa. These initiatives had succeeded only in documenting the devastating 
impact that arms transfers have on Africa continent. 
In terms of conceptualization and initiation, the UN, AU and ECOWAS have been front 
runners in the search for possible solution to the scourge of SALW proliferations. West 
African states, for have participated in arms control initiatives at regional level through 
ECOWAS Small Arms Control Program (ECOSAP) and ECOWAS moratorium. Other 
initiatives are; the African Union and the Bamako Declaration, the UN firearms protocol 
and the UN action on the control of SALW, SADC Protocol on firearms, ammunition and 
other related materials, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
agreement and Nairobi protocol for the prevention, reduction and control of SALW. 
The consequences of continued insecurity and strife, as well as the widespread 
proliferation and trafficking of SALW, made it impossible for the fifteen ECOWAS 
Member-States to show indifference. Even when they had declared and observed 
neutrality, friendly and unfriendly states alike  came to terms with the droves of refugees, 
unacceptable numbers of civilian casualties, militarization of borders and cross-border 
crimes including arms trafficking. This effectively implies that a crisis in any one country 
necessarily affects the other, and that the collective security of the West African sub region 
can best be anchored on, and coordinated by, sub-regional mechanisms. The state of 
conflict in the sub-region  had predictably negative consequences on the structural stability 
of states, human security and economic and social development. As a consequence, at 
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International level, we shall examine the role of UN in its general and particular effort in 
SALW control. 
1.3. The Un General Overview  on SALW Control 
As Arms transfers and trafficking  continued to be a spiral, in part, the international 
community had not effectively enforced United Nations  sanctions, criminalized embargo 
violations, penalized financial institutions that act as conduits for weapons purchases, 
failed to promote indigenous controls over African arms production and sales to countries 
under UN arms embargoes, or taken actions against countries that serve as arms 
transshipment points.
512
 
The UN remained at the forefront of efforts to restrain the spread of SALW. Building on 
its earlier initiatives which called for action to combat illicit trade and the criminal misuse 
of SALW, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of 1991 “Creation of an 
Effective United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program”,513  adopted a 
number of resolutions over recent years calling for a range of actions at all levels.  
Resolution 46/36 H of December 6, 1991 called on states to curb illicit trafficking in arms 
by insuring better control over stocks and transfers, and by encouraging work at all levels 
to harmonize relevant laws and procedures. This resolution contained a list of indicative 
measures to be implemented at the state, regional, and international level.  
Resolution 50/70 B of December 12, 1995 “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position 
Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN”,514 
requested the Secretary-General to establish a panel of governmental experts to prepare a 
report on the nature and causes of problems of small arms. The panel of 16 nations was 
established and first convened on June, 24, 1996, and met again in July of 1997. In October 
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1997, the panel issued a report that analyzed the nature and causes of small arms problems 
and provided a number of recommendations for voluntary action by states to address the 
problem.  
Resolution 52/38 J of December 9 ,1997, Report of the Secretary-General. General and 
Complete Disarmament: Small Arms”, “ established a second panel of 23 members, 
convened in 1998, to review the implementation of the recommendations of the first report, 
to suggest further measures, and to examine the feasibility of holding an international 
conference on the illicit trafficking of small arms in all its aspects. 
Resolution 54/54V of December 15, 1999 called for an international conference on the 
“illicit trade in SALW and in all its aspects” during the summer of 2001. The resolution 
specified that the conference should produce a global action program as its primary output. 
The conference was scheduled to take place July 9-20, 2001. The first Preparatory 
Committee (Prepcom) met February 28-March 3, 2000; January 8-19, 2001; and March 20-
30, 2001. 
The above reports led to the UNGA resolution on the convening in 2001 of a Conference 
on the illicit Trade in SALW. In the understanding of the governmental experts, the phrase 
‘in all aspects’ included aspects of legal  transfers insofar as they were directly related to 
illicit trafficking and manufacturing of the arms in question. These included: Report on and 
Firearms Protocol (April 1998)  and on Ammunition
515
 and explosives (June 1999)
516
. 
Before that, in December 1998, in an effort to combat destabilizing accumulations of small 
arms, EU countries also adopted a legally binding Joint Action on Small Arms. The Joint 
Action was designed to help stem the spread of small arms by supporting inventory 
reductions, regional registers, exchanges of information, enhancing national controls, 
improving education and awareness, and providing incentives to warring factions to 
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surrender and destroy their arms
517
 this is because members states were more responsible 
in SALW proliferation among most  African states.  
To begin with, in the early 1990s, UN  imposed arms embargoes against Liberia and 
Somalia and against various insurgent groups, including the Revolutionary United Front 
(Sierra Leone), National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and Hutu 
and ex-Far extremists in Central Africa. But for our particular study, we would like to look 
at Liberia. 
1.4.  Arms embargo on Liberia 
In November 1992 UN Security Council Resolution 788, adopted unanimously, established 
an arms embargo on Liberia, though the sanctions committee under the Security Council to 
monitor its implementation was not formed until UN Security Council resolution 985 in 
April 1995. This was in reaction to the continued civil conflict in the country. This 
embargo was ended in March 2001 by UN Security Council resolution 1343. However, 
resolution 1343 established a new arms embargo that entered into force in May 2001 for a 
period of 12 months as well as imposing additional sanctions upon Liberia. The arms 
embargo and sanctions were extended in May 2002 by UN Security Council resolution 
1408 for a period of 12 months and again in May 2003 by UN Security Council resolution 
1478 for a further 12 months.
518
 
Security Council Resolution 1343 prohibits all States from selling or supplying Liberia 
with arms and related material and from providing Liberia with technical training to 
manufacture, maintain, or use arms and related material. The resolution orders the 
government of Liberia to "immediately cease its support for the RUF in Sierra Leone and 
for other armed rebel groups in the region" by expelling RUF members from its territory 
and halting financial and military backing to the RUF
519
. 
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Under the resolution, Liberia would have stopped in trading rough diamonds from Sierra 
Leone that were not controlled through the ‘certificate of origin’ regime that was currently 
in place. Developed under a July 2000 Security Council resolution to curb illicit arms for 
diamonds trafficking, the regime formally certifies Sierra Leone diamonds mined in 
government-controlled areas and bars all States from importing Sierra Leone diamonds 
without official documentation.
520
 
Following the resignation of President Charles Taylor, the cessation of the long-running 
civil war, and the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), the 
arms embargo was ended in December 2003 by UN Security Council resolution 1521. 
However, resolution 1521 established a new arms embargo on Liberia. This embargo does 
not apply to transfers to UNOMIL forces and 'supplies of arms and related material and 
technical training and assistance intended solely for support of or use in an international 
training and reform program for the Liberian armed forces and police'. Other prohibitions 
on transfers to militias and other armed groups remained in force. In December 2005 the 
embargo was extended for a period of 12 months by UN Security Council resolution 
1647.
521
 
Beyond arms embargoes, the UN and some member States, notably Canada and Great 
Britain, had advocated a "name and shame" policy. According to UN Secretary by then, 
General Kofi Annan, the "public identification of international arms merchants" is the 
single most important tool in combating the arms trafficking problem. On September 24, 
1999, the UN Security Council held its first ministerial meeting on small arms; this led to a 
Security Council presidential statement urging member States to curb arms trafficking. The 
UN’s "name and shame" strategy has had no impact on weapons flows. Neither the UN nor 
any of its member states has focused on Africa’s role in arms trafficking. In particular, 
there has been no UN action against countries like Burkina Faso, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda; all are major transshipment points for arms shipments to west, central, and eastern 
Africa. The UN Register of Conventional Arms, which has been in operation since 1993, 
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has received data about weapons sales from 153 nations. However, the response by African 
states is among the lowest in the world
522
. This therefore called for reinforcement from 
African continental leaders  and States that formed up what we called OAU by then now 
AU. 
1.5  The African Union 
In African continent and its institutions for a long period of time did not put much effort to 
curb State security and human security as well. The institutions were weak hence did not 
have quick and positive impact to avert the mentioned. During the Cold War era, 
traditional State-centered security concepts were obsessed with strategic interest; on the 
other hand, African institutions and governments rejected any form of conflict intervention 
for principle reasons: the main aims of  the  Organization of African Unity (OAU) were to 
promote the Unity and solidarity of the member states and act as collective voice for the 
for the African continent.  
At the end of the era, most Sub-Saharan Africa became increasingly marginalized in 
international relations, especially in the global economy estimated at the level of 2 percent 
with exception with some of the rich countries like Nigeria and South Africa. To 
reintegrate the continent into the global economy and to draw new attention (and aid) from 
Western countries, enlightened by African leaders launched the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, and they replaced the OAU with AU in 2002. 
The African leaders argued that OAU was unable to deal with Africa’s most pressing issue 
such as internal wars and the erosion of States’ steering capacities leading in some cases to 
state failure. The new continent-wide cooperative institutions of the AU can be interpreted 
as ‘tool’ for the continent to face the “multifaceted challenges” posed by globalization523. 
In July 1999, OAU by then, issued a declaration on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation 
and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons that called for a coordinated African 
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solution to the arms trafficking problem. In collaboration with the Pretoria-based Institute 
for Security Studies, the OAU devised the Initiative on Small Arms Proliferation and 
Africa, designed to raise awareness of the small arms proliferation problem and to facilitate 
an in depth discussion of the menace it poses. Several sub-regional initiatives aimed to 
control arms trafficking but they lacked the investigative capabilities and legal authority to 
enforce strictures against arms trafficking. Among these initiatives is the Bamako 
declaration. 
1.6  The Bamako Declaration 
The Bamako Declaration is a continental initiative. It evolved out of the need for a 
common African approach at the UN Small Arm Conference of 2001. Following a 
ministerial conference in Bamako (capital city of Mali) held from 30th November to 1st 
December 2000, it was recommended that the following actions would be undertaken at 
the national level.
524
 
I. Creation of national coordination agencies for small arms; 
II.  Enhancement of the capacity of national law enforcement and security 
agencies and officials, including training and upgrading of equipment and 
resources; 
III.  Destruction of surplus and confiscated weapons; 
IV. Development and implementation of public awareness programs; and 
Conclusion of bilateral arrangement for small arms control in common 
frontier zones. 
In addition to the Bamako Declaration, the AU created on 9th July 2002, the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) of the African Union. 
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1.6.1. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
The PSC was not part of the AU Constitutive Act (adopted in Lome´, Togo in July 2001). 
Rather, it grew out of an ad hoc process to reform the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution, which had been adopted by the OAU’s Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government in June 1993. The Mechanism’s primary objective was the 
anticipation and prevention of conflicts. This focused on prevention that emerged after a 
series of intra-African debates in Kampala (1991), Dakar (1992) and Addis Ababa (early 
1993), when then the AU members took a conscious decision not to involve the 
organization in peacekeeping operations. Rather optimistically, they hoped that a focus on 
preventive diplomacy would dramatically reduce the need for subsequent peacekeeping on 
the continent. The consensus proved short-lived, however. The mass killings in Burundi 
and Rwanda (1993–4) in particular caused the AU to revisit its self-imposed ban on 
peacekeeping.
525
 
After mooting a range of alternative names, including Peace Council, African Security 
Council, and Council for Security, it was unanimously agreed at the second ‘brainstorming 
retreat’ in South Africa in March 2002 to refer to the new organ as the Peace and Security 
Council. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 
the African Union (hereafter PSC Protocol) in Durban on 9 July 2002 (AU 2002). The PSC 
Protocol came into force on 26 December 2003 (after ratification by twenty seven of the 
fifty-three AU members), and the Council officially began its work on 16 March 2004.
526
 
The Council was created as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, 
management and the resolution of conflicts, and a collective security and early warning 
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situation in 
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Africa. The protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
AU reiterates the growing concern about the impacts of illicit proliferation, circulation and 
trafficking of SALW on Africa’s peace and security as well as its economic and 
infrastructural developments. It therefore, emphasizes the need for a well resolved 
coordinated and framework of corporation to tackle this problem. However, for the PSC to 
be formally established,  required a minimum of 27 ratifications. By that period, only 15 
countries had ratified it, out of which three were West African (Ghana, Mali and Sierra 
Leone)
527
 which were part of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)- regional organization.  
1.7.  The ECOWAS. 
ECOWAS was established by the Treaty of Lagos signed in May 28, 1975. The member 
countries of ECOWAS were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Cape 
Verde. Mauritania used to be a member but decided to withdraw in 2000 to join the Arab 
Maghreb Union. One important thing to notice about the Treaty is that it did not lay the 
foundation for supranational body within the ECOWAS framework. This in future  led to 
violation of the aim by some member countries.
528
 
In the early 1990s, ECOWAS realized that the need for transforming the organization. This 
need was the result of minimal progress in economic and  other areas of cooperation, a new 
global situation after the Cold War and the growing consensus that the security crisis 
needed to be dealt with therefore economic development could succeed. The main 
objective of ECOWAS was to promote cooperation and integration in the context of an 
economic union of West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its people, to 
maintain and increase economic stability, to strengthen relations among the Member States 
and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent. If the initial 
objectives were essentially economic, the Community however took on political and 
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security issues as well. In 1990, it established a peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) to help 
deal with various conflicts in the region.
529
 
Just as in Liberia, Nigeria’s force had been making a lot of sacrifices in the name of peace 
in Sierra Leone, at a considerable financial cost and, particularly in Liberia, with little gain 
in terms of diplomatic recognition or enhanced international prestige. On 25
th
 March, 1997, 
African Liberation Day, a force in Sierra Leonean rebels from the newly formed Armed 
Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in Freetown blew down the gates of the Pademba 
Road Prison with mortars, freed their imprisoned rebel comrade Major John Paul Koroma 
mounting a successful coup d’état against Kabbah regime.  The coup was a major affront 
to the peacekeeping efforts of the international community and underlined the fragility of 
the democratic process. This same year, Tony Blair stepped up its involvement un Sierra 
Leon on behalf of the  ousted Kabbah. In June of that year, the AU met overwhelming 
approved a Nigerian military response under auspice of ECOWAS.
530
 The US supported 
the British in their desire to see the early negotiated end to the conflict. ECOWAS and the 
AU were also determined to see an end to the endless instability in the region and lent their 
support to the Anglo-American effort.
531
 This being a regional problem, it called for a 
renewal of moratorium by member states. 
In October 1998, the 16 member states of  ECOWAS, led by the President of the Republic 
of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare, declared a three-year renewable moratorium
532
 on the 
production, import and export of light weapons in the West African region. This was the 
culmination of almost  five  years of intensive efforts on the part of the government of 
Mali, the U.N, and other governments, both in the region and beyond,  to establish the 
first-ever moratorium on conventional arms. An organizational mechanism was established 
to implement and administer the moratorium, as a number of nations consider how best to 
contribute to its success hence calling for ECOWAS reform.  
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1.7.1.  ECOWAS Reform 
The status of ECOWAS integration after fifteen years was not encouraging. The main 
dilemma were largely overlapped by security concerns. The failure of success was due to  
lack of commitment of national governments to implement policies at the national level, 
their failure to agree on  financial resources and the absence of national links with the 
Secretariat. It seemed by then most member countries wanted to solve their own economic 
and security problems instead of using ECOWAS.
533
 Although ECOMOG was formed to 
tighten security as noted above, this created as well more  problem in the area of regional 
cooperation. 
1.7.2. Problem Areas  in ECOWAS Cooperation 
The implementation problem of ECOWAS was  in building regional integration. The 
member states failed to be faithful in implementing the protocols and the decisions of the 
organization.
534
 One of the main reasons being  lack of political will. We can analyze 
political will: First, on the incentives and disincentives faced by a leader (s) who is 
contemplating a possible action, and those faced by other political actors who might 
support or oppose that action. Second, on the motives, thinking and feelings of a leader (s)  
and of other political actors  to pursue those aims. This is exactly part of the concerns in 
the implementation of ECOWAS decisions  between the Anglophone and the Francophone 
countries which existed ever since independence. This tension between the two major 
blocs in West Africa  was increased by the language barrier  master-minded by former 
colonizers.  Most members states were ready to divulge their own security and their 
foreign policies
535
 due to the support from the latter.  
In addition, the Anglophone countries saw ECOWAS as a means to hinder the extensive 
French influence. But it was not homogenous wish of all West African states. Nigeria was 
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the strongest force behind the process with support from other Anglophone countries. 
Francophone West Africa did not  strongly see the need for a regional arrangement mainly 
because they had the Francophone cooperation. They also saw the possibility of Nigerian 
hegemony, which they strongly opposed. In short, the political divide between the 
Francophone and the Anglophone states, the clash of national interests and geopolitics was 
a big obstacle for the creation of ECOWAS.
536
  
In 1997 Adedeji examined the pattern of cooperation, which he asserted, had been marked 
in a most remarkable manner by the mixture of colonial experiences among West African 
countries. He observed that the language barrier created by the pattern of colonialism and 
the perpetuation of the strong vertical link between former French colonies and France as 
opposed to the weak horizontal link between them and their British counterparts, 
discouraged meaningful relations across the Anglophone/Francophone divide. This 
situation, he said, was complicated by an ideological divide in which, Ghana, an 
Anglophone was on the radical left and Ivory Coast, a Francophone on the conservative 
right. He observed that, ECOWAS objectives were to provide a Pan West African 
economic organization to replace similar bodies of limited membership and to eliminate 
the distrust among the Anglophone and francophone states. He therefore concluded that, 
for West Africa, the problem is not lack of mechanism to create an effective body out of a 
multiplicity but the real issue is that of focal point for conflict resolution and political co-
operation that requires a new approach.
537
 
The fact that only five of the sixteen ECOWAS member states: Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea 
and Gambia initially contributed the ECOMOG troops, created the Francophone’ 
perception that ECOMOG was designed to establish Anglophone, especially Nigeria’s 
dominance over sub-regional politics. Two Francophone countries, Ivory Coast and 
Burkina Faso who openly undermined ECOWAS efforts, further weakened the situation. 
This attitude was a legacy of the Anglo-Francophone rivalry in Africa, which, dates back 
to the late nineteenth century. It thus becomes obvious that the history of ECOWAS 
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member nations as off springs of historical rivalry was a commanding factor which affects 
consensus building in the sub-regional effort at managing and resolving conflicts.
538
 
Another revelation of the review was the diverse colonial experience of the member 
nations of ECOWAS, this apart from resulting in cooperation along colonial lines, such as 
the formation of Francophone Accord on Non-Aggression and Defense (ANAD) and 
predominantly Anglophone of Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (PMAD), made 
common agreement difficult among the member nations. Joses, (1999) reinforced this 
position by asserting that the inability of ECOWAS to take bold steps to work out a merger 
of PMAD and the new ECOWAS mechanism together with ANAD was likely to reawaken 
the ‘cold war’ between the Francophone and Anglophone countries to the detriment of 
future efforts towards conflict resolution in the sub-region.
539
 
Another important factor to note is, the overlapping intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) in the region. At the beginning of the 1990s, there were about thirty  IGOs in West 
Africa.
540
 They were not only overlapping but also at times they could confront each other. 
This led to poor collaboration due to different interests at the time.  
1.7.3.  Ideal birth plan of ECOWAS  Moratorium 
It is against the above backdrop that the ECOWAS Moratorium on the importation, 
exportation and manufacture of light weapons in the sub-region was agreed by the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government in October 1998, as an instrument for the 
promotion of collective and human security, including the fight against the proliferation 
and trafficking of SALW. The Moratorium then constituted a critical component of the 
wider provisions of the ECOWAS Protocol Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, 
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Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security adopted in December 1999 to 
promote peace and security in the sub-region as a whole.
541
 
This mechanism was based on the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the 
AU Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter of Human 
and Peoples' Rights. It also embodies and reaffirms commitments undertaken by the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government in the Protocol on Non-aggression signed on 
29 April 1978; the PMAD signed on 29 May 1981; and the provisions of the Declaration of 
Political Principles of ECOWAS on Freedom, Peoples' Rights and Democratization, 
adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991.
542
 
While allowing for 1egitimate national defense and security requirements and the 
requirements of international peace keeping missions, Article 50 on the Protocol 
Mechanism (in keeping with the provisions of the Moratorium) required Member States to 
put effective measures to: control import, export and manufacture of light weapons; 
register and control the movement and use of legitimate arms stock; detect and destroy all 
illicit and surplus weapons; permit exemptions to the Moratorium only in accordance with 
strict criteria. In December 1999, the Heads of State and Government approved a Code of 
Conduct with 19 Articles, setting out roles, responsibilities and concrete actions to be 
undertaken by Member States and the  ECOWAS Commission respectively.
543
 
Article 4 of the Code of Conduct assigns the primary responsibility for the implementation 
of the Moratorium in individual Member-States to National Commissions, established to 
fight against the proliferation and trafficking of SALW in the sub-region. These 
Commissions include representatives of all major key players within and outside 
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governments, and their membership status and functions are determined on the basis of 
principles agreed by Member-States.
544
 
1.7.3.1.  Background For And Making Of The Moratorium 
Although most of the West Africa conflicts have been intra-state conflicts, they cannot be 
viewed only in light of domestic issues. It is important aspects are regional ethnic groups, 
regional armed groupings, cross border trade, historical ties across borders, management of 
natural resources and weapons that became what we term as regional security complex. 
Buzan defines this regional security complex as a group of states so closely connected that 
security consideration of one regime cannot be seen isolated from the security 
consideration of the other regime.
545
 Having said the above, the Moratorium can be viewed 
in the light of the following: 
The initiative leading to the Moratorium came from President  of Mali as stated above. The 
UN acted upon the initiative and established an advisory Mission, which during 1994-1995 
visited several African countries. The conclusion was that the dissemination of SALW was 
a prerequisite for future development. In November 1996, UNDP and UNIDIR convened a 
conference in Bamako on Conflict Prevention, Disarmament and Development  in West 
Africa. Delegates from twelve West African countries participated along with ECOWAS 
delegates. The idea drew particular interest. During 1997, the respective governments of 
West African states, the AU, and also the Wassenaar Arrangement were informed and 
briefed. They all took to the idea. Two other subsequent conferences, one in 
Yamoussoukro in March 1998 and the other in Oslo in April confirmed the commitment by 
ECOWAS member states curbing the proliferation of SALW through declaring a 
Moratorium. The proposed Moratorium was debated and approved along with draft of the 
Code of Conduct in Banjul in 1998.
546
 The Moratorium was declared in Abuja on 31, 
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October, 1998 by all ECOWAS member states.
547
 It came into force the next day, on 1, 
November, for a renewable period of three years. The signing of the Code of Conduct was 
delayed but it was signed on 10, December, 1998 in Lomé.
548
 The a Moratorium laid the 
foundation for a region-wide strategy on arms proliferation in particular and disarmament 
in general.
549
 
1.7.3.2. Implementation of a Moratorium 
The implementation of the Moratorium is the responsibility of the individual member state. 
But ECOWAS has a responsibility regarding coordination, guidance, monitoring and 
raising resources. Connected to the Moratorium, there are two important documents 
relating to the process of implementation. These are The Code of Conduct and The Plan of 
Action.   
1.7.3.2.1. The Code of Conduct 
Approved at the level of ECOWAS Heads of State, the Code of Conduct contains all the 
practical actions seen as necessary for the implementation of the Moratorium as well as 
concrete measures to be taken in order to reach the objectives laid out in the 
Moratorium.
550
 It consists of 17 articles. The most important of these are: 
 • Institutional Arrangements such as National Commissions (NatComs) (4) and the         
 ECOWAS Executive Secretary (5) 
 • Administrative Mechanisms such as Information Exchange (6), Harmonization of  
   legislature (7) and Exemptions (9)  
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• Operational Aspects such as Intra- and Inter-state     
 Cooperation (11), Enhancing Border Controls (12) and Collection and Destruction  
of Surplus Weapons (13) 
 • Promotion and Expansion measures such as Public Relations and Outreach (14), 
Resource  Mobilizations (15), Dialogue with Suppliers and Producers (16) and Expansion 
of the Moratorium (17).
551
 
1.7.3.2.2. The Plan of Action  
Recognizing the limited capacity of ECOWAS to fulfill the task of implementing the 
Moratorium, the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and 
Development (PCASED) was established by UNDP in March 1999 for an initial period of 
five years as an institutional arrangement meant to assist in the implementation process. It 
was, among other things, meant to temporarily replace and assist the National 
Commissions (NatComs), which was going to be established. There had been a mistaken 
general impression that PCASED is an implementing agency. However, PCASED was 
created to lend support to the implementation. The primary responsibility for implementing 
the Moratorium rested upon the NatComs.
552
 
The establishment of NatComs has proceeded at a very slow pace. Many of them exist only 
on paper and therefore, the main responsibility for the implementation has been placed 
with PCASED even though that was not intended. The document presenting the guidelines 
for PCASED was the Plan of Action. It has nine priority areas:  
• Establishing a culture of peace;  
• Training programmes for military, security and police forces;  
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• Enhancing weapons controls at border posts; 
 • Establishment of a database and regional arms register;  
• Collection and destruction of surplus and unauthorized weapons;  
• Facilitating dialogue with producer/suppliers;  
• Review and harmonization of national legislation and administrative Procedures;  
• Mobilizing resources for PCASED objectives and activities;  
• Enlarging membership of the Moratorium.553 
1.7.3.2.3.  Analysis of the implementation  
Before we direct attention to the different motives regarding the effort to curb the 
proliferation of SALW we need to see how West African countries have been divided: they 
are categorized  into three groups by their political situation. First, we have the politically 
stable countries such as Cape Verde and Ghana. They see SALW in relation to violent 
crimes and most significantly, domestically speaking, they want to stop the proliferation as 
a part of stopping crime. The second group, is post-conflict countries, which see the 
elimination of small arms as a key to avoiding renewed political violence.
554
The third 
group consist of countries currently in conflict. They see SALW as a prolonging and 
fuelling factor in a conflict they hope to end. But they also see SALW as an important 
means to win the war.  
This is important to remember because the different the role played by SALW in West 
African societies and the different consequences of their proliferation  influenced the 
motives, the will and the actions that each and every government took. While a post-
conflict country may focus on disarmament, a politically stable country may focus on 
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policing
555
. Even though this is a problem for the whole region, there was need for new 
strategies apart from old methods and tactics, the impacts on the different countries varied 
and so also the goals and the actions taken to obtain them. One needed to supplement the 
regional focus with a national focus.  
After nearly seven years it still seemed to be clear that the States that signed the 
Moratorium  violated the outlined terms of the agreement and they took advantage of 
certain weaknesses. And these weaknesses were interesting. In the Code of Conduct they 
outlined some exemption criteria. These criteria were mainly meant for national security, 
peacekeeping operations and for hunting and sporting purposes.
556
 
Although one was supposed to request permission from the Executive Secretariat, the 
loopholes have been widely misused. Member States, without seeking approval from 
ECOWAS, still imported weapons when they feel the need to do so. In the cases where 
exemptions have been granted (which in 2001 it applied to 10 cases) it has been for 
legitimate defense and security purposes.
557
 The major problem is all about importation. 
For instance, from 1999-2001 Ghana officially imported sporting and hunting shotguns for 
over US$ 5.8 million.
558
 
Although there might be some game hunting going on in Ghana, or farmers acquiring 
shotguns for protection of their livestock and crops, it is doubtful whether all those 
shotguns have been used exclusively for “hunting and sporting purposes” or “national 
security”. Due to the price of imported guns compared to locally produced guns,  it is 
likely that not many ordinary people can afford to buy imported guns of this kind knowing 
that artisan produced guns are significantly cheaper and in many cases, easier to obtain. 
And this is not an isolated incident. In the same period, Guinea imported shotgun 
cartridges for US$ 4.7 million.
559
 These numbers are only the official import. Just looking 
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at the official statistics one can actually see that all 16 countries, which signed the 
Moratorium, had imported more weapons after the declaration was signed.
560
 We are not 
saying that  all these weapons necessarily ended up as illegal weapons flowing around 
Africa and fuelling conflicts, but there is definitely a significant chance that some of them 
did so typical in Liberia. 
As mentioned above, all West African countries have during the years of the Moratorium 
officially bought weapons. The top four suppliers to West Africa; USA, Britain, France 
and Spain,
561
 of which  all are members of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
562
 
In December 2002 the 33 member States of Wassenaar approved a document setting out 
non-binding guidelines for exporting SALW. In this document, the arrangement calls upon 
the members to subject small arms to national export controls. One of the measures that the 
member States were encouraged to take when considering a possible export, is to consider 
the importing country’s compliance record with arms control and non-proliferation 
agreements. Other considerations included whether the potential buyer can afford the 
weaponry, whether it had a legitimate need for such arms, and its record concerning human 
rights. Further, exports should have been  avoided if Wassenaar member States believed in 
a risk  that these weapons could end up in the hands of terrorists or organized crime. The 
member States should also not approved exports if the arms could prolong or aggravate an 
ongoing conflict or if they could have been diverted to another country.
563
 In reality, not all 
                                                             
560
 Cfr. Ibidem., 
561
 Cfr. Marsh, Nicholas, Presentation by Nicholas Marsh, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 
(PRIO) at the New York Small Arms Forum, April 2005. 
562
 These four countries top the list of official imports. They are not necessarily on top of a list including 
unofficial Imports. The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and 
international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of 
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. 
Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not 
contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are 
not diverted to support such capabilities. The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole 
responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement are taken in 
accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion. 
Therefore, for specifics on Export Controls in Participating States contact the National Authorities in that 
country. 
563
 Cfr. Boese, Wade, Wassenaar Members Adopt Small Arms Initiative, Arms Control Today, Arms Control 
Association, Washington, February 2003 (2005, 21 May) [online],  www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01  
(retrieved on 23.Sept. 2014). 
150 
 
the members of the Wassenaar Arrangement had taken these encouragements into account 
when exporting SALW to West Africa. 
1.7.3.2.4. A Theory and Implementation 
In the implementation documents of the Moratorium there are mainly two areas where the 
central aspects are reflected. These are:  
(1) the effort made in relation to (it might not be primarily aimed at this but can   
  potentially have an effect on) establishing a culture of peace and  
(2) the measures taken to address the existence of transnational network  in weak    
States. 
1.7.3.2.5. A Culture of Peace as a Goal of Formal Regionalism 
There are mainly four ways of stopping illegal arms trade, you can either remove the 
traders’ will to trade, you can take measures to remove their possibility to trade, you can 
stop them by taking away their ability to trade or you can take measures to remove the 
demand for arms. 
The first priority area of Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and 
Development (PCASED) addresses the traders’ will to trade and the demand for arms. That 
is establishing a culture of peace.  PCASED states that “[…] appropriate programmes must 
be put in place to counter the growing culture of violence.
564
 This was done  through 
education plan and enlightenment.
565
 But the establishment of a culture of peace is in line 
with the goal of formal regionalism, namely socio-economic development which again is 
preconditioned by regional peace and security.
566
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Other aspects of establishing a culture of peace includes for instance democratization, 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution, which would seriously reduce the demand for 
arms. These are also areas where ECOWAS was involved for instance with ECOMOG but 
also through AU and NEPAD
567
 and their plans and projects concerning democratization. 
One example is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
568
 
ECOMOG as we saw in previous chapters was founded as a more or less ad hoc force 
meant to stop the civil war in Liberia but has since then been institutionalized as the 
Peacekeeping force of ECOWAS.
569
 The APRM had basically been hampered by lack of 
commitment
570
 and a review board where at least 6 out of 7 members have past links to 
non-democratic regimes and/or corruption charges.
571
 None of these other aspects of 
establishing a culture of peace are mentioned in preamble of the Moratorium. The Plan of 
Action was  exclusively focusing on education and enlightenment as means to establishing 
a culture of peace as a revival of the transnational networks in weak states. 
1.7.3.2.6. The Existence of Transnational Networks in Weak States   
The area where the implementation of the Moratorium is most coherent with the theories is 
institution building. Even though the Moratorium was aimed at institution building it was 
important to remember that in their effort, ECOWAS had a tendency to presuppose a 
degree of transparency that did not exist. And transparency was needed if the institution 
building was going to succeed at a regional level. The lack of transparency was an issue 
that needed to be addressed because as long as there was  no enough transparency among 
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member States and in the West African region at large, the States would  remain weak with 
a low degree of institutionalization. This is not to say that transparency alone would fix the 
problem of State weakness but it was one factor that needed to be solved  alongside doubt 
among member countries of ECOWAS. 
Dokken states that “the weakness of the State facilitates the growth of informal networks, 
and these networks are by nature trans-national”.572 Consistent with this, Bach argues that 
African regionalization has proceeded mainly from interactions initiated by non-state 
actors faced with decaying states, unable or unwilling to assert their sovereignty.
573
 It is a 
common belief that Africa is moving in the direction of increased formalization and 
institutionalization, but as Chabal and Daloz, advanced their argument that, it is more 
likely that Africa is moving towards increased informalisation.
574
 The African State are 
weak. Following the argumentation of the duo, the way to emerge out of this weakness and 
into a modern State is the emancipation of the institutions from society and then the 
constitution of autonomous political institutions. This will mean and lead to the end of 
patrimonialism.
575
 There are several steps taken to build stronger institutions emancipated 
from society in West Africa. Four out of nine PCASED. Even if this has been hinted on 
above, there is need for elaboration. 
1.8 The Program of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development   
    (PCASED)- 1999 -2004 
The PCASED, a regional project of UNDP, constituted the main implementation support 
mechanism of the Moratorium. Working in close collaboration with the ECOWAS 
Commission, its main program goals included stemming the flow of SALW into the sub-
region; consolidating the gains of the Moratorium through conflict prevention and peace 
building initiatives; and, helping to create a secure environment in order to facilitate 
sustainable development within ECOWAS Member-States. A Plan of Action adopted by 
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the ECOWAS Council of Foreign Ministers with the following priorities below that guided 
the operations of PCASED: priority areas can be related to institution building and 
strengthening of the state. These include: 
 (1) training security forces;  
(2) enhancing weapons controls at border posts;  
(3) the establishment of arms registers and;  
(4) reviewing and harmonizing national legislation and administrative 
procedures.
576
 This issues are also given in Code of Conduct under the presentation of 
Institutional Arrangements and Administrative Mechanisms.
577
 
The first two of these four initiatives are directed at the illegal trade and smuggling and 
was aimed at decreasing the possibility of illegal cross-border arms trade. They were also 
directed to one of the most important groups of transnational actors in weapons trade, 
namely the illegal networks conducting large scale arms trafficking. The problem is that 
most African borders are not well demarcated , there are only a few border posts and many 
borders exist only as frontiers,
578
 not as “real” borders.579 Illegal traders have many other 
options than to pass over those few border posts. Even if security forces were better trained 
and arms controls at border posts are enhanced, it would only stop a part of the smuggling. 
It might make it a bit more difficult for the smugglers, but it will definitely not stop them. 
In reference to our arguments of PCASED,  Chabal and Daloz, continued to stress that this 
program must still be recognized as a step in the right direction towards building stronger 
institutions. The institutions can then possibly be emancipated from society and not be 
influenced by the private sphere to the same extent as they are today. Stronger institutions 
are necessary in order to fully succeed in implementing the Moratorium. The problem with 
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the institution building process is that it has continued at a very slow pace.
580
 There might 
also be a discrepancy between the stated goal and what is realistically obtainable and really 
wanted by those who are supposed to implement it. Due to very limited resources, both 
regarding finances and personnel, controlling tremendously long borders in an often 
inhospitable environment might not be a realistic goal for West African States today. 
1.8.1. The border Frontier 
 In West Africa, the problem of border frontiers caused unrest situation in all spheres 
among States and continent as well.  The various super actors:  first being British West 
Africa which was the collective name for British Colonies in West Africa during 
the colonial period, either in the general geographical sense or more specifically those 
comprised in a formal colonial administrative entity. The United Kingdom colonized 
varying parts of these territories or the whole from the late 1780s until the 1960s. From 
west to east, the colonies became the independent countries Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana 
and Nigeria.  
Another actor included French West Africa (French: Afrique occidentale française, AOF) 
which was a federation of eight French colonial territories in Africa: Mauritania, Sengal, 
French Sudan (now Mali) French Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Upper Volta (now 
Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin) and Niger. The capital of the federation was Dakar. 
The federation existed from 1895 until 1960. We should bear in mind that the colonial 
doctrine in these States remained so strong even after independence. The border Frontier 
was impossible to regain its geographical location as it was before during pre-colonial 
error. This obviously leads us to ask “what is independence or is possible to say that these 
African States are independent”? Lack of accurate answer  is what we have seen in the 
regional conflict in the above ex -colonized states. Most of the countries maintained the 
line drawn by their colonial masters using the method of “divide and rule” through both 
direct and indirect rule.  In the struggle to leave up to the promise to ex-colonial masters, 
conflicts in the border region (Mano River basin), was inevitable. We could say that The 
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European responsibility rests in fact probably more with their perception and radicalization 
of ethnic differences, which have been further aggravated after the independence by the 
politicization of ethnicity and the creation of national identities. Most patterns of conflict 
are now simultaneously polarized over ethnic boundaries and national borders. 
Much has been blamed in particular on the drawing of borders inherited from European 
powers during the colonization. Borders in Africa would be arbitrary and artificial, 
delineated by exogenous colonial powers with little knowledge of the local communities, 
dividing pre-existing and homogeneous ethnic groups and thereby stirring frustrations and 
conflicts. Primordialist (or essentialist) analysts have accordingly denounced the 
delimitation of territorial borders and the adoption of the nation-state as the root causes of 
African conflicts.
581
 This widespread perception partly relies on concrete evidence and 
common sense: some 87 percent of African borders in 1990 were inherited from colonial 
times. They were above all the product of continental and even global rivalries among 
European powers.
582
 
Colonial borders cannot logically be pictured as utterly alien to African local cultures and 
causing ethnic conflicts altogether. As Paul Nugent puts it: “conventional wisdom has it 
that they (the borders) were imposed upon unwilling Africans who (…) have either 
suffered dearly from their consequences or merrily continued with life as if they did not 
exist.
583
 
An issue not specifically mentioned in the Plan of Action, is the fact that a lot of weapons 
flow into West Africa from the sea.
584
 The majority of West African ports do not have a 
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system for registering ships coming in and therefore no way of controlling the shipment.
585
 
Also, there is no coast guard personnel to control those unloading at sea. It is not a difficult 
task along the West African coast to transport shipments close to shore, unload into smaller 
boats and then bring the goods to shore and transport it to their  final destinations without 
being questioned by any official authority. 
Progress on the last two of the four initiatives mentioned proceeded slowly. Establishing an 
arms register which was costly. Financing the project and finding an appropriate approach 
became problematic.
586
 Reviewing the legislation commenced in 2001 but it had been a 
problem to convince member States to adapt their national legislation to the proposed 
regional law.
587
 For PCASED’s credit, they had taken the issue of legislation seriously. In 
a document of 2003 were they stated that: 
Many West African states are governed by laws that were elaborated during the 
colonial era, and operate under legal regimes that no longer reflect adequately the 
security situation and socio-political environment of these countries. Furthermore, 
what may exist by way of laws and regulations, do not often take into account light 
weapons possession and use by civilians, or small arms ammunition import and 
export. Consequently, the difference between legal and illegal transfers of small arms 
and light weapons is often hard to establish in the sub-region.
588
 
The factor preventing reviewing and harmonization of legislation is first and foremost 
political Will as discussed above. There might be several motives for this lack of political 
Will. One likely reason is the overall reluctance shown by almost all African States to 
surrender any kind of sovereignty to a higher authority. Being told to review and 
implement laws on behalf of ECOWAS might have been perceived by some West African 
leaders as a “violation” of their national sovereignty although no supranational authority or 
the establishment of such is involved. One could also not overlook the fact that  lack of 
administrative and economic resources was needed for such a review that might been an 
additionally important factor that slowed the process down. 
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In addition to the four measures mentioned in the Plan of Action, the Code of Conduct 
presents the establishment of another institutional arrangement, the NatComs.
589
 They are 
made up of representatives of the relevant authorities and civil society.
590
 Including civil 
society in policy formation is an area where African states have fallen behind but it is also 
an area, which has been given quite a lot of attention lately. The number of NGOs in 
Africa was growing. One reason for this is that foreign aid was increasingly being 
channeled through NGOs instead of being given directly to governments.
591
 The problem 
regarding the NatComs was that their establishment proceeded very slowly. By 2001only 9 
of the 16 countries had established NatComs.
592
 But by January 2005 all states except 
Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire had fulfilled this task.593 One country reluctant to establish a 
NatComs is Cape Verde.  
Most of the member states  preferred to use an already existing committee of security 
matters.
594
 The reason for this may be related to the fact that they do not have any 
significant small arms proliferation compared to the rest of West Africa. As mentioned, the 
situation of the single country would influence its political Will and the steps taken even 
though it is mainly a regional project. The reluctance shown by Cape Verde in this area 
illustrates that point. However, many of the commissions established  suffered from weak 
capacity and lack of funds and political support.  
The tasks fulfilled by PCASED was supposed to be transferred to the NatComs as soon as 
these were established but instead, the member States had used PCASED as an excuse for 
not forming NatComs. And even if established they were not capable of fulfilling the tasks 
they had been supposed to fulfill due to lack of resources and political support. The latest 
development in this area was that PCASED had been taken out of action as its five year 
period came to an end in 2004 and the successor, ECOSAP, had been established as a 
                                                             
589
 Cfr. The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons, op.cit., p.50. 
590
 Cfr. The Code of Conduct for the Implementation of the Moratorium. 
591
 Cfr. Chabal, Patrick & Daloz, Jean-Pascal ,1999, p.22. 
592
 Cfr. Ogunbanwo, Sola, op.cit. 
593
 Cfr. Vines, Alex (2005). 
594
 Cfr. Ogunbanwo, Sola, op.cit. 
158 
 
result of an UNDP proposal.
595
 The hope of the UNDP was that ECOSAP would  provide 
the technical and financial support to the NatComs and strengthen the capacity for 
implementation in the ECOWAS secretariat, which PCASED had not managed.
596
 
1.8.2. Areas where the Implementation does not reflect the Central Aspects 
In the following we shall focus on four areas where the process of implementation did not 
properly reflect central aspects. These include:  
(1) the operations of transnational networks;  
(2) the handling of end-user certificates;  
(3) artisan production and;  
(4) the top-down strategies adopted by ECOWAS. 
1.8.3. The Operations of Transnational Networks 
There were several areas with a discrepancy between the insights presented the way in 
which the Moratorium was implemented. This was especially related to addressing the 
operations of the transnational networks. If the arms flow into West Africa was to be 
stopped, measures must had been taken against the transnational networks conducting the 
illegal trade. As the Small Arms Survey points out, “embargoed governments and 
insurgent movements were so numerous that they created a market for illicit weapons 
possibly rivaling the scale of legal demand”.597 West African governments were not only 
part of the demand side but also the supply side.  
Although all governments certainly would deny being involved, they did contribute to the 
supply of SALW. Greene stated about the governments in general that “it is an open secret 
that many governments are deeply implicated in much of the illicit arms trade, either by 
facilitating covert supply to proxies and allies or by turning a “blind eye” to the diversion 
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into the black market of legal arms transfers from or through their territory”.598 The 
ECOWAS Moratorium has had very limited effect on the criminal transnational arms 
networks operated and thrived in West Africa.
599
 There are different actors involved in 
these groups. At the top, there is a small group of individuals leading the transnational 
networks. These are people with extensive resources and with many contacts and 
intermediaries. They can be statesmen, businessmen and/or warlords.
600
 
In West African, leaders like Taylor, the RUF leader a, Foday Sankoh and different 
ECOMOG generals and leading officers have also been heavily accused of supplying 
weapons to whoever was willing to pay the asking price or “give- away- price”. Common 
to all of them were their resources and their high position  described in the hierarchical 
web of patron-client relationships, which gave them influence over large masses of people 
and political processes all over the region. These men cooperated with the arms brokers. 
The majority of weapons coming illegally into West Africa came through the dealings of 
Eastern European arms agents. They gained access to supply for instance surplus arms 
from the former Soviet Union, stolen weapons, arms bought from corrupt governments or 
actually also legal arms from legitimate producers.
601
 It is important to notice that arms 
brokering is in itself not an illegal act in most states. As IANSA had stated that: 
Arms brokering may be understood as activities such as negotiating, arranging or 
otherwise facilitating the transfers of weapons that are neither necessarily in the 
ownership of the broker, nor necessarily originate in the country from which the 
broker operates. Such brokering activities are a legitimate and often integral part of the 
international arms trade. However, there is a significant lack of regulation on 
brokering activities which makes it very difficult to distinguish between legitimate and 
illicit activities. Moreover, unscrupulous brokers have ruthlessly exploited the current 
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lack of controls to facilitate arms transfers to regions of instability and governments 
and rebel groups under international arms embargoes.
602 
These agents operating in the illegal market needed to be blocked. But by 2000, only six 
countries in the world had taken official measures targeted at controlling arms brokers.
603
 
The last major group is the transportation agents, some transporting goods through air, 
some over land and some through sea. These people are not necessarily people who are 
dealing exclusively in arms trade, but rather agents to those who are willing to do business 
with whoever is willing to pay for it. Transporting arms is good business for them. Some 
do it for the good profits while others do it more out of necessity as a general survival 
strategy.  
A wide range of different actors loosely organized is typical of transnational trafficking 
networks. And this makes it an enormous challenge for ECOWAS member states to try to 
unravel, control and stop them, even if they truly had wanted to. But still, it would be 
possible for ECOWAS and the West African States to launch actions aimed at limiting 
their dealings. At that period, there were no such actions mentioned in the implementation 
process of the Moratorium. The only measure taken  was  better policing and customs and 
border controls. Of course, that could help but it was not enough to have a serious impact 
on the trade conducted by these networks collaborators.  
In the implementation of documents there were no measures focusing on the traders’ 
ability to trade. It was commonly known that the natural resources of the region was 
widely used to buy arms but the only step taken to avert this, was international embargoes, 
which had obviously not succeeded. Embargoes were rather a platform to build up 
incentives for the growth of illicit trading than stopping it as we saw above with Liberia 
and its allies. 
Transnational networks were not only involved importing goods such as arms into West 
Africa but they were  much involved in exporting natural resources out of the region as 
                                                             
602
 Ibidem., 
603
 Cfr. Wood, Brian & Peleman, Johan, The Arms Fixers,  Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents, 
NISAT/PRIO/BASIC Report. Oslo (Norway), 2000. 
161 
 
well. As many other aspects of Transnationalism regarding arms trade, the issue of 
finances was completely ignored in the Moratorium. The main concern of many African 
rulers was regime security. The preservation of the regime is often the leading motive 
behind both domestic and foreign policy.
604
 
One way of approaching the problem was to look at the way in which these networks 
finance the trade and then take measures to block their finances which in many  instances 
they failed to address it.  An example  is the regime of Charles Taylor, the same person 
who willingly signed the Moratorium in October 1998, had several Payments from natural 
resources, money which he then used to buy weapons exclusively on the illicit market, 
because of an arms embargo. Often than not, he bought the weapons from contacts in 
Eastern Europe and imported them through a third country such as Libya and/or Nigeria.
605
 
Nothing was done to  freeze his account or his assets neither  at International nor Regional 
or National level. This clearly showed wider interests by many parties that were engaged in 
the deal. 
Although it might not be the case regarding only  Charles Taylor, we do not doubt that 
most West African Heads of State who signed the Moratorium  sincerely felt, and still 
feels, that stopping the arms proliferation in West Africa was a unique way towards  
achievement of peace and development at regional level and International as well, which 
they had all wanted for their respective countries. But this goal was too often sacrificed on 
the alternation of self preservation. West African politics can be contradictory, but it is in 
no way irrational in its own context.  
When two or more interests or commitments contradict each other, history has shown that 
most African leaders would choose the path in line with regime security, almost regardless 
of the consequences for the people or the country as a whole. The notion of regime security 
is actually one of the most important contributions of non-positivist realism to the study of 
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African politics.
606
 This can also clearly be linked up to several theories about the African 
state. As Chabal and Daloz have stated; ideology has been of secondary importance for 
African rulers. The logic of politics has commonly been driven by the need to acquire the 
patrimonial means of one’s political legitimacy.607 
In the case of arms purchases such as the ones committed by Charles Taylor, one could ask 
why ECOWAS did so little to control it. They must have known what was, and probably 
still was, going on, not only in Liberia but many other places in the region. In this case one 
had the Liberian state as a transnational actor not only deeply involved, but actually 
controlling and pushing a transnational network illegally importing weapons into West 
Africa. The illegal arms trading into Liberia was a typical example of Neo-patrimonialism. 
He used his position, his contacts and his government to fulfill his personal goals. State 
funds and State coffers were widely used for this purpose. This example shows the duality 
and the contradictions of the West African States and of the West African political leaders 
and how they present in theories of African State.  
The Guinean State acted in the way they did exactly as a response to their needs without 
much consideration of its commitments regarding the Moratorium. It used even the End 
User’s Certificates. This trend which was  so common in the African States  because one 
has to realized that what was happening in Africa was not the absence of politics, as some 
have argued, but it was rather politics practiced in a complex way that might seem absurd 
to the ways of explaining political actions in traditional IR theory.
608
 
1.8.4. End-User Certificates (EUCs) 
There has been one institution building measure which had not been given much attention 
in the implementation process in the control of over arms flows that the state could obtain 
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by building a stronger and more comprehensive system of end-user certificates.
609
 The 
misuse of such certificates had been flourishing. As for the previously mentioned example 
from Guinea, while the Guinean Ministry of Defense maintained that Katex was the 
government agent for the import of agricultural supplies for the army’s rice plantations, 
Human Rights Watch obtained an EUC issued by the Ministry of Defense for Katex Mine 
to obtain weapons.
610
 
EUCs, if not misused, were clearly an important issue in stopping the arms proliferation. 
They are supposed to guarantee the final destination of weapons but “in effect they were 
just weapons shopping lists on official letterhead”.611 EUCs had become merchandise that 
the issuing authority could provide for other countries under weapons embargoes such as 
Liberia, or for rebels, insurgents or warlords. It had been proven by the UN that in the 
summer of 2002, eight different EUCs, all from ECOWAS member states, were used to 
import over 210 tons of arms into Liberia.
612
 From where these certificates came from was 
not known, but they must have come directly from some state officials in several 
ECOWAS countries or they had been forged. This importation was of course in violation 
not only of the Moratorium but also the arms embargo on Liberia. And there were many 
more such examples of EUCs being misused. 
When persons within the government circle bring such certificates onto the black market, it 
is a perfect example of the corruption vividly present in the neo-patrimonial system in 
Africa. This is not to say that corruption necessarily is an inherent part of a neo-patrimonial 
state but most cases show that it is present in such states. Chabal and Daloz describe it as a 
means through which patrimonialism is practiced.
613
When corruption  became that 
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common, it also gains a sort of legitimacy in the minds of people. Then the moral threshold 
for taking part in these illegal acts,  becomes  even lower. But not all misused EUCs come 
from unfaithful servants in the state system but there was currently no reliable international 
system to check the originality of these documents.
614
 This means that the likelihood of 
false documents being in circulation, in addition to the illegitimate documents, was 
definitely inevitable. 
On the matter concerning the suppliers, there was a grey area in the process of granting 
exemptions from the Moratorium. The suppliers did not have to seek permission from 
ECOWAS in order to sell weapons to West African countries. This was an obvious flaw. 
As mentioned, ECOWAS did  issue some exemptions when arms purchases were proved to 
be legitimate but those who had been given such permission did not have to show the 
documents when purchasing the weapons.
615
 This was also a flaw which might have  lead 
to illegitimate purchases being disguised by the buyers as legitimate.  
One could only speculate to what could be the reasons for these obvious flaws might be 
because it would not demand much coordination or funds to correct them. It might though, 
be fair to say that it is quite convenient  for Western arms manufacturers to be made 
completely non-responsible if and when they supply weapons to West African states in a 
way that violates the Moratorium and the recommended considerations issued by the 
Wassenaar Arrangement. And that the system was also convenient for those transnational 
actors on the demand side who had access to political power. The weapons manufacturers 
are powerful actors both in business and in politics. There is huge profits to be made on 
weapons production and weapons sales. The interests vested in this business were 
enormous and those who stand to lose if the exports were to be cut, so they were doing 
what they could to avoid such losses. This applied as well to Local producers of arms. It 
was then clear that the producers and exporters were an important transnational actors in 
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the arms proliferation of West Africa. And with their resources they were able to influence 
state policies and by doing so, ensuring continued export to West Africa.
616
 
1.9. Local (Artisan) Production of Arms 
When working on the Moratorium, it was important to realize that not all arms in West 
Africa had been imported into the region. Production within the region and Africa at large 
was also a part of the Moratorium and local production is clearly part of the arms 
proliferation problem. Most small arms and ammunition that were used in, and recovered 
from, armed conflicts or crime on the continent originate not only from outside but also 
inside Africa. Indeed, 3 per cent of an estimated 1,200 companies producing components 
of SALW and their ammunition globally are reportedly located in Africa.
617
 The SAS also 
found that a lot of small arms and ammunition were not just locally sourced, but locally 
manufactured. It is important to acknowledge this underreported activity and to examine its 
role in the illicit trafficking of small arms and ammunition on the continent and in the 
region. 
Sowatey  estimated that about 100,000 guns were produced annually in Ghana alone
618
. 
Most of them are made by local blacksmiths or other competent people in the region trying 
to make the best possible living for themselves and their families in a harsh environment. 
Others were saying that artisan production of arms was largely insignificant due to the fact 
that the vast majority of the weapons in West Africa were imported.
619
  But still we need to 
include artisan production because the Moratorium declaration specifically stated that it 
was  a Moratorium on importation, exportation and manufacture.  
Therefore, it is important to underline  that all aspects of the Moratorium, including 
production, needed to be dealt with, not only the importation and exportation as part of the 
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problem. Although these weapons might not be a huge and important factor in most West 
African armed conflicts, they were without a doubt being used extensively in gun-related 
crimes, which significantly contributed to the general situation of insecurity inflicted upon 
ordinary people in the region. And if and when the importation of arms would decrease, 
the demand for locally produced arms would grow. 
Artisan production of guns is not a new phenomenon in West Africa. Using the Ghanaian 
case as an example, Oppong argues that an iron specialist in former times produced 
weapons such as knives and spears and later guns and bullets for chiefs among certain 
ethnic groups.
620
 Under colonial rule, local gun production was banned. In order to protect 
themselves, the colonizers did not want the colonized to be armed in any way. This ban 
was carried over into the post-colonial period. But the tradition and skills of artisan 
production did not disappear.
621
The reasons for this are both cultural and economic. Long 
traditions and the status of owing a gun, are important to a large part of the rural 
population. It is also good business for the artisan because the demand for guns was much 
higher than the demand for other iron works such as agricultural tools. Some locally 
produced guns in Ghana were also being illegally exported through transnational trade to 
neighboring countries. There had been occasions where some manufacturers had been 
invited by groups with hidden motive in Côte d’Ivoire to produce guns. Knowing then the 
present situation of uncertainty in Côte d’Ivoire, one could easily imagine what these guns 
were planned to be used for.
622
 
Artisan production in Ghana had increased over the last decade. Rising living costs and 
rising demands tempt more people into acquiring these skills and to produce as much as 
possible and also produce more sophisticated guns. These guns were at an increasing rate 
ending up in the hands of criminal networks and were then  being used more frequently in 
violent conflicts all over West Africa. But still, there was no mentioning of artisan 
production in the implementation of the Moratorium. The United Nations Regional Centre 
for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) started an initiative called Small Arms 
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Transparency and Control Regime in Africa (SATCRA).
623
 In this document, dealing with 
problems related to artisan production was mentioned. Their plan for dealing with the issue 
consisted of assisting states in conducting a survey and establishing an inventory of local 
SALW producers. It would have been natural for  ECOWAS to get involved in this and to 
integrate it into the implementation of the Moratorium.  
Sowatey continues to say that there were two mutually reinforcing options for dealing with 
artisan production of arms: the legalization of gun production as a way of marking and 
tracing; and diverting the gun making skills of the producers to the production of peaceful 
tools that the artisans already had the capacity to produce.
624
 
As in most aspects of ECOWAS cooperation, a top-down approach had been adopted. 
Regarding the Moratorium, the lowest level of production was ignored.  The 
implementation process had not directed any focus towards the processes of arms 
production from below. This lead to the next point, the top-down approach adopted by 
ECOWAS in their information strategies. 
2.1. Regionalism from Below Related to ECOWAS Top-Down Information Strategies 
Both the Plan of Action and the Code of Conduct mentioned  information  and promotion 
as areas of priority. The main rationale for this was to mobilize resources and enlarge the 
membership of the Moratorium. The fact that these motives  formed the basis for the 
information strategies, it was reflected in the way in which information had been spread. 
ECOWAS had directed their main focus outwards towards possible donors in the Western 
world, towards possible partners such as IGOs or NGOs and towards other regional or 
continental organizations in Africa. This is by all means an understandable strategy due to 
the Moratorium’s complete dependency on external aid and support. The problem with this 
strategy was that it was almost exclusively directed outwards. No major information 
campaign has been directed within the people of West Africa.  
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A report of the Experts’ Meeting and Civil Society Meeting in March 1999 stated that 
although it was then five months since the Moratorium was signed, few people other than 
specialists were aware of its existence.
625
 It had been estimated that 79 percent of all small 
arms in Sub-Saharan Africa were in the hands of civilians, while only 2 percent were in the 
hands of insurgents (the remaining 19 percent were  estimated to be in the hands of 
different state institutions such as police and military).
626
 
Apart from Ghana, there is very little information on the main producers and exporters of 
small arms in Africa. Only a few African countries have the capacity to manufacture arms 
and ammunition with South Africa topping the list, followed by Nigeria. But other states, 
like Sudan (Khartoum), Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are also producers. In 
Western Africa the production capacity is smaller and based on imported technology. 
Some factories of ammunition exist in Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Guinea and RDC. Even 
the production capabilities of these countries are limited and are based on imported 
technology, machinery and basic components. There is little information on the final use of 
the small arms imported by these states. The difficulty to get this information is due to the 
fact that most of these states never reported their transfers and production to the UN 
Register, marking always NONE. But we shall consider the first four due to the quantity 
they produce although we shall not give real statistics because they didn’t register in UN 
excluding South Africa as a special case. 
2.1.2. Sudan 
Arms production in Sudan started in 1959 in a rifle ammunition plant supplied by British 
and West German companies.
627
 The current Sudanese arms industry is concentrated in the 
Military Industry Corporation (MIC), which was established in the early 1990s.
628
 Several 
reports suggest that MIC rebuilt or refurbished its ammunition-production facility in 1996-
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97, possibly with the involvement of Bulgarian, Pakistani and Ukrainian firms.
629
 
Currently, the small arms that MIC claims to produce are copies of the Soviet-designed 
Kalashnikov assault rifle, the US-designed M-16 assault rifle, and the German-designed 
MG-3 machine gun, G-3 assault rifle and MP-5 sub-machine gun.
630
 The technology or 
components for these weapons are likely to come from China, Iran or Pakistan, which 
produce these weapons themselves and have had arms supply relations with Sudan in 
recent years.
631
 On its website, MIC advertises that it is involved in the upgrading of T-55 
tanks and in the production of Chinese-designed WZ-501 armored personnel carriers 
(APCs) and Type-85-2 tanks and several Soviet-designed artillery pieces.
632
 The T-55 
upgrade package was imported from Iran around 2006 and the artillery production is 
probably related to an import of materials and production equipment from Bulgaria in 
1995–2002.633 MIC advertises that it assembles a light aircraft with Russian and Chinese 
assistance, AK1-3 light helicopters from Ukraine and UTVA-75 light aircraft from 
Serbia.
634
 MIC also has a maintenance centre for combat and transport aircraft and 
helicopters.
635
 
2.1.3. Nigeria  
The Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) was established in 1964, when 
Nigeria obtained production equipment for Italian-designed rifles and small arms 
ammunition from West Germany. In 1983 DICON started production of rifles, pistols and 
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machine guns with technology imported from Belgium.
636
 After a period of decline, in 
2007 the Nigerian Government financed a project to revive DICON, which reportedly 
managed to restore a substantial part of its production capability.
637
 The project included 
the procurement from China of a production line for 7.62-mm ammunition.
638
  DICON 
also claims to have designed its own version of the Kalashnikov assault rifle (called the 
OBJ-006) and to have procured machinery from China to produce it.
639
 On several 
occasions in 2006–2009 DICON announced the start of production of the OBJ-006 rifle.640 
It currently claims it can produce or assemble 81-mm mortars, Belgian-designed FAL and 
Soviet-designed Kalashnikov assault rifles, Soviet-designed RPG-7 grenade launchers, 
Belgian-designed MAG light machine guns, Italian-designed M-12 sub-machine guns as 
well as hand grenades and small arms ammunition.
641
 Nigeria has porous borders on both 
its land and sea edges, allowing gun smuggling from a variety of countries. Many of these 
weapons come from war-torn countries in Africa. Many of the arms smuggling rings 
operate out of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. The smugglers use speed-boats 
to connect to the high seas, and then ferry the arms back to shore.  
2.1.4. Kenya  
The Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation started production in 1997 of small arms 
ammunition on a Belgian-supplied production. With assistance from FN Herstal of 
Belgium (1996), Kenya has domestic capacity to produce small arms and ammunition. The 
bullet factory’s capacity is 20,000-60,000 bullets per day, while local consumption is about 
two million bullets per year. Kenya refuses to open up its factories for independent 
verification of their facilities despite ratifying the UN Arms Trade Treaty. The factory 
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produces three types of bullets, namely, 9mm ammunition for the FN35 Browning pistol 
and the Sterling, Uzi or H&K MP5 submachine guns used by the armed forces; 
7.62x51mm for the FNFAL and the G3, the main rifles used by the armed forces; and 
5.56mm ammunition, used by the Kenya police. The factory does not have the capacity to 
manufacture ammunition for the AK-47.
642
  
2.1.5. Uganda  
Uganda also has small arms ammunition factories. It justifies it by the long-running war 
with rebels in the north and hostility with Sudan. Uganda refuses to open up its factories 
for independent verification of their facilities despite ratifying the UN Arms Trade Treaty 
just as Kenya. There are three weapons manufacturers in Uganda; the largest,  Luwero- 
Nakasongola Arms Factory, is owned by Chinese (government and private sector) interests 
until late 1997. The Industries refurbishes Kalashnikov-type rifles and uses South African 
equipment and cartridge cases, propellant, primer caps and bullets imported from China to 
produce ammunition.
643
 
2.1.6 Tanzania  
It has small arms ammunition factories. Mzinga Corporation reportedly had an annual 
production capacity of 7 million rounds in 2005, using Chinese production equipment 
supplied in 1972. A 2005 effort to increase production capacity with Belgian equipment 
failed because the Belgian authorities did not authorize the deal.
644
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2.1.7  Zimbabwe 
In 1985 ZANU (PF) government established the Zimbabwe Defense Industry (ZDI) which 
erected two arms production factories with a dual status of being both a private company 
and a state enterprise. In 1986 NORINCO of China was awarded the contract to build a 
small arms ammunition factory in Zimbabwe for the ZDI. By 1990, only the Explosives 
Filling Plant, the Small Arms Ammunition project were built. Zimbabwe Defense Industry 
(ZDI) started to produce ammunition for small arms, mortars and artillery in the early 
1990s using equipment imported from France and China.
645
 
Added to that a number of arms traffic networks operating from Tanzania, Burundi and DR 
Congo have been sending arms to the different rebel groups. The Somali had been under 
UN embargo since 2000, yet. the government of Djibouti had furnished arms and 
medicines to the Islamic Court Union, an opposition group. Darfur also had been for years 
under UN embargo but arms had been provided by the Chadian government.
646
 
Governments and armed groups in neighboring or further states are also significant sources 
of illicit small arms. These governments, e.g. the case of Morocco, Algeria and Libya that 
bought arms that were likely aimed at providing material support to one or more of the 
parties to the conflict, in neighboring countries by transferring illicitly large numbers of 
small arms. Since 2000, UN investigators documented weapons transfers by neighboring 
governments to armed groups in Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Sudan, all of which were under UN arms embargoes at the time of the 
transfers.
647
 
As a strategy of survival, of enlargement of membership or of building a stronger 
arrangement, the ECOWAS information strategy was  probably the right strategy but as a 
part of the implementation strategy it was  absolutely incomplete. The ECOWAS 
Moratorium had, as many other initiatives over the last decade, been portrayed as an 
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African initiative to solve an African problem. The top-down approach adopted here  was  
not unusual in the African context. As Clapham stated, “(...) the imposition of control from 
the top rather than the mobilization of support from below became the predominant 
relationship between African rulers and their subjects.
648
 ECOWAS is known for its liking 
of adopting top-down strategies. These strategies stretch from state-led projects to 
individual and informal cross-borders trade due to the nature of geopolitical settings. 
To curb up this, the New Regional Approach (NRA) was adapted. It  is a theory, which  
adopted a bottom-up profile to compliment the top-down approach usually adopted in 
traditional regionalist theory. But this insight was not reflected in the strategies adopted by 
ECOWAS concerning the implementation of the Moratorium but through third parties like 
civil societies. 
2.2. Civil Society as an Actor in West African Regionalism 
NRA focused on the diversity of actors in regionalization. Civil society
649
 is an important 
actor. There was a multiplicity of organizations dealing with small arms in West Africa. 
We will briefly mention some of the most important civil society organizations involved, 
these include: The IANSA
650
 an important organization which  cooperated with Amnesty 
International. They had also formed a sub-organization called the West Africa Action 
Network on Small Arms (WAANSA).
651
 There was also Global Witness,
652
 and Human 
Rights Watch
653
 there are two other example an NGO like Safer Africa.
654
 One civil 
society actor that had been quite actively involved in the Moratorium is NISAT,
655
 which 
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is a project under PRIO and is supported by the Norwegian government. The last NGO is 
Small Arms Survey.
656
 
 But NGOs were not the only group of civil society actors that was  involved. The Church 
was one of the most influential civil society elements in Africa. Its position in society in 
general was  very influential in trying to solve the SALW problem. We should also not 
forget the influence of women organizations in Africa. They are certainly a force to be 
recognized.  
Civil society organizations had not been participating so directly in the actual 
implementation process. But they had been consulted before the signing of the different 
documents and they had also been consulted when discussing a possible restructuring of 
the Moratorium but that was about it when it comes to civil society participation. They 
were also present in the NatComs but as mentioned above, many of those NatComs 
established were suffering from weak capacity and lack of funds and political support.  
When civil society organizations had been consulted, they gave an overall very positive 
critique. This raised two questions. Why had civil society not been more involved? And 
why had they been so positive to a project, which had almost no proven results to show so 
far? There many things that have been said about the practice and importance of civil 
society in Africa.  
First of all, a working civil society held  many functions. Among these were being a buffer 
or a broker between State and society, being representative of various interests or an agent 
of change. Chabal and Daloz have been quite critical of African civil society and  
concluded that there was no functional civil society in Africa at all.
657
 The main argument  
was that the African society was divided vertically. Therefore there were no social 
networks distinct from the State and capable of transcending communal or religious ties. 
Civil society in Africa do not hold the influence that the number of NGOs should imply but 
there are important societal forces capable of influencing society and governmental policy 
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on the continent. So, the reason for the lack of a more influential civil society participation 
in the Moratorium must again, first and foremost, be ascribed to the top-down approach, 
which ECOWAS had been known to adopt. 
Regarding  second question, the reason for their enthusiasm then when knowing the poor 
record of accomplishment might be explained by their initial enthusiasm and support and 
therefore their unwillingness to admit being proved wrong.
658
 It could also be explained by 
a sort of realistic recognition that the Moratorium was not perfect. The fact still remained 
that civil society had not taken, or had not been allowed to take, part in the process as 
important as would be natural in a NRA approach. We are not saying that  civil society was 
not concerned with the problem of SALW but it seemed that they operated outside the 
institutional arrangements envisioned in the Moratorium. They were more or less 
frequently consulted but they were not properly drawn into the actual implementation 
process. One example of an area where they could give immense contributions through for 
instance awareness campaigns was the first priority area of PCASED, establishing a 
culture of peace. This was mentioned in the Plan of Action: “Member States, the 
ECOWAS Executive Secretariat (…) will seek the active collaboration of 
intergovernmental organizations ,UNESCO, civil society organizations, and women’s 
organizations”659 but due to other concerns as mentioned above coupled with  distrust 
among member states, it could not favor the progress of this program.  But before we 
analyze the distrust, we should consider briefly other African states that has played a 
crucial role in arms production as well. 
2.2.1. Distrust among member states 
It is commonly recognized that trust among the integrating countries was a precondition 
for a regionalist project to succeed. Trust among nations inside a region is intimately 
connected to the level of regional identity, financial and political ideology. This level of 
regional coherence and regional identity is what Hettne has referred to as the pursuit of 
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regionness
660
 and lack of political identity  could not circum to different players in the 
same time hence creating conflict among  political players. In this sense, confidence 
among the West African countries would be strengthened by steps taken to build up a 
stronger regional identity.  This regional identity is severely hampered by for instance the 
divide between the Anglophone and the Francophone countries as well as ex Portuguese 
colony, not only regarding language but also culture inherited from the colonial era, 
trading, and hegemonic aspirations. Other factor like different currencies, fiscal code and 
public administrative structures and practice were of paramount interest.  Additionally, the 
relations between the countries are earmarked by long-standing territorial disputes and 
political rivalries. This caused frequent and violent changes in political leadership in the 
whole region of West Africa. 
As Khobe has stated: “Healthy competition for development among States is what every 
seriously minded person desires, but deep rooted suspicion and rivalry between the ruling 
classes of the various member  States  instead created a platform for outside interest to 
undermine the elites of their own countries”.661 It would be safe to say that West Africa is 
today far from reaching the fifth and highest level of regionness defined by Hettne to be a 
regional institutionalized polity where the region is an “acting subject with a distinct 
identity, actor capability, legitimacy, and structure of decision-making.”662 One of the 
measures that would address the distrust is transparency. The Code of Conduct advocated 
for transparency by increasing information exchange in the area of arms ordering. 
ECOWAS was then supposed to use this information given to them by the member states 
and make an arms register as a confidence building measure.
663
 
As long as the states are contradicting themselves by operating in the manner for instance 
Charles Taylor or the government of Guinea, no confidence would ever be present among 
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the West African countries. The lack of confidence was not an irrational act of political 
paranoia but rather a well founded fear of interference in domestic politics by neighboring 
States like we have seen in the cases  when the government of Guinea was supplying 
LURD with weapons because it was offering possibilities for the Guinean government to 
obtain certain domestic and/or foreign policy objectives. There was definitely a political 
interest in not solving the problem of SALW in West Africa, but there was lack of enough 
motive force. Motive force is defined as “the compelling factors of high politics character 
that bring a process of integration forward”.664 
Pushing such an extensive process as the implementation of the Moratorium required a 
stronger force than mere political interest. It required the presence of motive force. The 
member states needed to see the solution to the SALW problem as a compulsion, not as an 
interest in their modus operandi. What decided the faith of the process was how those in 
involved with the Moratorium perceived the threat of SALW proliferation.
665
 
For the Guinean government the objectives were  perceived as so important that they were 
given preference over the political commitments laid down in the Moratorium. 
Transparency in official arms import would not deal with this issue of distrust as long as 
governments were importing huge amounts of weapons through illegal transnational 
networks. Distrust was a feature of the region, which severely restricted the possibilities 
for cooperation because it made transparency and information sharing almost impossible. 
The UN Small Arms Panel had addressed this issue: 
Accumulation of weapons by means of illicit trafficking is facilitated by a lack of 
coordination and cooperation among the states involved. In the case of both the re-
circulation and supply of weapons from outside the region or sub-region, efforts to 
diminish the negative effects of such weapons are hampered by states that will not or 
cannot cooperate in such basic functions as sharing information regarding illicit 
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trafficking in weapons and coordinating the cross-border seizure and collection of 
weapons.
666
 
The fact that West African countries differ in their willingness to handle the problem of 
SALW proliferation, is a critical issue, whether the reasons for the lack of Will was 
financial, political or ideological,
667
 Bøås and Dokken argues that in order for Africa to 
achieve successful regional integration, they needed to begin with areas where they are 
mutually dependant on each other
668
 as could be the case of West African States. 
The importance of perception and different identities could be linked up to so called 
“constructivism”. A constructivist approach to the problem of motive force would 
highlight that it was the collective identity and meaning which  constituted the structure 
organizing of actions. And the structure holds no logic by itself. The logic was created by 
the states and other actors. States, as humans, held a certain number of identities.
669
 These 
identities are applied in different circumstances. And it was these identities that lead led to 
the control of their actions.
670
 
While the establishment of the Small Arms Unit (SAU) had been a step in the right 
direction, it is crucial that the ECOWAS Commission moved quickly to develop a viable 
structure, staffing arrangement and internal procedures in order to make the SAU 
operational. For example, capacity for the effective management and monitoring of 
Member States' compliance with the exemption process, (in accordance with Articles 5 and 
9 of the Code of Conduct) needs urgent attention if the ECOWAS Commission wished to 
prove it is capable of ensuring the legality of arms purchases and use. Without this, the 
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fight against illicit proliferation and trafficking would remain a daunting and deadly 
challenge to States and citizens alike.
671
 
3.1. ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP) 
 ECOSAP was being conceived under the Conflict Prevention, Peace building and Disaster 
management Strategic area of support of the Second Regional Cooperation Framework of 
UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa. Under this, the Bureau seeks to assist Africa in 
collectively addressing the challenges of peace and security within a regional framework 
under the African Union and sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS and SADC among 
others. This support was built around three key strategies: 
a) developing, and implementing, regional strategies for conflict prevention,  
b) strengthening regional peace building and post conflict recovery and,  
c) improving disaster preparedness and management in Africa. The overall    
   objectives of the  support are to: 
 i) reduce the incidence and recurrence of conflict  
ii) secure increased effectiveness in regional peace-building and recovery process 
and improving disaster preparedness and management capacities of vulnerable countries as 
well as improved regional support.
672
 
3.1.1. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Firearms,              
         Ammunition and Other Related Materials. 
The SADC Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials is a regional 
and legally binding instrument to increase control over the proliferation of small arms in 
Southern Africa. It was adopted in August 2001 and entered into force in November 2004. 
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Its main objectives were to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of 
firearms, ammunition and other related materials, to promote legal uniformity and 
minimum standards in the manufacture, control, possession, import, export and transfer of 
firearms, and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information, and experience on 
SALW issues in the Region, so as to ensure the standardized marking of firearms at the 
time of manufacture.  
However,  Progress in implementing the protocol has been disappointing. The mere fact 
that it took more than three years for two-thirds of the 14 member states organization to 
ratify it for it to enter force after adoption, is proof of the lack of Will on the part of the 
involved governments pointed out the lack of up-to-date legislation for the long term. 
3.1.2. Economic Community of Central African States (Agreements) 
Although there is no declaration, moratorium or convention governing the production, 
purchase, distribution and use of SALW for the central African sub-region, the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) agreed within the framework of a regional 
consultative seminar in May 2003, to establish an effective licensing system for 
international importation, exportation and transiting of SALW and to control the activities 
of SALW intermediaries and brokers. In September 2003, a high level training of trainers 
workshop was held in Yaoundé, Cameroon on the control of arms proliferation in Central 
Africa in line with the implementation of the 2001 UN Program of Action.
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A substantial weakness that can be found in almost all of the above efforts is the fact that 
their major focus is on illicit arms proliferation and not the arms trade itself. As long as 
laws and policies governing the arms trade per se are not reviewed, the difficulties to 
effectively tackle SALW proliferation will continue to exist. The examples of South 
Africa, Nigeria and even Sudan have shown that what later became illicit weapons often 
had a legal origin. It is therefore of utmost importance to look at better ways of controlling 
the legal trade in firearms to make sure that weapons that are traded legally are not diverted 
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into the illegal market. It is also important to target the problem of arms proliferation 
looking at its root causes by implementing measures which address both demand and 
supply side issue.
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In addition to tailored individual country needs and responses in consolidating the gains of 
PCASED, ECOSAP will constitute an instrument for the formulation and implementation 
of joint initiatives that are in the common interest of countries within a particularly cluster, 
and that have also been jointly endorsed by their respective National Commissions. On this 
regard, two  initiatives are worthy of mentioning: First, the joint decision taken by the 
National Commissions of Nigeria, Benin and Niger during the third Networking Meeting 
of National Commissions in Banjul, in June 2003, culminating in the First International 
Conference on Border Security between the three countries in Sokoto, Nigeria, in 
November 2003. Secondly, the  UNDP Preparatory Assistance project for a Small Arms 
Control Program in the Mano River Basin would be implemented as a pilot cluster 
initiative on small arms control in the sub-region. It will be integrated in the larger 
ECOSAP program once is fully operational. The experience and lesson learnt in the 
preparatory assistance stage of this initiative would form future strategies for addressing 
other Cluster initiatives in the sub-region. 
3.1.3. Linkages with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 
The NEPAD initiative highlights peace, security and good governance as conditions for 
sustainable development. The key activities leading towards these goals include building 
the capacity of African institutions for early warning of conflicts; enhancing their capacity 
to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts; and, institutionalizing commitment to the core 
values of African leadership. Among the priorities for the sub-committee on Peace and 
Security agreed upon in the second meeting of NEPAD's Heads of State and Government 
Implementation Committee (HSIC) in Abuja in March 2002, is to "Support efforts to curb 
the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons in 
Africa". Already, UNDP/RBA has signed a project document in support of the 
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AU/NEPAD common peace and security agenda that recognizes the role of the Sub-
regional Organizations such as ECOWAS in promoting peace within the common 
continental security architecture under the AU Peace and Security Council.
675
 
According to the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW; the Bamako Declaration 
on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of 
SALW
676
 and such sub-regional initiatives as the ECOWAS Moratorium, African leaders 
have committed themselves to resolutely combat the scourge of small arms, light weapons 
and land mines at the sub-regional and continental levels in a comprehensive, integrated, 
sustainable and efficient manner. 
3.1.4. Linking the development of ECOSAP to existing African and international SALW   
      control initiatives 
Efforts to control the licit and illicit flows of SALW within the ECOWAS region, through 
the development of a regional moratorium, code of conduct, National Commissions and 
PCASED, were an early inspiration and model for action in other parts of Africa. 
Subsequent initiatives such as the Nairobi Declaration and Regional Focal Point, the 
development of national plans of action in East and Southern Africa and substantial 
African and international civil society capacity building efforts have, in recent years, 
shown the way forward. 
The process that lead into the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA) 
was a landmark effort to acknowledge and address the illicit proliferation of SALW 
globally, and provided an internationally agreed framework for cooperation between states 
in a number of key areas. These key areas include support for the establishment of national 
focal points, information exchanges, legislation, regulations, law enforcement, marking 
and tracing, stockpile management and other technical and policy measures to address 
small arms proliferation. The adoption of the UNPoA was followed, in 2002, by the All 
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Africa Conference between African and OECD member states on the needs, requirements 
and partnerships necessary to fulfill the UNPoA. 
3.1.5. UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Proliferation of   
           Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. 
This UN Program of action (UNPoA) was unanimously adopted at the 2001 United 
Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects. It is not legally binding but identifies; National, Regional and Global measures 
including legislation on illegal production, possession, stockpiling and trade in small arms; 
Stockpile management and destruction of weapons confiscated or collected; Identification 
and tracking of illicit arms; International cooperation and assistance to states to strengthen 
their ability to identify and trace the illicit weapons; and Public awareness campaigns. 
Though, it had noble goals, the UNPoA was bound to be weak and not very successful first 
of all, because it was only a program of action, that is, politically but not legally binding, 
and secondly, because influential powers like the USA and other major weapons producers 
like China, India, Israel, Russia, Egypt etc approached it with a lukewarm attitude. The 
subsequent biennial meetings of July 2003 and July 2005 and particularly the UNPoA 
review conference of July 2006 in New York did not bring any ground-breaking results 
and concluded without agreement on a final document as countries continued to disagree 
on several issues like ammunition possession, prohibition of transfers to non-state actors 
and global guidelines for SALW transfers. The 2006 review conference eventually failed 
to provide a mandate for a follow-up review conference in five years and guidance on 
future implementation.
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The UN is formally committed to cooperating with ECOWAS on policy development 
relating to security and cross-border issues, as framed by the March 2003 UN Security 
Council Resolution 1467 on the Proliferation of SALW and mercenary activities: threats to 
peace and security in West Africa and the March 2004 Report of the Secretary General on 
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ways to combat sub-regional and cross-border problems in West Africa. The Secretary 
General's report is explicit in its recommendations for cooperation between the UN and 
ECOWAS and on specifies actions to advance a small arms control agenda in the sub-
region. These reports have also reinforced the need to build the capacity of the ECOWAS 
Commission and National Small Arms Commissions.
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The new AU/NEPAD peace and security agenda in its small arms trafficking component 
and the accompanying G8-NEPAD partnership agenda for action on peace and security 
development in Africa have also placed considerable emphasis on the need to build both 
strong national and regional capacity.
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Any new regional small arms initiatives should also seek to complement existing legally 
binding protocols to address transnational organized crime, as well as regional African 
initiatives and Protocols for the control of firearms and ammunition such as the SADC 
Protocol and the EARPCCO Protocol. The institutionalization of regional police chiefs 
committees and the increasing programming of the Regional Interpol Bureau will also 
increase the effectiveness and coordination of continental and international law 
enforcement efforts to address illicit trafficking. 
Other initiative about arms control include Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control 
and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. The Nairobi 
Protocol is legally binding, was adopted in April 2004 and entered into force in May 2005. 
It requires member states to outlaw the illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession and 
misuse of SALW and obliges them to address the problem of internal conflict, which 
makes the flow of light weapons into Central and East Africa attractive. In June 2005, the 
Best Practice Guidelines, a non binding document was adopted to implement it. Institution 
building to oversee the implementation of the protocol has been very positive but success 
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will depend on the sustained Political Will and commitment of all governments in the 
region.
680
 
NB. This initiative comes outside our period of research but it is as a result of constant trial 
on the improvement  regarding the control of influx of SALW within the continent and 
region. 
 Conclusion  
The adoption of a peace and security mandate by ECOWAS, (and within it the 
Moratorium), continued to pose significant challenges for the organization at all levels. 
The establishment of the new ECOWAS Department for Defense, Security and Political 
Affairs had been a timely measure towards the provision of the requisite human resources 
and operational procedures to enable the Secretariat to fulfill the then critical role, as 
prescribed not just in the Moratorium proposals but the wider Protocol Mechanisms for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.   
National interests might have been articulated and pursued with calculable degrees of 
effectiveness through other means: diplomatic, political, economic, mediation, sanctions, 
peacekeeping, and peace-building, the use of military force, pre-emptive, preventive or 
intervention, being the last resort. Thus, Liberia’s national security should not have 
continued to be at the expense of any of its regional neighbors, immediate or distant. 
Beyond the confines of the Mano River Basin, there was considerable scope for peace-
building intervention by ECOWAS, which also had a moral right and obligation for 
substantive contributions towards durable peace in Liberia, in order to secure the gains of 
its previous peacekeeping and peace-building interventions by preventing a relapse into 
conflict.  
The Liberian conflict is convincing evidence that because intra-state conflict may not 
necessarily be contained within state borders  and may be exported as an active deliberate 
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policy of regional destabilization and regional organizations that constituted key 
stakeholders in not only resolving the conflicts, but also preventing their future recurrence. 
It is therefore necessary in this context that in the next chapter, we shall focus on security 
reform, general conclusion and recommendation about our research on SALW in Liberia 
after the Cold War. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
  0.0 SECURITY REFORM IN LIBERIA. 
Seeing the genesis of problems in Liberia and West Africa at large, there has been a need 
of security reform. Clearly, the unchecked flow of SALW to areas of conflict represented a 
significant threat to world peace and security. While it cannot be said that such weapons 
are a primary cause of conflict, their worldwide availability, low cost and ease of operation 
made it relatively easy for potential belligerents of all kinds to initiate and sustain deadly 
conflict. Accordingly, policy-makers  began to highlight the need for new international 
controls in this area. In a January 1998 message to the UN Conference on Disarmament, 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, "With regard to conventional weapons, there is a 
growing awareness among member-states of the urgent need to adopt measures to reduce 
the transfer of SALW. It is now incumbent on all of us to translate this shared awareness 
into decisive action." 
Interest in the trade in light weapons has also been spurred by a growing number of 
national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), many of which played 
a key role in the international campaign and lobbying. Along with UN officials and leaders 
of interested governments, these groups led the search for new policy prescriptions 
1.1  International Efforts 
In line with the increased attention being focused by the international community on the 
dangers posed by SALW, the United Nations has been engaged in a wide variety of 
activities to both publicize the problem and initiate steps toward policy controls. The two 
major efforts undertaken so far by the United Nations were the study conducted by the 
Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in 1996 and 1997, which analyzed the 
types of weapons used in contemporary conflicts and the nature and causes of their 
excessive accumulation and the parallel study of member-states' firearm regulations 
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conducted by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the same 
two-year period.
681
 
Operationally, the United Nations sought to monitor the effectiveness of various 
international embargoes on the transfer of weaponry into areas of conflict. In 1996, a UN 
International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the implementation of the UN arms 
embargo, paying particular attention to specific allegations of embargo violations. In their 
report, members of the commission noted that "we could not fail to note the absence of an 
effective, proactive mechanism to monitor or implement the arms embargo the Security 
Council it had imposed  path-breaking efforts to collect and destroy firearms internally and 
to promote a regional moratorium on the trade in SALW.
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Other international organizations also became involved in the light weapons issue, 
particularly as it relates to issues of economic and human development. The World Bank 
devoted resources to issues of post-conflict reconstruction, particularly in regard to the 
demobilization of combatants and their reintegration into civil society. Also, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), through its task force 
on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, put greater emphasis on the need for 
"timely prevention measures" (such as limiting arms flows in areas of potential conflict) in 
order to forestall armed violence.
683
 
1.2. Regional Efforts 
In West African governments worked hand in hand with the United Nations to assess the 
regional implications of light weapons diffusion and to craft a regional moratorium on the 
import, export and manufacture of such arms. In Central Africa, the United Nations 
established a trust fund with which to remove SALW from the region. Similarly, the 
Southern Africa Development Community recommended the establishment of a regional 
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database on stolen firearms and the implementation of multilateral police operations to 
recover such weapons to avoid its misuse. 
Among European countries, there was increased pressures for controlling both legal and 
illegal shipments of weapons, particularly to countries experiencing civil strife and human 
rights abuses. In June 1997, the European Union (EU) agreed to a Programme for 
Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. In June 1998, the EU 
formally adopted a "code of conduct" on arms transfers with the goal of preventing such 
transfers to areas of conflict and internal repression. While useful steps, both measures will 
require Political Will in constraining arms transfers and dedicated resources to help 
affected countries monitor arms shipments and remove excess weaponry. 
The impact of this development has been as a result of  increased internal insecurity to 
ordinary peoples, effectively undermining their ability to engage in productive and 
economic activities as well as active politics. It is therefore on this milieu, that a major tool 
that emerged, motivated by the International Community, the African Union (AU), and the 
United Nations (UN), the implementation of comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
in the immediate post-conflict peace-building process. 
In this context, SSR attempted to facilitate the disarmament of all belligerent groups, 
strengthening policing and border control measures, while at the same time motivating for 
an adequate, economically sustainable and legitimate ‘core’ armed force. In other words, 
comprehensive SSR  engaged at the strategic level, providing a conducive political 
environment, but also offering constructive guidelines at tactical/technical and operational 
levels. 
Conducting SSR and enhancing law enforcement as part of a comprehensive post-conflict 
peace-building exercise in Liberia threw up immense challenges for the UN Mission in 
Liberia (UNOMIL). The framework for the process in Liberia had initially been launched 
in the 1990s by ECOMOG but was not fully implemented. As a result of the resumption of 
the conflict in 2002/03, a second attempt was set in motion in 2004, following the signing 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana, on 18
th
 August, 2003. These 
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included: the Government of the Republic of Liberia, the LURD, MODEL and other 
Political parties as highlighted in chapter one of this work. The main concern to address the 
issue of civil war that had engulfed Liberia and all its effects.
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The intimidating task faced by UNOMIL had revealed serious dysfunctions and deserved 
serious attention, to identify the challenges confronting a successful SSR in Liberia, and 
suggest suitable policy options. Another  factor uniquely related to the challenges of SSR 
in Liberia concerns smuggling of SALW in the Mano River basin and by extension Côte 
d’Ivoire. According to the  HRW the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte 
d’Ivoire “forced thousands of young men and boys to become mercenaries”.685 
This scenario created a challenge that went beyond the capacity of many of the small and 
weak states to confront and reflect the absence of political ethos in the youthful rebel 
movements that characterized in the region by the presence of the hired gangs,
686
 had to be 
seriously considered as part of the national dynamics of insecurity. 
Therefore we shall make evaluation on the dynamics of the implementation of the 2003 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) by the national transitional government of Liberia 
(NTGL) with the support of UNOMIL. Basing on this, we shall focus on the frame work of 
SSR and then highlight the rule of Law deficit in Liberia as a platform of post conflict 
security sector. 
There is a need also to focus on the restructuring and retraining of the Liberian National 
Police (LNP), Correctional Services, or Prisons, and other allied security institutions, such 
as Intelligence and Border Police, as well as the core force, the Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL). 
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The scrutiny will focus on the activities of the UN civilian police (CIVPOL) or the 
International Police Service (IPS), as well as mutual partners in reforming the country’s 
security services. Much attention is paid to Liberia’s security versatile that made the case 
for contextualizing Liberia’s security sector reform within the framework of a reincarnated 
Mano River Union. 
1.3. The concept of security sector reform 
Security sector reform can be defined as being “concerned with the ‘provision of security 
within the state’” although the final word, ‘reform’, denotes the provision of security in a 
preferred manner or way. Accepting the normative implication in the definition, security 
sector reform relates to “the provision of security within the state in an effective and 
efficient manner and within the framework of civilian democratic control”.687 
This rests on the notion of propagating a democratic framework in which elected civilians 
in charge of the security sector reign supreme. It also accepts contribution in the process of 
reforming the security sector by the ‘international community’ and also imbibing related 
ideas about values, standards and guidelines. These created the entry points for structures 
within the international security system and the UN, as well as regional organizations, to 
engage at local and national level in reforming national components of the security sector. 
1.4. Background to Security Sector Reform Assisted by UNOMIL in Liberia 
While the methods used by the protagonists in the Liberian conflict and their effects on 
Liberian society had horrified the world community, our task has been up to now  based on 
some of the more significant contours not only to provide clarity, but also to demonstrate 
the level of degeneration during the year between 1989-2003. But we can summarize it in 
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the following ways: In socio-political terms, the protracted conflict polarized Liberian 
society, reduced most to ferreting for survival or immigration, in economic terms, the war 
wrecked the already fragile lines of production and left the treasury bare,
688
 this led to 
economic war based on looting; criminal activities, armed violence; petty trading with 
capital clandestinely obtained from the ongoing disarmament, demobilization reintegration 
and rehabilitation (DDRR) voluntary refugee repatriation packages; food handouts in IDP 
camps; and an artificial temporal injection of peacekeeping funds, as the backbone of a 
rather temporal alternative economy. As well, Liberian society became burdened under the 
weight of the social costs of the war, which included the breakdown of social morals and 
prostitution on a scale hitherto unseen in the small country. The phenomenon of broken 
homes, single parent homes and, of course, the attendant increase in the incidence of 
HIV/AIDS became commonplace.
689
 Finally, the Liberian conflict precipitated regional 
conflicts into the rest of the Mano River Union (MRU) comprising Guinea, Sierra Leone 
(1991–1998), and Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2003). 
Many believed that even though the CPA (2003) made provision for the establishment of a 
truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) and an Independent National Commission on 
Human Rights (INCHR), the lack of substantive provisions for a criminal tribunal to deal 
with human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, coupled with the fact that the CPA 
had allowed Taylor and other key players in the conflict to escape justice, made it doubtful 
whether these crucial ideals would be achieved. 
Within the context of this chapter, however, although the regional peace initiative was 
disposed towards a blanket amnesty for perpetrators of human rights abuse,
690
  the UN 
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System has come out strongly against the regional political expediency. The UN Security 
Council, in its preamble to Resolution 1509, has: 
… deplored the violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against civilian 
populations, including widespread sexual violence against women and children(…) 
mindful of the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. 
This therefore threw down the gauntlet to the region and, indeed, to the regional lead 
nation, Nigeria, to review its decision to grant asylum to former president Taylor  an 
indicted war criminal. Although some might argue that the decision was politically 
expedient at the time, it runs the risk of robbing the victims of the conflict in the sub-region 
of their principal culprit. Of course this could not be justified because later on Taylor was 
handed over to the ICC. 
1.5.  Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Reforms in Liberia. 
what should be the real focus of reform of the rule of law in Liberia? As a minimum, it has 
to entail two critical dimensions. One of these relates to the restoration of the rule of law 
during the transitional period by promoting law and order, preventing crime and, devoid of 
corruption, ensuring due process for offenders.  However, these measures would not 
suffice, unless they were accompanied by reform of security sector organizations and 
institutions. 
The second dimension relates to human rights abuses and impunity (discussed in chapter 
Three), it being the considered view again that, whether then or later, the ends of the rule 
of law would be better served by ensuring that the transitional justice would  include 
mechanisms to bring persons suspected of gross abuse of human rights to trial. Unless this 
was done, the cycle of impunity that had become endemic in Liberia and the MRU area 
would be more difficult to penetrate.  If arms brokers, the perpetrators of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity who escaped justice in the 1990s would walk away again in the 
2000s, it would sent the wrong signal to aspiring warlords and make the next generation of 
warlords deadlier, with no restraints on the means and methods that would apply for 
attainment of their objectives. 
194 
 
Having said this, the vital importance and symbiotic linkages between the rule of law and 
security of the state were duly recognized in the CPA (2003), as well as in UN Security 
Council Resolution 1509 (2003), which established the UNOMIL. The CPA called for the 
establishment of the TRC that would provide a forum for truth-telling and national healing, 
but not for punishing those who had committed crimes against the people, outside the 
norms of the laws of armed conflict.
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Liberia’s transitional legislature codified this agreement in May 2005 (TRC Act, 2005). 
The deployment of the joint ECOWAS and UNOMIL had sustained the resultant peace 
and security in Liberia through a two-year transitional government and nationwide 
elections of a new government in late 2005 to the present. 
These national reconciliation processes, while all distinctive in some ways, often typically 
include four overlapping phases:  
(1) public truth telling;  
(2) a redefinition of the identities of the belligerents and the roles and relationships   
of important social groups and institutions; 
 (3) limited justice (i.e., justice short of full retribution for all harms); and  
(4) an explicit call to break with the past and dedicate to a new relationship and a   
new social and moral order.
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A public, officially sanctioned truth and reconciliation commission is often one of the first 
and most indispensable elements of a successful national reconciliation. Implementation of 
a TRC was practical because the alternative to a truth and reconciliation approach to 
settlement a war crimes tribunal that would put all the warlords on trial was unacceptable 
to the warring factions engaged in the peace negotiations, and the legal mechanisms 
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needed to address accountability through formal judicial proceedings were unavailable in 
Liberia after fourteen years of civil war.
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1.6. The Roles of Truth in the Reconciliation Process 
Truth telling is not synonymous with reconciliation. Rather, it opens up a public space for 
reconciliation by allowing a formerly taboo  like  cannibalism as we discussed in chapter 
three as well, subject to become amenable to the action of political bodies and future 
policies. Truth telling is “one part of a broader process . . . [to] help spark a longer-term 
process of national healing and reconciliation”.694 It plays a critical, perhaps indispensable, 
role in the process of national reconciliation and contributes directly and indirectly to the 
requirements for justice and redefinition of personal and institutional identities essential to 
complete the process of reconciliation.  
Public truth telling goes beyond merely knowing the truth. In a small, densely populated 
society like Liberia, few were untouched by the violence and many know what abuses 
occurred and who carried them out. Thus the importance of truth telling in the context of a 
truth commission is not only about uncovering the truth, but also in acknowledging it. 
Aryeh Neier wrote, “Knowledge that is officially sanctioned” becomes “part of the public 
cognitive scene that is not there when it is merely ‘the truth’.” Official acknowledgement 
of what has long been denied can psychologically begin to heal societal wounds because it 
unmasks an official lie and strips away impunity. The truth is especially potent in these 
respects when it is promulgated so as to be quantifiable to a large swath of the public.
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According to Jon Sobrino  Truth telling also facilitates the pursuit of justice. The findings 
of a truth commission provide the evidentiary foundation and a pool of possible witnesses 
for the pursuit of formal justice against those named in the report.
696
 
The TRC and Liberia have several obstacles on the path to reconciliation and the 
consolidation of peace, however. First, the TRC itself must adhere to a demanding 
schedule of hearings, data analysis, and reports. Following the Report, Liberia must stand 
up an Independent National Human Rights Commission with the responsibility of seeing 
that the TRC recommendations are scrupulously implemented. Liberia’s governing 
institutions would have to demonstrate political Will and skill in meeting their reporting 
requirements and enacting the recommendations. Some achievements are registered 
through TRC, like democratic elections, testimonies and reconciliation but other social 
services  still remained a hindrance  as we saw in the recent breakout of Ebola in 2014 
among other issues. 
It is significant therefore, that the CPA (2003) provided the mandate for the 
reestablishment of the rule of law by the LNTG, composed of members of all the warring 
factions, in conjunction with other international partners. The second provision was also 
informed by the nature of the war and foot-soldiers employed in the conflict, most of 
whom were children and needed special efforts for their urgent and effective 
rehabilitation.
697
 
We may therefore argue that: 
 The regional peace instruments providing for a TRC alone were flawed and amount 
to a miscarriage of justice that was detrimental to sustainable peace-building in 
Liberia and West Africa. As a result, the regional peace initiative needed to realign 
itself with the stated opposition of the UN System to the blanket amnesty. 
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 The desirability of a criminal court notwithstanding, the establishment of such a 
court would have to be carefully timed so that it does not compromise the 
effectiveness of the TRC or the peace process. 
  In addition, there was a need for mechanisms to build on the strengths of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), in order to make such a court process for 
Liberia more effective.  
To support the institutionalization of human rights and the rule of law in Liberia, 
Resolution 1509 mandated UNOMIL to focus assistance by helping to establish the 
necessary security conditions to the promotion of human rights monitoring activities in 
Liberia, through UNOMIL’s presence, capacity and expertise. In addition, the Resolution 
enjoined the missions to restructure the security sector, particularly the police, and to 
consolidate its legal framework, coupled with the reform of judicial and correctional 
institutions.
698
 
Among a range of measures to fulfill its mandate, UNOMIL established the Human Rights 
and Protection Unit, comprising child protection, rule of law, transitional justice, gender 
and trafficking advisors, for advocacy on human rights, as well as the institutionalization 
and operationalization of the TRC and INCHR, in pursuance of the CPA (2003). By 
focusing on a constant assessment of the implementation and application of the law, the 
rule of law advisory group has contributed to: 
 plugging legal gaps in laws relating to detention and trial; 
  improving legal procedures relating to access to justice, including the realignment 
of traditional practices contravening or impeding human rights; 
  supporting the retraining and education of law enforcement officers at the LNP 
academy, focusing strongly on human rights; 
  building the capacity of civil society organizations by involving the media and a 
legal resource base in the implementation of the law; 
  advocating, with the NTGL, INCHR and other institutions, the 
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ratification of international agreements relating to human rights.
699
 
Liberia’s constitution, statutory and customary laws, coupled with the international laws 
acceded to by the country,
700
 constituted only the software of the rule of law. The courts 
and law enforcement agencies, notably the police, criminal investigation and intelligence, 
constitute the hardware that is indispensable to the rule of law in Liberia, etc, as well as 
correctional institutions. 
1.7 The  security sector reform in Liberia 
Institutions such as the AFL, LNP, the Prisons Services, the Liberian National Coast Guard 
(LNCG) and related agencies, including intelligence services in their conduct and 
relationship with the society, reflected decades of interference by the ruling elite. 
UNOMIL  was mandated to train and  restructure the LNP and other security services  the 
National Police Force, the Immigration Force, Special Security Services (SSS), custom 
security guards and other statutory security units adopting a professional orientation that 
emphasizes democratic values and respect for human rights, among others.
701
 This 
intervention was grafted into the security sinews  of the regional organization, ECOWAS, 
as well as the international community. 
In the implementation of the restructuring of the LNP, the UNMIL-IPS, working through 
the Joint Rule of Law Implementation Committee (whose Reform and Restructuring Unit 
is co-located with LNP Headquarters), formulated major policy decisions relating to the 
reform and restructuring of the LNP. A memorandum of understanding, which provides the 
operational framework for implementing reform and restructuring measures, was signed by 
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the parties.
702
 The NTGL and UNMIL have undertaken a number of reform measures, 
including the screening, vetting, registration, training and deployment of old and new 
personnel of the LNP. The LNP academy was refurbished through bilateral US assistance. 
Similarly, improvements have been made to the standard operating procedures (SOP) to 
guide security measures around vital installations in the country.
703
 The UNMIL 
Correctional Advisory Unit, guided by the Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan 
(IMIP), handled the reform of Liberia’s Correctional Service. The unit provides for a 
revision and improvement in penal legislation, policies and procedures to international 
standards  of prison administration. At the core of the international norm for correctional 
service is its adherence to human rights as well as motivation for suitable correctional 
facilities design.
704
 
The presence of a retrained police was expected to generate confidence between the 
population and the security force. The CIVPOL/IPS, as well as civil society organizations 
and other stakeholders, from the beginning had incorporated human rights, gender and the 
protection of vulnerable groups into the training program. What appears to be deficient, 
however, is gender balancing in the LNP.
705
 
The success story, however, is different if we consider progress in the Judiciary and 
Correctional Service, despite the efforts of the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL)/IPS and 
judicial units. Preliminary evidence revealed deficits and the need for improvements in the 
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area of justice delivery. Part of the explanation lies in the lack of capacity on the part of the 
NTGL, including inadequate correctional facilities.
706
 
It appears that rather than tackling the challenge head on, UNOMIL chose the softer niche 
area of police reforms, given its lack of resources and capacity, but also given the UN 
Charter position that tends to ‘preclude’ UN peace operations from the reform of national 
armed forces and leaves that task to coalition or bilateral arrangements. With ECOMIL 
subsumed and unable to complete ECOMOG’s task, the responsibility for the reform of the 
AFL therefore devolves on bilateral technical arrangements, substantively the US, which 
had indicated its interest in undertaking the task. However, by mid-2004, the US policy 
from unofficial sources for the reform of the AFL was still ambiguous.
707
 
Among other reasons, the delay is owing to the debate in some sections of the UN System, 
particularly the UNOMIL, Jacques Paul Klein, had argued that Liberia should totally 
abolish its army and make do with a “decent police force and a well-trained border security 
force of between 600–700 men”.708 
Between October 2004 and February 2005 it has gradually become clearer that the US 
would outsource the restructuring, recruitment and retraining of the new AFL to DynCorp 
International, a private military company (PMC), on a budget of US$ 35 million, as an 
implementing partner. In contrast, the entire Liberian security sector program had received 
pledges amounting to US$ 200 million.
709
 Against the background of the United States’ 
preference for support to PMCs, the UN had submitted a further funding proposal to 
continue its efforts with the police, in a process that we have argued was imperfect. After 
receiving critical comments from the field on its policy focus, the UN sought to address 
this by seeking the assistance of the US, towards undertaking the reform of the AFL within 
                                                             
706
 Cfr. Aboagye and Bah, op. cit, p.11. Liberia’s three prisons are Belle Yalla (Lofa County) Prison for 
condemned convicts; Post Stockade (Montserrado County) for political prisoners; and the Central Prison 
Compound (Monrovia City) serving as the general prison. 
707
 Cfr. Aboagye and Bah, op. cit, p.17. The unofficial policy seemed to be to wait for the establishment of a 
more functional government in Liberia. 
 
708
 www.CorpWatch Liberia, 15 February 2005, for an outline of the plan. It is indicated that the US-based 
PMC specializes in security and aircraft maintenance and has been involved in the contract training of new 
police forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Liberia. 
709
 Cfr. www. CorpWatch Liberia, op cit. 
201 
 
the framework of the UNOMIL ‘Blue Paper’. This provided for a new “defense policy 
outline, aimed at securing the territorial integrity of the Liberian state. Sensitive to its 
geographical location, the new policy threat assessment and response included setting up a 
new coastguard to provide maritime patrols.”710  
The involvement of a PMC in the reform of Liberia’s security sector therefore aroused 
concern because functional democratic civil-military relations devolved on the principles 
of transparency and accountability to the civil authority. These were principles to which 
some PMCs and private security companies (PSCs) had not lived up, or had not 
demonstrated sufficient commitment.
711
 
1.8.  Liberia’s Security Complex and Concerns: The Way Forward For Security Sector 
Reform 
The security sector in Liberia and elsewhere in post-conflict Africa cannot slough off its 
colonial character. Whether post-conflict or otherwise, the process of security sector, 
transformation had to be part of, if not the result of, a similar drive to transform and 
modernize the state in Africa.
712
 
As a result of this dilemma, the Liberian security complex devolved on a number of issues 
and dynamics. These include: 
 social, political and economic tensions between the settler and indigenous societies, 
as well as among some of the ethnic groups; 
 national fratricide and its impact on professionalism of the security forces; 
  the dislocation and disorientation of the AFL and militia and their role in 
threatening human security in Liberia; 
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  the involvement and role of non-state actors in undermining human security in 
Liberia; 
  the proliferation of SALW; 
  the calculated exportation of the conflict into neighboring states and its fuelling 
through a network of regional warlords; 
  the endemic presence of regional mercenaries; 
  the illegal exploitation of natural resources through the force of arms and cross-
border criminal networks 
  the new paradigm of civil society involvement and engagement in influencing and 
shaping the processes and ends of peace-building, including constitutional, socio-
political, judicial and security reforms; and 
  the disconnect between the UNOMIL’s DD and RR components informed by the 
funding deficit for effective sustainable reintegration and rehabilitation. 
Security sector reform in Liberia was therefore underscored by these dynamics and issues 
that had seriously eroded the monopoly of the state over the use of coercive instruments of 
violence, which had been traditionally exercised through statutory security forces. 
Liberia’s security sector, as in many other countries afflicted by conflict, was characterized 
by state (statutory) and non-state (non-statutory) actors, who had demonstrated paradoxical 
selective security agenda and objectives, sometimes to protect civilian populations, but at 
other times, to threaten other civilian populations.
713
 
To be able to restore a modicum of the authority of the state over the use of coercive force 
in Liberia, the state should have first appreciated the broad spectrum of these statutory and 
non-statutory actors.
714
  In consideration of the complicity of the state in abusing the 
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human rights of the very people it was established to protect,
715
 the post-conflict state in 
Liberia is confronted with the challenge of regaining the trust of the people after successive 
governments compromised their side of the social contract. The reform of the security 
sector should therefore be informed by a number of requisites, including but not 
necessarily limited to the following: 
 A security policy paper that provides a clear assessment and definition of what 
constitutes the national interests of Liberia, the relevant threats to such interests, 
and the best means of addressing these threats, in order to safeguard those 
interests
716
; 
  Appropriate quantitative levels of manpower, coupled with a qualitative goal of 
achieving ethno-regional balance and professionalism; 
  A measurable program to rid the society of the illicit weapons in circulation, 
coupled with gainful programmes to absorb the disarmed, displaced and returned 
refugees; and 
  Regional and international community engagement to deepen the process of 
sustainable peace-building. 
The collapse of the state should provide Liberia and its people, as partners in peace-
building, with a new opportunity to undo the legacies of their colonial past by transforming  
reconstructing the entire national security landscape.
717
 
As espoused by the AU in its Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP), 
security in Renaissance Africa means more than the security of regimes, it means: 
… ensuring the common security of Africans involves working on the basis of a 
definition which encompasses both the traditional, state-centric, notion of the survival 
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of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression, as well as 
the non-military notion which is informed by the new international environment and 
the high incidence of intra-state conflicts. The causes of intra-state conflict necessitate 
a new emphasis on human security, based not only on political values but on social 
and economic imperatives as well. 
According to this approach: 
This newer, multidimensional notion of security thus embraces such issues as human 
right; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal 
development as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities 
of life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and 
health conditions; the right to protection against marginalization on the basis of 
gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental 
degradation. 
As a layered approach, it also means that: 
At the national level, the aim would be to safeguard the security of individuals, 
families, communities, and the state/national life, in the economic, political and social 
dimensions. This applies at the various regional levels also; and at the continental 
level, the principle would be underscored that the security of each African country is 
inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a 
whole.
718
 
Liberia does not need convincing that this is not the 19th century with its strategic 
doctrinal emphasis on the absoluteness of the military instrument of state power,
719
 but 
ought to be based on a ‘non-offensive defense (NOD)’ framework that emphasizes a 
national defense posture involving such simple, but effective confidence building 
mechanisms as exchange of defense attachés, military students and directing staff, as well 
as joint training exercises and observation.
720
 In general, the transformation ought to focus 
on efforts and mechanisms to realign those internal and external dynamics that have 
shaped its national security in the past. A similar view is expressed by Rupiya: 
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… reforming the security sector is basically part of a process designed to fit the 
bureaucracy within states, especially those structures that have/ had the role of 
exercising monopoly of violence on behalf of ‘one-party’ or such like, in line with the 
new liberal democratic dispensation and subordinated to the existing  international 
security system.
721
 
Against the background of the country’s history and the objective performance of the 
security forces, Liberia’s security forces should exist for one purpose only, to provide and 
guarantee the security of its citizens, where human security becomes a public good
722
. 
The reforms should transcend the notions of regime security to instill a culture of 
democratic civil-military relations, based on respect for human rights that is influenced by 
professional leadership. In this context, it was essential to aim at achieving a balance 
among the various ethnic groups
723
, in order to ensure a fair representation in the reformed 
armed forces. 
2.0. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
2.1. Recommendation 
From all that has been learned about the international trade in SALW in our discussion, it 
is evident that no single set of policy initiatives will suffice to deal with this problem. 
National governments especially will have to go beyond their support for cracking down 
on the illegal trade in light weapons and examine their own role in the  legal weapons 
trade. The following initiatives represent a rough menu of the sort of steps that will be 
needed to subject light weapons transfers to greater international scrutiny and to reduce the 
flow of such munitions to areas of conflict. 
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2.2. Establish International Norms  
The first, and perhaps most important, step is to adopt international norms against the 
uncontrolled and destabilizing transfer of SALW to areas of tension and conflict. Although 
deference must be made to the traditional right of sovereign states to arm themselves, it 
must be made clear that this right has natural limits and does not extend to the acquisition 
of arms for the purpose of engaging in genocide or the suppression of opposition political 
or religious movements. It must become axiomatic, moreover, that the right to acquire 
arms for self-defense entails an obligation to maintain such weapons under effective 
government control at all times and to preclude their diversion to illicit purposes. 
While it may take some time to clarify and win support for such norms, the basic 
groundwork has been provided by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. 
In its 1997 report, the panel concludes: "The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and 
transfer of SALW is closely related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts and high 
levels of crime and violence," and is, therefore, "an issue of legitimate concern for the 
international community”. With this in mind, the report calls on UN member-states to 
"exercise restraint" with respect to the transfer of such weapons and to take all necessary 
steps to prevent the diversion of government arms supplies into illegitimate hands. 
Undoubtedly, much work is needed to strengthen these norms and to promote their 
acceptance by governments. As in the worldwide campaign against SALW, the media can 
focus public attention on the dangers posed by such weapons, especially to civilians and 
children. The issue is admittedly complicated by the fact that, national governments and 
military and police forces can demonstrate a far greater legitimate need for light weapons 
for purposes of self-defense and national security. Nonetheless, the frequency with which 
such weapons are used against civilians and children points to a humanitarian aspect. 
International norms could also be developed along the lines of the Geneva Conventions, 
where states-parties would be prohibited from supplying light weapons to any government, 
group or entity that does not have the resources to treat its wounded or those of the enemy, 
or has not trained its own personnel in the laws of war. In addition, public sentiment could 
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be mobilized to support constraints on the inhumane or indiscriminate effects of light 
weapons, in the same way that blinding laser weapons have been banned by the recently 
adopted protocol to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). 
2.3. Increase International Transparency 
At present, efforts to monitor and control the diffusion of SALW are hampered by a lack of 
detailed information on the production, sale and transfer of such munitions. Few 
governments provide detailed data on imports and exports of light weapons, and the UN 
Conventional Arms Register covers major weapons only. To ensure effective international 
oversight of the legal trade in light weapons, efforts at increased transparency must be 
made at the national, regional and international level. National governments should be 
required to publish detailed annual tallies of weapons imports and exports, while regional 
arms registers covering light weapons should also be encouraged. Finally, at the 
international level, the UN arms register should be gradually extended to cover all types of 
munitions, including SALW. 
Enhanced international transparency is also necessary to curb the illicit trade in light 
weapons. In the absence of an effective transparency regime, it is relatively easy for illicit 
dealers to conceal their operations; as information on legal trade becomes more widely 
available, it will become more difficult to do this. Increased transparency will also 
facilitate joint efforts by law enforcement agencies to identify, track and apprehend black-
market dealers. 
2.4. Increase State Accountability  
In the current international milieu, control over the import and export of SALW rests with 
national governments; thus, efforts to better regulate the trade in such munitions will be 
most effective at the national level. Increased governmental accountability is needed in two 
key areas: first, the establishment of effective oversight over all military-type firearms 
found within the national territory, so as to prevent their diversion to criminal elements and 
black-market dealers; and second, strict controls over the import and export of such 
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weapons, so as to preclude their use for any purpose other than legitimate self-defense as 
sanctioned by the UN Charter. 
Efforts to accomplish the first of these objectives should be guided by the draft proposals 
of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Particularly effective 
measures would include a licensing system for manufacturers and gun owners, more 
effective identification systems to track firearms, more effective record keeping of 
firearms, and safe-storage measures. An additional measure called for, is the promotion of 
amnesty and weapons turn-in programs that encourage citizens to surrender illegal, unsafe, 
unwanted and excess weapons. 
In the same way, efforts to better control the import and export of SALW should be guided 
by the recommendations found in the report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on 
Small Arms. These include the collection and destruction of weapons once conflict has 
ended; the destruction of surplus weapons no longer needed by a country's military or 
police forces (as opposed to selling or giving them away); and the exercise of restraint in 
exporting military and police weapons from one country to another. States should also be 
encouraged to adopt a code of conduct for arms transfers such as those being considered at 
the regional (EU) and international levels. Such codes would bar the sale or transfer of 
SALW to any state that is ruled by a military dictatorship, that fails to respect the human 
rights of its citizens, that violates UN arms embargoes, or that cannot ensure the security of 
the weapons already in its possession. 
2.5 Regional and International Efforts 
While priority should be given to the development of effective controls at the national 
level, efforts should also be made to establish systems of oversight and control at the 
regional and international levels. Action at the regional level is particularly important 
because light weapons are often circulated by regional networks of illicit dealers, 
insurgents and permissive government agencies. Moreover, experience suggests that it may 
be easier to mobilize political support for control systems at the regional level than at the 
international level. At the regional level, policy initiatives could include agreements for the 
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strengthening of import and export regulations, tougher enforcement of laws against illicit 
trafficking and joint operations against black-market dealers. 
At the international level, emphasis should be placed on the adoption of measures needed 
to strengthen the implementation of weapons embargoes agreed to by the United Nations 
and associated bodies. While such embargoes may never be entirely leak-proof, evidence 
has shown that even a modest number of international observers at airfields, seaports and 
other points of entry for weapons to an area of conflict can make a difference. When 
supplemented by stricter national export controls, embargoes can make it far more difficult 
to deliver significant quantities of modern weapons to areas of conflict. 
The major arms-supplying countries should also establish a mechanism (possibly as part of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement for conventional arms control) for consultation on arms flows 
to areas of current and potential conflict, along with provisions for the imposition of a 
moratorium on weapons transfers to any state or region deemed to be at risk of ethnic 
slaughter, state failure or genocide. International inspectors should be sent to the region to 
ensure compliance with these measures and to suggest any other actions that might be 
taken to reduce the flow of arms. 
2.6 Reducing Surplus Weapons  
Addressing the problem of surplus weaponry generated by decades of Cold War 
competition was especially important because many states particularly former Eastern bloc 
countries were eager to sell arms for hard currency with few or no questions asked. 
Because export controls on surplus arms were generally less strict than those for newly 
manufactured weapons, black-market dealers found it easier to obtain and sell surplus arms 
than newly made weapons. The problem of surplus arms was acute in areas just recovering 
from armed conflict, where impoverished ex-combatants  tried to sell their weapons for 
cash rather than turn them over to UN peace-keepers or other designated authorities. 
Measures to reduce global stockpiles of surplus munitions a critical component of any 
international effort to constrain the flow of light weapons can take several forms. States 
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that can afford to do so should agree to destroy the surplus arms and ammunition in their 
possession and to take all the necessary steps to prevent the leakage of weaponry from 
government depots and warehouses. 
2.7. Role of CSO 
We shall not really ignore the participation of different bodies an CSO that has tried to 
cross- check SALW and its ammunition and other related materials as has been discussed 
above, against illicit proliferation in Liberia, at regional level and so how at International 
level through the UN and EU. Coupled to this, it tried also to address other indirectly 
related problems like state security in the country, region and in sub-regions. Problems like 
human trafficking and trans-border drug dealing, money laundering, smuggling armed 
robberies, and trans-border terrorisms, all linked to proliferation of SALW. 
In order to tackle the above at length and in a more detailed way, we would recommend the 
following: 
 The Mano River area should have a pressure group non- partisan which would well 
trained and animated to sensitize the population within about the risks of 
proliferation of SALW. This could be through initiative like  seminars, symposium, 
group participation. 
 Field research officers who can man the border professionally should also be as 
well established. This will help in joint cooperation of arms control at the border 
point. 
 Infrastructural and social services to the area as well as the regional level becomes 
a necessary step to be taken. This will serve  as an alternative to those involved in 
arms smuggling across the border for survival. Then follow up should be made in 
order to see the progress. 
 There should be also proper border demarcation in terms of control in order for 
effective management. This could as well help to control various insurrection and 
large scale armed violence across the region and in Mano River basin. The effective 
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implementation of the convention will go a long way towards enhancing physical 
safety, socioeconomic security and political stability. 
 Although we have discussed the effort made by Liberian government, there is more need  
to pursue a robust strategy that takes three broad dimensions of interventions: Governance, 
Security and Diplomacy (GSD). Some of the specific intervention mechanisms would 
include; 
2.7.1.  Governance  
The Liberian government should strengthen institutions and processes of good governance 
to enhance social provisioning for its citizens, who had increasingly frustrated poor 
governance  and general inefficiency, thereby resorting to violent crimes that increase 
demand for SALWs as means of survival in what we had termed in as demand and supply 
theory in our discussion. 
Government  should start at grass root campaigns and to partner with the locals, state and 
private sector to undertake a progressive job creation program for the youths. This could 
give another option and renewal of life. For example those who could surrender SALW 
peacefully they could be taken to rehabilitation centre, trained and then given some capital 
or getting employed.  
There is more need for interventions at the national, state and local levels to be 
strengthened to promote peaceful coexistence amongst the diverse ethnic and political 
groups in Liberia. This would help minimize the outbreak and persistence of violent 
conflicts caused by SALW proliferation. 
The government leader should partner with credible civil society organizations (CSOs) and 
the media to mount enlightenment and orientation programs on the practice of security 
situation awareness or security consciousness critical to crime prevention. This will enable 
people to appreciate the importance of monitoring developments around them and to report 
unwholesome activities (arms trafficking) to security agencies. 
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2.7.2.  Security  
The proposed establishment of a National Commission on the Control of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (NatComs) should be fast-tracked to lead this effort, involving 
collaboration with CSOs and other share holders. Implementation of effective collaborative 
mechanisms between security agencies and border communities to enhance information-
sharing on activities along the borders through different networks. 
The strengthening of border security arrangements through enhanced intra and interstate 
collaboration among security and intelligence agencies in maritime and along the coast, to 
ensure effective tracking and interdiction of SALWs traffickers. 
Robust funding and provision of equipment for security agencies, including security posts 
at the nation’s entry points: land, sea and airports. This should well established with proper 
infrastructure like armory. 
Conduct of regular and comprehensive verification exercises to ensure that government 
arms are not being stolen. This exercise could be easy if all government weapons are well 
marked and have EUCs. 
2.7.3. Diplomacy 
The  government should deepen its commitments  with other states at regional, continental 
and international levels to strengthen its call for a legally binding international instrument 
that will regulate, control and monitor illicit trade in SALWs: an international Arms Trade 
Treaty (ATT). 
It should also boost it working network within the African Union, by  creating  a continent-
wide body to regulate arms trade in Africa. The Liberian government, and governments at 
the west African sub-region must Work as a team at various levels and ensure the citizens  
have more trust and confidence in government projects and as such would be committed to 
their plight, this would create a sense of belonging and  solidarity for the governments at 
national levels and would or, probably help to repress  any acts of insurgencies, rebellion, 
213 
 
or disloyalty that  would require the use of arms for insecurity again both within and 
outside the borders. 
3.1. General Conclusion 
By considering adequate measures and identifying them with the emerging international 
and regional anti-proliferation of small arms and light weapons regimes, the Liberian 
government must set standard for building an effective security community in the country 
that would be devoid of corruption, violence, disloyalty to the National government and 
general insecurity. The is need for more increased attention to the lethal effects of easily 
available SALW on the part of humanitarian relief agencies, national governments, 
international organizations and the media is translating into a greater public appreciation of 
the need to better control the production, supply and diffusion of these weapons. 
The government should, however, act with prudence to do its utmost to roll back the 
danger of illicit small arms flow that gives vent to the threats of armed rebellion or the so 
called militia, subversive activities and violent crimes in the polity through promotion of 
good governance, elevating culture for peace and of law and order, social justice, poverty 
reduction, equal opportunities for all citizens and creating a sustainable environment for 
those even Diaspora and for future citizens in the making. Admittedly, the problem is 
incredibly complex and policies to control and regulate these weapons will not come 
easily. Nonetheless, the scale of death and injury caused by light weapons is such that the 
international community must continue to search for effective means of controlling and 
reducing the lethal commerce of SALW around the world. 
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